Detect Data Manipulation in Elastic Security
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, threatening the integrity of the data. This technique encompasses three sub-techniques: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001), where adversaries directly alter files, databases, configuration data, or audit logs at rest; Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002), where data is modified during transit via network interception or proxy manipulation; and Runtime Data Manipulation (T1565.003), where in-memory data structures or process state are altered during execution. Real-world examples include FIN13 (Elephant Beetle) injecting fraudulent financial transactions into compromised payment networks to incrementally siphon funds while mimicking legitimate processing behavior. Successful data manipulation campaigns often require prolonged access, domain-specific knowledge of the target system, and specialized tooling. The impact ranges from corrupted financial records and falsified audit trails to undermined operational decision-making and destroyed forensic evidence.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Impact
- Technique
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
Elastic Detection Query
// Branch 1: Audit log cleared (Sysmon EventID 1102 / System 104 equivalent via Windows Security)
sequence by host.name
[
any where event.code in ("1102", "104") and
event.provider in ("Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog", "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing")
]
// Branch 2: Database file tampered by scripting engine
file where event.type in ("creation", "change") and
file.extension in ("mdf", "ldf", "db", "sqlite", "accdb", "mdb", "sql", "bak", "dbf", "frm") and
process.name in~ (
"powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
"mshta.exe", "python.exe", "python3.exe", "perl.exe",
"php.exe", "node.exe", "ruby.exe", "bash", "sh"
)
// Branch 3: Critical path tampering by non-whitelisted process
file where event.type in ("change", "deletion") and
(
file.path like~ "*\\windows\\system32\\winevt\\logs*" or
file.path like~ "*\\inetpub\\logs*" or
file.path like~ "*\\program files\\microsoft sql server*" or
file.path like~ "*\\windows\\system32\\config*"
) and
process.name not in~ (
"svchost.exe", "wininit.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe",
"csrss.exe", "MsMpEng.exe", "sqlservr.exe", "sqlagent.exe",
"taskhostw.exe", "TrustedInstaller.exe", "TiWorker.exe"
)Detects T1565 Data Manipulation via four patterns: audit log clearing (Event IDs 1102/104), database file modification by scripting engines, bulk file modification bursts, and tampering with critical system paths by unexpected processes. Uses Elastic ECS file and process event types.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Database administrators performing legitimate maintenance, backups, or schema migrations using scripting tools like PowerShell or Python DBAs scripts
- Software deployment tools (SCCM, Ansible, Chef) performing bulk file modifications across multiple directories during patch cycles
- Antivirus or EDR solutions scanning and updating critical path files during definition updates, triggering critical path modification alerts
- Log rotation utilities that legitimately clear or archive Windows event logs on a scheduled basis
- Development and CI/CD pipelines that modify database files or large numbers of files during build or test phases
Other platforms for T1565
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Clear Windows Security Event Log
Expected signal: Security Event ID 1102 logged in the Security log immediately before clearing, capturing SubjectUserName and SubjectDomainName of the clearing account. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) showing wevtutil.exe execution with CommandLine 'cl Security'. Note: the Security log itself will be empty after execution — collect artifacts from SIEM/forwarded logs.
- Test 2Inject Fraudulent Record into SQLite Database via Python
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing sqlite3 and INSERT. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate event for test_ledger.db in %TEMP% with python.exe as the initiating process. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName=test_ledger.db, InitiatingProcessFileName=python.exe.
- Test 3Bulk File Content Modification Simulating Data Falsification
Expected signal: Multiple Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) events in rapid succession with powershell.exe as the initiating process, spanning 4 different subdirectories. DeviceFileEvents will show 100+ FileModified/FileCreated events from powershell.exe across 4+ distinct FolderPath values within a 5-minute window.
- Test 4Tamper with IIS/Web Application Log File via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate with TargetFilename matching u_ex260318.log, Image=powershell.exe. DeviceFileEvents: ActionType=FileCreated or FileModified, FileName containing IIS log naming convention, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe. The file path does not match the real IIS log directory but demonstrates the process-level signal.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/003/
- https://f.hubspotusercontent30.net/hubfs/8776530/Sygnia-%20Elephant%20Beetle_Jan2022.pdf
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicefileevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-1102
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1565/T1565.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/CISA_Techniques_for_Detecting_Data_Tampering.pdf
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin13-elephant-beetle-targeted-financial-frauds
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1565 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.