Detect Data Manipulation in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, threatening the integrity of the data. This technique encompasses three sub-techniques: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001), where adversaries directly alter files, databases, configuration data, or audit logs at rest; Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002), where data is modified during transit via network interception or proxy manipulation; and Runtime Data Manipulation (T1565.003), where in-memory data structures or process state are altered during execution. Real-world examples include FIN13 (Elephant Beetle) injecting fraudulent financial transactions into compromised payment networks to incrementally siphon funds while mimicking legitimate processing behavior. Successful data manipulation campaigns often require prolonged access, domain-specific knowledge of the target system, and specialized tooling. The impact ranges from corrupted financial records and falsified audit trails to undermined operational decision-making and destroyed forensic evidence.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
QRadar Detection Query
// Branch 1: Audit Log Cleared
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
username AS AccountName,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
QIDNAME(qid) AS EventName,
'AuditLogCleared' AS AlertType,
'Critical' AS AlertSeverity,
'Windows Security/System Event Log' AS TargetFile
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) IN (12, 13)
AND (eventid = 1102 OR eventid = 104)
AND DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd') = DATEFORMAT(NOW(), 'yyyy-MM-dd')
UNION ALL
// Branch 2: Database File Tampering by Scripting Engine
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
username AS AccountName,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
'DatabaseFileTampering' AS EventName,
'DatabaseFileTampering' AS AlertType,
'High' AS AlertSeverity,
CONCAT('File modified: ', UTF8(payload)) AS TargetFile
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 12
AND eventid = 11
AND (
LOWER(UTF8(payload)) MATCHES '.*\.(mdf|ldf|db|sqlite|accdb|mdb|sql|bak|dbf|frm).*'
)
AND (
LOWER(UTF8(payload)) MATCHES '.*(powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|python[23]?\.exe|perl\.exe|php\.exe|node\.exe|ruby\.exe|bash|sh).*'
)
AND DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd') = DATEFORMAT(NOW(), 'yyyy-MM-dd')
UNION ALL
// Branch 3: Critical Path Tampering
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
username AS AccountName,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
'CriticalPathTampering' AS EventName,
'CriticalPathTampering' AS AlertType,
'High' AS AlertSeverity,
UTF8(payload) AS TargetFile
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 12
AND eventid = 11
AND (
LOWER(UTF8(payload)) MATCHES '.*(\\windows\\system32\\winevt\\logs|\\inetpub\\logs|\\program files\\microsoft sql server|\\windows\\system32\\config).*'
)
AND NOT (
LOWER(UTF8(payload)) MATCHES '.*(svchost\.exe|wininit\.exe|lsass\.exe|services\.exe|sqlservr\.exe|sqlagent\.exe|msmpeng\.exe|csrss\.exe|trustedinstaller\.exe|tiworker\.exe).*'
)
AND DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd') = DATEFORMAT(NOW(), 'yyyy-MM-dd')
ORDER BY EventTime DESCQRadar AQL detection for T1565 Data Manipulation covering three branches: audit log clearing via Windows Security/System event IDs 1102 and 104, database file tampering by scripting engines detected through Sysmon Event ID 11, and critical system path file modifications by non-whitelisted processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate database backup software (SQL Server Agent, third-party backup tools) that uses scripting wrappers to initiate backup operations modifying .bak or .mdf files
- System administrators using PowerShell scripts to perform authorized log maintenance, archiving, or clearing in compliance with retention policies
- Software update mechanisms for SQL Server or IIS that modify files within critical path directories during patch application
- Security tools performing authorized file integrity monitoring that write checksums or metadata to monitored directories
Other platforms for T1565
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Clear Windows Security Event Log
Expected signal: Security Event ID 1102 logged in the Security log immediately before clearing, capturing SubjectUserName and SubjectDomainName of the clearing account. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) showing wevtutil.exe execution with CommandLine 'cl Security'. Note: the Security log itself will be empty after execution — collect artifacts from SIEM/forwarded logs.
- Test 2Inject Fraudulent Record into SQLite Database via Python
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing sqlite3 and INSERT. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate event for test_ledger.db in %TEMP% with python.exe as the initiating process. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName=test_ledger.db, InitiatingProcessFileName=python.exe.
- Test 3Bulk File Content Modification Simulating Data Falsification
Expected signal: Multiple Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) events in rapid succession with powershell.exe as the initiating process, spanning 4 different subdirectories. DeviceFileEvents will show 100+ FileModified/FileCreated events from powershell.exe across 4+ distinct FolderPath values within a 5-minute window.
- Test 4Tamper with IIS/Web Application Log File via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate with TargetFilename matching u_ex260318.log, Image=powershell.exe. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName containing IIS log naming convention, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe. The file path does not match the real IIS log directory but demonstrates the process-level signal.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003/
- https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1565/T1565.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/CISA_Techniques_for_Detecting_Data_Tampering.pdf
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-elephant-beetle-targeted-financial-frauds
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