Detect Inter-Process Communication in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code execution, command-and-control channel establishment, or lateral movement. IPC mechanisms allow processes to share data, communicate, or synchronize execution. On Windows, adversaries commonly abuse named pipes to relay commands between C2 framework components (Havoc SMB demon, Cobalt Strike pipe-based beacons, Metasploit named pipe stagers), move data between kernel and user mode components (Uroburos/Snake malware), or pipe output from arbitrary commands to a controlling process (LunarWeb, ROADSWEEP, OilBooster). The IPC$ administrative share provides a network-accessible path for named pipe connections, enabling cross-host pipe-based C2 (HyperStack, Cobalt Strike lateral movement). On Linux and macOS, adversaries leverage Unix domain sockets (PITSTOP), shared memory segments via shmget (RotaJakiro), and anonymous pipes for inter-process communication. Medusa Ransomware and Cyclops Blink use the CreatePipe API to coordinate parallel operations. Raspberry Robin embeds a Tor client that communicates with its main payload via shared process memory. Detection focuses on named pipe creation by high-risk processes, non-standard pipe names matching known C2 framework patterns, and unusual network-based IPC$ share access.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Technique
- T1559 Inter-Process Communication
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
LogScale Detection Query
// T1559 IPC Named Pipe Abuse Detection
// Detection 1: Named pipe creation by high-risk or C2-associated processes
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=PipeCreated
| PipeName = /(?i)(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|MSSE-\d+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_\d+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe)/
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, PipeName, ImageFileName, ProcessId, ParentBaseFileName])
| rename(field=ImageFileName, as=CreatingProcess)
// Detection 2: High-risk process creating any non-standard pipe
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=PipeCreated
| CreatingProcess = /(?i)(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)/
| not PipeName = /(?i)(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|MsFteWds|atsvc|trkwks|W32TIME_ALT|svcctl|eventlog|InitShutdown|winreg|protected_storage|ROUTER|LSM_API_service|IPCDump)/
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, PipeName, ImageFileName, ProcessId, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine])
// Detection 3: SMB connections from high-risk processes (lateral movement via IPC$)
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| RemotePort=445
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)/
| not RemoteAddressIP4 in ["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"]
| groupBy([ComputerName, ImageFileName, RemoteAddressIP4], function=[count(as=ConnectionCount), collectDistinct(RemotePort, as=ports)])
| where ConnectionCount >= 1
| sort(ConnectionCount, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) detection for T1559 IPC abuse using three complementary detections: (1) Named pipe creation events matching known C2 framework pipe name patterns from Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and Havoc; (2) High-risk LOLBin or scripting engine processes creating non-standard named pipes that don't match known system pipe names; (3) SMB port 445 connections from high-risk processes indicating potential IPC$ lateral movement or pipe-based C2 tunneling. Results are correlated by host to identify endpoint compromise patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT automation and remote management tools such as SCCM client agents that use PowerShell to create named pipes for communicating status back to management infrastructure
- Application virtualization platforms that use dllhost.exe or rundll32.exe as host processes for isolated application components that communicate via named pipes
- Legitimate penetration testing activity using authorized Cobalt Strike or Metasploit deployments during sanctioned red team engagements covered by a rules of engagement document
Other platforms for T1559
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Named Pipe Server Creation via PowerShell (Simulated C2 Listener)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=argus_ipc_test_pipe, ProcessId=<pid>, User=<current user>. Security Event 4688 (if process command line auditing is enabled) for the PowerShell invocation.
- Test 2Named Pipe with Known C2 Framework Pattern (Cobalt Strike postex_ simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=postex_ssh_8a3f, ProcessId=<pid>. This is the highest-confidence detection trigger — the pipe name exactly matches the Cobalt Strike postex_ pattern.
- Test 3IPC$ Named Share Access via Net Use (Remote Pipe Connection Simulation)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 5145: ShareName=\\*\IPC$, IpAddress=127.0.0.1 (loopback — note: the detection filters loopback by default; modify the IpAddress filter to include 127.0.0.1 to capture this test). Security Event 4624 (logon) for the SMB session establishment. Sysmon Event ID 3 for the network connection on port 445 from cmd.exe.
- Test 4Anonymous Pipe Process Output Capture (OilBooster/ROADSWEEP Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Parent Image=powershell.exe, Child Image=whoami.exe, ParentCommandLine contains 'RedirectStandardOutput'. Security Event 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) for whoami.exe creation with parent PID of the PowerShell process. Note: anonymous pipes do NOT generate Sysmon Event ID 17 — they are transient kernel objects with no name.
- Test 5Unix Domain Socket Listener (Linux IPC Abuse Simulation)
Expected signal: Linux auditd (if configured with AF_UNIX socket rules): SYSCALL record for socket() with a0=1 (AF_UNIX), SYSCALL record for bind() with the socket path, SYSCALL record for listen(). Syslog/EDR process creation event for python3 with the IPC-related command arguments. File creation event for /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock. Check with: 'lsof /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock' or 'ss -xln | grep argus' while the script is running.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipes
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/anonymous-pipes
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/audit-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/master/chapters/named-pipes.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1559/T1559.md
- https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/stealbit-exfiltration-tool
- https://www.mandiant.com/media/17826
- https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-hyperstack-carbon-snake
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/l/raspberry-robin-malware-targets-telecom-financial-industries.html
- https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2022_toddycat-is-knocking-on-your-door
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