Detect Spoof Security Alerting in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders' awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Rather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled. An adversary can also present a 'healthy' system status even after infection. For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a 'healthy' system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled. This technique was observed in Black Basta ransomware campaigns using custom EDR evasion tools tied to FIN7.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1562 Impair Defenses
- Sub-technique
- T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
LogScale Detection Query
// T1562.011 — Spoof Security Alerting: Fake Defender GUIs and Service Disablement
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName = /(?i)(SecurityHealthSystray\.exe|SecurityHealthHost\.exe|MSASCuiL\.exe|NisSrv\.exe|MsMpEng\.exe)/
OR CommandLine = /(?i)(SecurityHealth|Windows Defender|WindowsSecurity|sc stop WinDefend|sc stop SecurityHealthService|sc stop wscsvc|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|sc config WinDefend start= disabled)/
| eval DetectionType = case(
FileName = /(?i)(SecurityHealthSystray\.exe|SecurityHealthHost\.exe|MSASCuiL\.exe|NisSrv\.exe)/
AND ImageFileName != /(?i)(C:\\Windows\\System32|C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender|C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender)/,
"FakeSecurityProcess_WrongPath",
CommandLine = /(?i)(SecurityHealth|Windows Defender|WindowsSecurity)/
AND FileName != /(?i)(SecurityHealthSystray\.exe|SecurityHealthHost\.exe|MSASCuiL\.exe|NisSrv\.exe|MsMpEng\.exe|svchost\.exe|services\.exe)/,
"SpoofedSecurityUI",
CommandLine = /(?i)(sc stop WinDefend|sc stop SecurityHealthService|sc stop wscsvc|DisableRealtimeMonitoring|sc config WinDefend start= disabled)/,
"DefenderServiceDisabled",
true, null)
| where DetectionType != null
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, FileName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, DetectionType], function=count(as=EventCount))
| sort(EventCount, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale CQL detection for T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting using Falcon ProcessRollup2 events. Groups and counts events by host, user, process path, command line, and detection type to surface: spoofed Windows Defender/Security Health executables running outside legitimate Defender directories (as seen in Black Basta/FIN7 EDR evasion toolkits), non-defender processes with security-themed command lines, and sc.exe/PowerShell commands explicitly disabling WinDefend and Security Center services.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) detection tools that enumerate Defender process names from arbitrary working directories during threat hunting exercises
- Software packaging systems that temporarily extract and stage Defender-named helper binaries to temp paths before installation validation
- Corporate SOC scripts using sc.exe to audit Defender service state across endpoints during incident triage — flagged due to keyword overlap with attacker commands
Other platforms for T1562.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Fake SecurityHealthSystray from TEMP Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image pointing to %TEMP%\SecurityHealthSystray.exe instead of C:\Windows\System32\. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the copied binary. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE shows FolderPath as the TEMP directory.
- Test 2Disable Windows Defender Real-Time Monitoring
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104. Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational Event ID 5001 (Real-Time Protection disabled). If Tamper Protection is on, Event ID 1125 (tamper attempt blocked).
- Test 3Stop Windows Defender Service via sc.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine 'sc stop WinDefend'. System Event ID 7036: WinDefend service entered stopped state. If Tamper Protection is on, the command will fail with Access Denied.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting/
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