T1559

Inter-Process Communication

Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code execution, command-and-control channel establishment, or lateral movement. IPC mechanisms allow processes to share data, communicate, or synchronize execution. On Windows, adversaries commonly abuse named pipes to relay commands between C2 framework components (Havoc SMB demon, Cobalt Strike pipe-based beacons, Metasploit named pipe stagers), move data between kernel and user mode components (Uroburos/Snake malware), or pipe output from arbitrary commands to a controlling process (LunarWeb, ROADSWEEP, OilBooster). The IPC$ administrative share provides a network-accessible path for named pipe connections, enabling cross-host pipe-based C2 (HyperStack, Cobalt Strike lateral movement). On Linux and macOS, adversaries leverage Unix domain sockets (PITSTOP), shared memory segments via shmget (RotaJakiro), and anonymous pipes for inter-process communication. Medusa Ransomware and Cyclops Blink use the CreatePipe API to coordinate parallel operations. Raspberry Robin embeds a Tor client that communicates with its main payload via shared process memory. Detection focuses on named pipe creation by high-risk processes, non-standard pipe names matching known C2 framework patterns, and unusual network-based IPC$ share access.

Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

kusto

let SuspiciousPipePatterns = dynamic([
    "postex_", "meterpreter", "msf-pipe", "cobaltstrike", "havoc_",
    "MSSE-", "dsniff", "win_svc_pipe", "agent_pipe", "status_",
    "msagent_", "mojo_fuzz", "winsock_pipe"
]);
let CommonSystemPipes = dynamic([
    "srvsvc", "wkssvc", "netlogon", "samr", "lsarpc", "spoolss",
    "browser", "epmapper", "MsFteWds", "atsvc", "trkwks", "W32TIME_ALT",
    "svcctl", "eventlog", "InitShutdown", "winreg", "protected_storage",
    "ROUTER", "LSM_API_service", "IPCDump"
]);
let HighRiskProcesses = dynamic([
    "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
    "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "certutil.exe", "msiexec.exe", "dllhost.exe"
]);
// Detection 1: Non-standard named pipe access over IPC$ network share (Security Event 5145)
// This covers remote lateral movement and C2 relaying via named pipe tunneling
let NetworkIPCPipeAccess = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 5145
| where ShareName contains "IPC$"
| where RelativeTargetName !in~ (CommonSystemPipes)
| where IpAddress !in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "-", "0.0.0.0")
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"  // Exclude expected machine account traffic
| extend PipeName = tostring(RelativeTargetName)
| extend IsSuspiciousPipeName = PipeName has_any (SuspiciousPipePatterns)
| extend DetectionSource = "IPC$NetworkPipeAccess"
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    Computer,
    AccountName = SubjectUserName,
    Domain = SubjectDomainName,
    PipeName,
    IsSuspiciousPipeName,
    DetectionSource,
    SourceAddress = IpAddress,
    SourcePort = IpPort,
    AccessMask;
// Detection 2: High-risk process initiating SMB connections (potential pipe tunnel establishment)
let HighRiskSMBPipeConn = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 445
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (HighRiskProcesses)
| extend PipeName = ""
| extend IsSuspiciousPipeName = false
| extend DetectionSource = "HighRiskProcessSMBPipe"
| project
    TimeGenerated = Timestamp,
    Computer = DeviceName,
    AccountName,
    Domain = "",
    PipeName,
    IsSuspiciousPipeName,
    DetectionSource,
    SourceAddress = LocalIP,
    SourcePort = LocalPort,
    AccessMask = "",
    InitiatingProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
    RemoteIP,
    RemotePort;
// Combine both detections
NetworkIPCPipeAccess
| extend InitiatingProcess = "", InitiatingCommandLine = "", RemoteIP = "", RemotePort = int(null)
| union HighRiskSMBPipeConn
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Network Share: Network Share Access Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation Windows Security Event ID 5145 Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceNetworkEvents

Required Tables

SecurityEvent DeviceNetworkEvents

False Positives

Legitimate administrative tools using IPC$ for remote management — PsExec, SC.exe, remote registry operations, and WMI will access standard pipes like svcctl and winreg over IPC$
Backup and monitoring agents (Veeam, Zabbix, SolarWinds) that use named pipes for inter-process coordination or query Windows services via SMB
Software deployment systems (SCCM, Intune) connecting to IPC$ shares on managed endpoints for policy application and software push installations
Database services (SQL Server) using named pipes as an alternative client connection transport, especially in environments with pipe-based connection strings
IT automation platforms (Ansible WinRM, Chef, Puppet) that use SMB and named pipes for remote configuration management on Windows targets
EDR and AV products that use named pipes for kernel-user communication may generate pipe creation events from svchost.exe or their own service processes

Splunk

spl

index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
| eval EventType=case(EventCode==17, "PipeCreated", EventCode==18, "PipeConnected", true(), "Unknown")
| eval PipeNameLower=lower(PipeName)
| eval SuspiciousPipeName=if(match(PipeNameLower,
    "(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-[0-9]+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_[0-9]+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz)"),
    1, 0)
| eval KnownSystemPipe=if(match(PipeNameLower,
    "(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|msfteWds|atsvc|trkwks|w32time|svcctl|eventlog|initshutdown|winreg|protected_storage|router)"),
    1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousCreator=if(match(lower(Image),
    "(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)"),
    1, 0)
| eval UnexpectedCreator=if(match(lower(Image),
    "(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe|acrobat\.exe)"),
    1, 0)
| eval RiskScore=(SuspiciousPipeName * 4) + (SuspiciousCreator * 2) + (UnexpectedCreator * 3) + if(KnownSystemPipe=0, 1, 0)
| where RiskScore >= 2
| table _time, host, EventType, PipeName, Image, ProcessId, User,
        SuspiciousPipeName, SuspiciousCreator, UnexpectedCreator, KnownSystemPipe, RiskScore
| sort - RiskScore, - _time

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Named Pipe: Named Pipe Creation Named Pipe: Named Pipe Connection Sysmon Event ID 17 (PipeEvent - CreatePipe) Sysmon Event ID 18 (PipeEvent - ConnectPipe)

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

False Positives

Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Electron apps) generate extremely high volumes of named pipe creation for IPC between renderer, GPU, network, and browser processes — expect hundreds of pipe events from these processes daily
Development tools like Visual Studio, VSCode, JetBrains IDEs, and build systems (MSBuild, CMake) create named pipes for debugger attachment, language server communication, and inter-process coordination
SQL Server and other database engines create named pipes for local and remote client connections when pipe transport is configured
Security products (CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, Carbon Black) create named pipes for sensor-to-service and kernel-to-user communication; their processes will generate events from svchost.exe or dedicated service executables
Docker Desktop on Windows uses named pipes for communication between the WSL2 VM and the Windows host, generating volume from com.docker.service and dockerd processes

IBM QRadar (AQL)

sql

SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  username,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  CATEGORYNAME(category) AS category_name,
  "FileName" AS pipe_name,
  "ProcessName" AS initiating_process,
  LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("FileName") MATCHES '(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-[0-9]+|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe)' THEN 4
    ELSE 0
  END +
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)' THEN 2
    ELSE 0
  END +
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe|acrobat\.exe)' THEN 3
    ELSE 0
  END AS risk_score
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 40, 143, 191)
  AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
  AND (
    ("EventID" = '17' OR "EventID" = '18')
    AND "FileName" IS NOT NULL
    AND LOWER("FileName") NOT MATCHES '(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|msfteWds|atsvc|trkwks|w32time|svcctl|eventlog|initshutdown|winreg|protected_storage|router)'
  )
  AND (
    LOWER("FileName") MATCHES '(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-[0-9]+|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|mojo_fuzz)'
    OR LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)'
    OR LOWER("ProcessName") MATCHES '(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe)'
  )
ORDER BY risk_score DESC, starttime DESC

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon via QRadar DSM Windows Security Event Log

Required Tables

events

False Positives

Automated patch management or software deployment systems that use PowerShell or msiexec.exe to install software that creates named pipes during installation
Enterprise endpoint detection and response agents that create named pipes for inter-component communication using scripting host processes
Legitimate penetration testing or red team exercises using Cobalt Strike or Metasploit under authorized change control

Sumo Logic CSE

sql

// Named pipe creation/connection detection with risk scoring for T1559 IPC abuse
_sourceCategory=*windows*sysmon* (EventCode=17 OR EventCode=18)
| parse "<EventID>*</EventID>" as EventCode
| parse "<Data Name='PipeName'>*</Data>" as PipeName
| parse "<Data Name='Image'>*</Data>" as ProcessImage
| parse "<Data Name='ProcessId'>*</Data>" as ProcessId
| parse "<Data Name='User'>*</Data>" as UserName
| parse "<Data Name='UtcTime'>*</Data>" as EventTime
| eval EventType = if(EventCode == "17", "PipeCreated", "PipeConnected")
| eval PipeNameLower = toLowerCase(PipeName)
| eval SuspiciousPipeName = if(matches(PipeNameLower, "postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|msse-\\d+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_\\d+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe"), 1, 0)
| eval KnownSystemPipe = if(matches(PipeNameLower, "srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|msfteWds|atsvc|trkwks|w32time|svcctl|eventlog|initshutdown|winreg|protected_storage|router"), 1, 0)
| eval ProcessImageLower = toLowerCase(ProcessImage)
| eval SuspiciousCreator = if(matches(ProcessImageLower, "rundll32\\.exe|regsvr32\\.exe|mshta\\.exe|wscript\\.exe|cscript\\.exe|powershell\\.exe|pwsh\\.exe|certutil\\.exe|msiexec\\.exe|dllhost\\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval UnexpectedCreator = if(matches(ProcessImageLower, "winword\\.exe|excel\\.exe|powerpnt\\.exe|outlook\\.exe|acrord32\\.exe|acrobat\\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval RiskScore = (SuspiciousPipeName * 4) + (SuspiciousCreator * 2) + (UnexpectedCreator * 3) + if(KnownSystemPipe == 0, 1, 0)
| where RiskScore >= 2
| fields EventTime, _sourceHost, EventType, PipeName, ProcessImage, ProcessId, UserName, SuspiciousPipeName, SuspiciousCreator, UnexpectedCreator, KnownSystemPipe, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore, _messageTime

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon operational log via Sumo Logic collector Windows endpoint agents

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=*windows*sysmon*

False Positives

Software installers using msiexec.exe that create temporary named pipes for IPC between installer components during application setup or update cycles
Legitimate remote administration tools such as PsExec relay components that create uniquely named pipes as part of their normal operation when managed by PowerShell orchestration scripts
Application performance monitoring and tracing agents that hook into scripting engines via named pipes for telemetry collection

Google Chronicle / SecOps

yaral

rule t1559_ipc_named_pipe_abuse {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "Detects T1559 Inter-Process Communication abuse via named pipe creation by high-risk processes or known C2 framework pipe name patterns including Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and Havoc"
    severity = "HIGH"
    priority = "HIGH"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Execution, Lateral Movement, Command and Control"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1559"
    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"

  events:
    $pipe_event.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
    $pipe_event.target.file.full_path = /\\pipe\\/
    (
      re.regex($pipe_event.target.file.full_path, `(?i)(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|MSSE-\d+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_\d+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe)`)
      OR
      re.regex($pipe_event.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe|winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|acrord32\.exe)`)
    )
    NOT re.regex($pipe_event.target.file.full_path, `(?i)(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|MsFteWds|atsvc|trkwks|W32TIME_ALT|svcctl|eventlog|InitShutdown|winreg|protected_storage|ROUTER|LSM_API_service)`)

  condition:
    $pipe_event
}

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon via Chronicle forwarder Google Chronicle UDM

Required Tables

UDM FILE_CREATION events

False Positives

Enterprise automation platforms running PowerShell DSC or Ansible that create named pipes as part of configuration management workflows on managed endpoints
Custom line-of-business applications compiled as DLLs loaded by rundll32.exe that use named pipes for communication between their service and UI components
Security software update mechanisms that use certutil.exe or msiexec.exe with named pipe IPC between downloader and installer stages

CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)

cql

// T1559 IPC Named Pipe Abuse Detection
// Detection 1: Named pipe creation by high-risk or C2-associated processes
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=PipeCreated
| PipeName = /(?i)(postex_|meterpreter|msf-pipe|cobaltstrike|havoc_|MSSE-\d+|dsniff|win_svc_pipe|agent_pipe|status_\d+|msagent_|mojo_fuzz|winsock_pipe)/
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, PipeName, ImageFileName, ProcessId, ParentBaseFileName])
| rename(field=ImageFileName, as=CreatingProcess)

// Detection 2: High-risk process creating any non-standard pipe
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=PipeCreated
| CreatingProcess = /(?i)(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)/
| not PipeName = /(?i)(srvsvc|wkssvc|netlogon|samr|lsarpc|spoolss|browser|epmapper|MsFteWds|atsvc|trkwks|W32TIME_ALT|svcctl|eventlog|InitShutdown|winreg|protected_storage|ROUTER|LSM_API_service|IPCDump)/
| table([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, PipeName, ImageFileName, ProcessId, ParentBaseFileName, CommandLine])

// Detection 3: SMB connections from high-risk processes (lateral movement via IPC$)
#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| RemotePort=445
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|certutil\.exe|msiexec\.exe|dllhost\.exe)/
| not RemoteAddressIP4 in ["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"]
| groupBy([ComputerName, ImageFileName, RemoteAddressIP4], function=[count(as=ConnectionCount), collectDistinct(RemotePort, as=ports)])
| where ConnectionCount >= 1
| sort(ConnectionCount, order=desc)

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon sensor telemetry Falcon PipeCreated events Falcon NetworkConnectIP4 events

Required Tables

#repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=PipeCreated #repo=base_sensor #event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4

False Positives

IT automation and remote management tools such as SCCM client agents that use PowerShell to create named pipes for communicating status back to management infrastructure
Application virtualization platforms that use dllhost.exe or rundll32.exe as host processes for isolated application components that communicate via named pipes
Legitimate penetration testing activity using authorized Cobalt Strike or Metasploit deployments during sanctioned red team engagements covered by a rules of engagement document

Last updated: 2026-04-21 Research depth: deep

References (13)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

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Get the full detection package for T1559 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

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Inter-Process Communication

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Sourcetypes

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

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Sub-techniques (3)

Same Tactic: Execution

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