Detect Spoof Security Alerting in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders' awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Rather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled. An adversary can also present a 'healthy' system status even after infection. For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a 'healthy' system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled. This technique was observed in Black Basta ransomware campaigns using custom EDR evasion tools tied to FIN7.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1562 Impair Defenses
- Sub-technique
- T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon OR _sourceCategory=windows/security
| parse "EventCode=*" as event_code nodrop
| parse "Image=*" as process_image nodrop
| parse "CommandLine=*" as command_line nodrop
| parse "ParentImage=*" as parent_image nodrop
| parse "User=*" as user nodrop
| parse "Computer=*" as host nodrop
| where event_code = "1"
| eval process_name = replace(process_image, /.*\\/, "")
| eval is_fake_path = if(
(process_name matches /(?i)SecurityHealthSystray\.exe|SecurityHealthHost\.exe|MSASCuiL\.exe|NisSrv\.exe/)
AND NOT (process_image matches /(?i)C:\\Windows\\System32|C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender|C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender/),
1, 0)
| eval is_spoofed_ui = if(
(command_line matches /(?i)SecurityHealth|Windows Defender|WindowsSecurity/)
AND NOT (process_name matches /(?i)SecurityHealthSystray\.exe|SecurityHealthHost\.exe|MSASCuiL\.exe|NisSrv\.exe|MsMpEng\.exe|svchost\.exe|services\.exe/),
1, 0)
| eval is_defender_disabled = if(
command_line matches /(?i)sc stop WinDefend|sc stop SecurityHealthService|sc stop wscsvc|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|sc config WinDefend start= disabled/,
1, 0)
| where is_fake_path = 1 OR is_spoofed_ui = 1 OR is_defender_disabled = 1
| eval detection_type = if(is_fake_path = 1, "FakeSecurityProcess_WrongPath",
if(is_spoofed_ui = 1, "SpoofedSecurityUI",
if(is_defender_disabled = 1, "DefenderServiceDisabled", "Unknown")))
| table _messageTime, host, user, process_image, command_line, parent_image, detection_type
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic CSE detection for T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting. Parses Sysmon EventCode 1 process-creation events to identify: Windows Security tray processes executing from illegitimate file paths (indicating spoofed security GUIs used by Black Basta/FIN7), non-defender processes with Defender-related command-line keywords (SpoofedSecurityUI), and explicit sc.exe or PowerShell commands disabling WinDefend and related protective services.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Backup and recovery software that bundles Defender-named helper executables that run from non-standard installation directories
- IT automation scripts that temporarily stop Defender services before running enterprise software deployments
- Security research sandboxes that deliberately replicate defender process names for behavioral analysis purposes
Other platforms for T1562.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Fake SecurityHealthSystray from TEMP Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image pointing to %TEMP%\SecurityHealthSystray.exe instead of C:\Windows\System32\. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the copied binary. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE shows FolderPath as the TEMP directory.
- Test 2Disable Windows Defender Real-Time Monitoring
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104. Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational Event ID 5001 (Real-Time Protection disabled). If Tamper Protection is on, Event ID 1125 (tamper attempt blocked).
- Test 3Stop Windows Defender Service via sc.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine 'sc stop WinDefend'. System Event ID 7036: WinDefend service entered stopped state. If Tamper Protection is on, the command will fail with Access Denied.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting/
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