Detect Data Manipulation in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, threatening the integrity of the data. This technique encompasses three sub-techniques: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001), where adversaries directly alter files, databases, configuration data, or audit logs at rest; Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002), where data is modified during transit via network interception or proxy manipulation; and Runtime Data Manipulation (T1565.003), where in-memory data structures or process state are altered during execution. Real-world examples include FIN13 (Elephant Beetle) injecting fraudulent financial transactions into compromised payment networks to incrementally siphon funds while mimicking legitimate processing behavior. Successful data manipulation campaigns often require prolonged access, domain-specific knowledge of the target system, and specialized tooling. The impact ranges from corrupted financial records and falsified audit trails to undermined operational decision-making and destroyed forensic evidence.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1565_data_manipulation {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects T1565 Data Manipulation: audit log clearing, database file tampering by scripting engines, and critical system path modification by unexpected processes"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1565"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Impact"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
events:
(
// Branch 1: Audit log cleared via Windows event
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "STATUS_UPDATE"
$e1.metadata.product_event_type = "1102"
$e1.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
)
or
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "STATUS_UPDATE"
$e1.metadata.product_event_type = "104"
$e1.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog"
)
)
or
(
// Branch 2: Database file tampered by scripting engine (Sysmon Event 11)
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
$e1.target.file.full_path = /\.(mdf|ldf|db|sqlite|accdb|mdb|sql|bak|dbf|frm)$/i
$e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /(powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|python[23]?\.exe|perl\.exe|php\.exe|node\.exe|ruby\.exe|bash|sh)$/i
)
or
(
// Branch 3: Critical path tampering by non-whitelisted process
$e1.metadata.event_type = "FILE_MODIFICATION"
$e1.target.file.full_path = /(\\windows\\system32\\winevt\\logs|\\inetpub\\logs|\\program files\\microsoft sql server|\\windows\\system32\\config)/i
not $e1.principal.process.file.full_path = /(svchost\.exe|wininit\.exe|lsass\.exe|services\.exe|csrss\.exe|MsMpEng\.exe|sqlservr\.exe|sqlagent\.exe|taskhostw\.exe|TrustedInstaller\.exe|TiWorker\.exe)$/i
)
condition:
$e1
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1565 Data Manipulation across three detection branches: Windows audit log clearing via product event types 1102 and 104, database file creation or modification initiated by scripting engines, and critical system path file modification by non-whitelisted processes using UDM event model fields.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate DBA tooling or ORMs that use embedded scripting engines to interact with database files during normal application operation
- Authorized Windows log management or SIEM collection agents that clear forwarded logs after successful transmission
- Windows Update or Trusted Installer operations that may briefly show non-whitelisted process names during multi-stage patching sequences
- Security orchestration tools that write reports or evidence to critical system paths during incident response workflows
Other platforms for T1565
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Clear Windows Security Event Log
Expected signal: Security Event ID 1102 logged in the Security log immediately before clearing, capturing SubjectUserName and SubjectDomainName of the clearing account. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) showing wevtutil.exe execution with CommandLine 'cl Security'. Note: the Security log itself will be empty after execution — collect artifacts from SIEM/forwarded logs.
- Test 2Inject Fraudulent Record into SQLite Database via Python
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing sqlite3 and INSERT. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate event for test_ledger.db in %TEMP% with python.exe as the initiating process. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName=test_ledger.db, InitiatingProcessFileName=python.exe.
- Test 3Bulk File Content Modification Simulating Data Falsification
Expected signal: Multiple Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) events in rapid succession with powershell.exe as the initiating process, spanning 4 different subdirectories. DeviceFileEvents will show 100+ FileModified/FileCreated events from powershell.exe across 4+ distinct FolderPath values within a 5-minute window.
- Test 4Tamper with IIS/Web Application Log File via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate with TargetFilename matching u_ex260318.log, Image=powershell.exe. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName containing IIS log naming convention, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe. The file path does not match the real IIS log directory but demonstrates the process-level signal.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003/
- https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1565/T1565.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/CISA_Techniques_for_Detecting_Data_Tampering.pdf
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-elephant-beetle-targeted-financial-frauds
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