T1559 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Inter-Process Communication in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code execution, command-and-control channel establishment, or lateral movement. IPC mechanisms allow processes to share data, communicate, or synchronize execution. On Windows, adversaries commonly abuse named pipes to relay commands between C2 framework components (Havoc SMB demon, Cobalt Strike pipe-based beacons, Metasploit named pipe stagers), move data between kernel and user mode components (Uroburos/Snake malware), or pipe output from arbitrary commands to a controlling process (LunarWeb, ROADSWEEP, OilBooster). The IPC$ administrative share provides a network-accessible path for named pipe connections, enabling cross-host pipe-based C2 (HyperStack, Cobalt Strike lateral movement). On Linux and macOS, adversaries leverage Unix domain sockets (PITSTOP), shared memory segments via shmget (RotaJakiro), and anonymous pipes for inter-process communication. Medusa Ransomware and Cyclops Blink use the CreatePipe API to coordinate parallel operations. Raspberry Robin embeds a Tor client that communicates with its main payload via shared process memory. Detection focuses on named pipe creation by high-risk processes, non-standard pipe names matching known C2 framework patterns, and unusual network-based IPC$ share access.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Execution
Technique
T1559 Inter-Process Communication
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql 
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  username,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  CATEGORYNAME(category) AS category_name,
  "FileName" AS pipe_name,
  "ProcessName" AS initiating_process,
  LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("FileName") MATCHES '(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-[0-9]+|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe)' THEN 4
    ELSE 0
  END +
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)' THEN 2
    ELSE 0
  END +
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe|acrobat\.exe)' THEN 3
    ELSE 0
  END AS risk_score
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 40, 143, 191)
  AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
  AND (
    ("EventID" = '17' OR "EventID" = '18')
    AND "FileName" IS NOT NULL
    AND LOWER("FileName") NOT MATCHES '(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|msfteWds|atsvc|trkwks|w32time|svcctl|eventlog|initshutdown|winreg|protected_storage|router)'
  )
  AND (
    LOWER("FileName") MATCHES '(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-[0-9]+|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|mojo_fuzz)'
    OR LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)'
    OR LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe)'
  )
ORDER BY risk_score DESC, starttime DESC
high severity medium confidence

AQL query for IBM QRadar that detects named pipe creation and connection events (Sysmon EventID 17/18) with risk scoring across three dimensions: known C2 framework pipe name patterns (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Havoc), high-risk process creators (LOLBins and scripting engines), and unexpected document application creators (Office suite, PDF readers). Events scoring >= 2 are surfaced, with higher risk scores indicating stronger indicators of IPC abuse for C2 or lateral movement.

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon via QRadar DSMWindows Security Event Log

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Automated patch management or software deployment systems that use PowerShell or msiexec.exe to install software that creates named pipes during installation
  • Enterprise endpoint detection and response agents that create named pipes for inter-component communication using scripting host processes
  • Legitimate penetration testing or red team exercises using Cobalt Strike or Metasploit under authorized change control
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1559

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Named Pipe Server Creation via PowerShell (Simulated C2 Listener)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=argus_ipc_test_pipe, ProcessId=<pid>, User=<current user>. Security Event 4688 (if process command line auditing is enabled) for the PowerShell invocation.

  2. Test 2Named Pipe with Known C2 Framework Pattern (Cobalt Strike postex_ simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe): Image=powershell.exe, PipeName=postex_ssh_8a3f, ProcessId=<pid>. This is the highest-confidence detection trigger — the pipe name exactly matches the Cobalt Strike postex_ pattern.

  3. Test 3IPC$ Named Share Access via Net Use (Remote Pipe Connection Simulation)

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 5145: ShareName=\\*\IPC$, IpAddress=127.0.0.1 (loopback — note: the detection filters loopback by default; modify the IpAddress filter to include 127.0.0.1 to capture this test). Security Event 4624 (logon) for the SMB session establishment. Sysmon Event ID 3 for the network connection on port 445 from cmd.exe.

  4. Test 4Anonymous Pipe Process Output Capture (OilBooster/ROADSWEEP Pattern)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): Parent Image=powershell.exe, Child Image=whoami.exe, ParentCommandLine contains 'RedirectStandardOutput'. Security Event 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) for whoami.exe creation with parent PID of the PowerShell process. Note: anonymous pipes do NOT generate Sysmon Event ID 17 — they are transient kernel objects with no name.

  5. Test 5Unix Domain Socket Listener (Linux IPC Abuse Simulation)

    Expected signal: Linux auditd (if configured with AF_UNIX socket rules): SYSCALL record for socket() with a0=1 (AF_UNIX), SYSCALL record for bind() with the socket path, SYSCALL record for listen(). Syslog/EDR process creation event for python3 with the IPC-related command arguments. File creation event for /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock. Check with: 'lsof /tmp/argus_uds_test.sock' or 'ss -xln | grep argus' while the script is running.

Last updated: 2026-04-21 Research depth: deep
References (13)

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Related Detections

Sub-techniques (3)

Related Techniques

T1559.001Component Object ModelT1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeT1559.003XPC ServicesT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1055Process InjectionT1090ProxyT1570Lateral Tool TransferT1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftT1543.003Windows ServiceT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Same Tactic: Execution

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