Detect Spoof Security Alerting in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders' awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Rather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled. An adversary can also present a 'healthy' system status even after infection. For example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a 'healthy' system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled. This technique was observed in Black Basta ransomware campaigns using custom EDR evasion tools tied to FIN7.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1562 Impair Defenses
- Sub-technique
- T1562.011 Spoof Security Alerting
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
KQL Detection Query
let SecurityTrayProcesses = dynamic([
"SecurityHealthSystray.exe", "SecurityHealthHost.exe",
"MSASCuiL.exe", "NisSrv.exe"
]);
let DefenderServiceNames = dynamic([
"WinDefend", "SecurityHealthService",
"wscsvc", "Sense", "WdNisSvc"
]);
union
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ (SecurityTrayProcesses)
| where not(FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName,
SHA256, DetectionType="FakeSecurityProcess_WrongPath"
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("SecurityHealth", "Windows Defender", "WindowsSecurity")
| where FileName !in~ (SecurityTrayProcesses)
| where FileName !in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe", "services.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName,
SHA256, DetectionType="SpoofedSecurityUI"
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sc stop WinDefend", "sc stop SecurityHealthService", "sc stop wscsvc", "Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring", "sc config WinDefend start= disabled")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
DetectionType="DefenderServiceDisabled"
)
| sort by Timestamp descDetects security alerting spoofing through three complementary detection vectors: (1) Windows Security tray/host processes running from unexpected file paths (not System32 or Windows Defender directories), indicating a fake binary masquerading as the legitimate security UI; (2) Non-standard processes with command lines referencing SecurityHealth or Windows Defender names, suggesting a spoofed security interface; (3) Defender service disable commands that often precede the deployment of fake security UIs. The combination of service disablement followed by a fake UI is the hallmark of Black Basta/FIN7's EDR evasion toolkit.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Third-party security tools (Norton, McAfee, Bitdefender) that may reference 'Windows Security' or 'SecurityHealth' strings in their own process command lines for integration purposes
- System administrators legitimately stopping Windows Defender services during installation of an alternative AV product as part of a documented migration
- Portable security scanning tools run from USB or temporary directories that contain 'Defender' or 'Security' in their file names
- Windows Update or feature updates that temporarily restart SecurityHealthService from a staging directory before moving files to their final location
Other platforms for T1562.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Fake SecurityHealthSystray from TEMP Directory
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image pointing to %TEMP%\SecurityHealthSystray.exe instead of C:\Windows\System32\. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the copied binary. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE shows FolderPath as the TEMP directory.
- Test 2Disable Windows Defender Real-Time Monitoring
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104. Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational Event ID 5001 (Real-Time Protection disabled). If Tamper Protection is on, Event ID 1125 (tamper attempt blocked).
- Test 3Stop Windows Defender Service via sc.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine 'sc stop WinDefend'. System Event ID 7036: WinDefend service entered stopped state. If Tamper Protection is on, the command will fail with Access Denied.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/011/
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/black-basta-ransomware-attacks-deploy-custom-edr-evasion-tools-tied-to-fin7-threat-actor/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/carbon-spider-embraces-big-game-hunting/
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