Detect Spoof Security Alerting in Splunk
Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders' awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Rather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled. An adversary can also present a 'healthy' system status even after infection. For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a 'healthy' system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled. This technique was observed in Black Basta ransomware campaigns using custom EDR evasion tools tied to FIN7.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1562 Impair Defenses
- Sub-technique
- T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(Image="*SecurityHealthSystray.exe" OR Image="*SecurityHealthHost.exe" OR Image="*MSASCuiL.exe")
NOT (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" OR Image="C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*" OR Image="C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\*")
| eval DetectionType="FakeSecurityProcess_WrongPath"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, Hashes, DetectionType
| sort - _time
| append [
search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(CommandLine="*sc stop WinDefend*" OR CommandLine="*sc stop SecurityHealthService*" OR CommandLine="*sc stop wscsvc*" OR CommandLine="*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*" OR CommandLine="*sc config WinDefend start= disabled*")
| eval DetectionType="DefenderServiceDisabled"
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, DetectionType
| sort - _time
]
| append [
search index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7036
(Message="*Windows Defender*" OR Message="*Security Center*" OR Message="*SecurityHealthService*")
Message="*stopped*"
| eval DetectionType="SecurityServiceStopped"
| table _time, host, Message, DetectionType
| sort - _time
]Detects security alerting spoofing using Sysmon and Windows System event logs. Monitors for (1) Security Health tray processes running from non-standard paths via Sysmon Event ID 1, (2) commands that disable Defender services (sc stop, Set-MpPreference), and (3) Windows System Event ID 7036 service state change notifications showing security services entering a stopped state. The multi-source approach catches both the spoofing and the preceding service disablement.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Third-party security tools that reference Windows Security strings in their command lines for integration
- Administrators legitimately stopping Defender during alternative AV product installation
- Windows servicing operations that temporarily stop and restart security services during feature updates
- Security product uninstallation workflows that stop services before removing binaries
Other platforms for T1562.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Fake SecurityHealthSystray from TEMP Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image pointing to %TEMP%\SecurityHealthSystray.exe instead of C:\Windows\System32\. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the copied binary. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE shows FolderPath as the TEMP directory.
- Test 2Disable Windows Defender Real-Time Monitoring
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104. Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational Event ID 5001 (Real-Time Protection disabled). If Tamper Protection is on, Event ID 1125 (tamper attempt blocked).
- Test 3Stop Windows Defender Service via sc.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine 'sc stop WinDefend'. System Event ID 7036: WinDefend service entered stopped state. If Tamper Protection is on, the command will fail with Access Denied.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting/
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