Detect Inter-Process Communication in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code execution, command-and-control channel establishment, or lateral movement. IPC mechanisms allow processes to share data, communicate, or synchronize execution. On Windows, adversaries commonly abuse named pipes to relay commands between C2 framework components (Havoc SMB demon, Cobalt Strike pipe-based beacons, Metasploit named pipe stagers), move data between kernel and user mode components (Uroburos/Snake malware), or pipe output from arbitrary commands to a controlling process (LunarWeb, ROADSWEEP, OilBooster). The IPC$ administrative share provides a network-accessible path for named pipe connections, enabling cross-host pipe-based C2 (HyperStack, Cobalt Strike lateral movement). On Linux and macOS, adversaries leverage Unix domain sockets (PITSTOP), shared memory segments via shmget (RotaJakiro), and anonymous pipes for inter-process communication. Medusa Ransomware and Cyclops Blink use the CreatePipe API to coordinate parallel operations. Raspberry Robin embeds a Tor client that communicates with its main payload via shared process memory. Detection focuses on named pipe creation by high-risk processes, non-standard pipe names matching known C2 framework patterns, and unusual network-based IPC$ share access.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1559 Inter-Process Communication
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
Sumo Detection Query
// Named pipe creation/connection detection with risk scoring for T1559 IPC abuse
_sourceCategory=*windows*sysmon* (EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
| parse "<EventID>*</EventID>" as EventCode
| parse "<Data Name='PipeName'>*</Data>" as PipeName
| parse "<Data Name='Image'>*</Data>" as ProcessImage
| parse "<Data Name='ProcessId'>*</Data>" as ProcessId
| parse "<Data Name='User'>*</Data>" as UserName
| parse "<Data Name='UtcTime'>*</Data>" as EventTime
| eval EventType = if(EventCode == "17", "PipeCreated", "PipeConnected")
| eval PipeNameLower = toLowerCase(PipeName)
| eval SuspiciousPipeName = if(matches(PipeNameLower, "postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-\\d+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_\\d+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe"), 1, 0)
| eval KnownSystemPipe = if(matches(PipeNameLower, "srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|msfteWds|atsvc|trkwks|w32time|svcctl|eventlog|initshutdown|winreg|protected_storage|router"), 1, 0)
| eval ProcessImageLower = toLowerCase(ProcessImage)
| eval SuspiciousCreator = if(matches(ProcessImageLower, "rundll32\\.exe|regsvr32\\.exe|mshta\\.exe|wscript\\.exe|cscript\\.exe|powershell\\.exe|pwsh\\.exe|certutil\\.exe|msiexec\\.exe|dllhost\\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval UnexpectedCreator = if(matches(ProcessImageLower, "winword\\.exe|excel\\.exe|powerpnt\\.exe|outlook\\.exe|acrord32\\.exe|acrobat\\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval RiskScore = (SuspiciousPipeName * 4) + (SuspiciousCreator * 2) + (UnexpectedCreator * 3) + if(KnownSystemPipe == 0, 1, 0)
| where RiskScore >= 2
| fields EventTime, _sourceHost, EventType, PipeName, ProcessImage, ProcessId, UserName, SuspiciousPipeName, SuspiciousCreator, UnexpectedCreator, KnownSystemPipe, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore, _messageTimeSumo Logic CSE query detecting T1559 IPC abuse through Sysmon named pipe creation (EventCode 17) and connection (EventCode 18) events. Implements a multi-factor risk scoring model: suspicious pipe names matching known C2 frameworks score 4 points, high-risk LOLBin/scripting process creators score 2 points, unexpected document application creators score 3 points, and non-system pipe names add 1 point. Events with cumulative risk score of 2 or higher are surfaced for analyst review.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Software installers using msiexec.exe that create temporary named pipes for IPC between installer components during application setup or update cycles
- Legitimate remote administration tools such as PsExec relay components that create uniquely named pipes as part of their normal operation when managed by PowerShell orchestration scripts
- Application performance monitoring and tracing agents that hook into scripting engines via named pipes for telemetry collection
Other platforms for T1559
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Named Pipe Server Creation via PowerShell (Simulated C2 Listener)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=argus_ipc_test_pipe, ProcessId=<pid>, User=<current user>. Security Event 4688 (if process command line auditing is enabled) for the PowerShell invocation.
- Test 2Named Pipe with Known C2 Framework Pattern (Cobalt Strike postex_ simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=postex_ssh_8a3f, ProcessId=<pid>. This is the highest-confidence detection trigger — the pipe name exactly matches the Cobalt Strike postex_ pattern.
- Test 3IPC$ Named Share Access via Net Use (Remote Pipe Connection Simulation)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 5145: ShareName=\\*\IPC$, IpAddress=127.0.0.1 (loopback — note: the detection filters loopback by default; modify the IpAddress filter to include 127.0.0.1 to capture this test). Security Event 4624 (logon) for the SMB session establishment. Sysmon Event ID 3 for the network connection on port 445 from cmd.exe.
- Test 4Anonymous Pipe Process Output Capture (OilBooster/ROADSWEEP Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Parent Image=powershell.exe, Child Image=whoami.exe, ParentCommandLine contains 'RedirectStandardOutput'. Security Event 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) for whoami.exe creation with parent PID of the PowerShell process. Note: anonymous pipes do NOT generate Sysmon Event ID 17 — they are transient kernel objects with no name.
- Test 5Unix Domain Socket Listener (Linux IPC Abuse Simulation)
Expected signal: Linux auditd (if configured with AF_UNIX socket rules): SYSCALL record for socket() with a0=1 (AF_UNIX), SYSCALL record for bind() with the socket path, SYSCALL record for listen(). Syslog/EDR process creation event for python3 with the IPC-related command arguments. File creation event for /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock. Check with: 'lsof /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock' or 'ss -xln | grep argus' while the script is running.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/anonymous-pipes
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/chapters/named-pipes.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1559/T1559.md
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/stealbit-exfiltration-tool
- https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826
- https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-hyperstack-carbon-snake
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/l/raspberry-robin-malware-targets-telecom-financial-industries.html
- https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2022_toddycat-is-knocking-on-your-door
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1559 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.