Detect Golden Ticket in Splunk
Adversaries who have obtained the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), known as golden tickets. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory with arbitrary group memberships, privilege levels, and ticket lifetimes — including non-existent accounts. The KRBTGT hash is typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (DCSync or direct LSASS dump) against a domain controller. Tools including Mimikatz (kerberos::golden), Rubeus (golden /rc4: or /aes256:), Impacket ticketer.py, and the Empire/Sliver frameworks can generate forged TGTs locally without contacting the KDC. The forged ticket is then injected into memory (Pass-the-Ticket) and used to request Kerberos Service Tickets (TGS) for any resource in the domain. Golden tickets are highly persistent: they remain valid until the KRBTGT password is reset twice, and the attacker can regenerate them at will as long as the KRBTGT hash is known.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.001 Golden Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
SPL Detection Query
| union
[search index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769
| rex field=Message "Service Name:\s+(?<ServiceName>[^\r\n]+)"
| rex field=Message "Ticket Encryption Type:\s+(?<TicketEncryptionType>0x[0-9a-fA-F]+)"
| rex field=Message "Client Address:\s+(?<ClientAddress>[^\r\n]+)"
| rex field=Message "Result Code:\s+(?<Status>0x[0-9a-fA-F]+)"
| where TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
| where Status="0x0"
| where NOT match(ServiceName, "\$") AND NOT (ServiceName="krbtgt" OR ServiceName="kadmin/changepw")
| where NOT (ClientAddress="::1" OR ClientAddress="127.0.0.1" OR ClientAddress="-")
| eval DetectionType="GoldenTicket_KerberosRC4Encryption"
| eval ToolIndicator="RC4-HMAC_TGS_Request"
| table _time, host, user, ServiceName, ClientAddress, TicketEncryptionType, DetectionType, ToolIndicator]
[search index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval Image=lower(Image), CommandLine=lower(CommandLine)
| where Image LIKE "%\\mimikatz.exe"
OR Image LIKE "%\\rubeus.exe"
OR match(CommandLine, "kerberos::golden")
OR match(CommandLine, "kerberos::silver")
OR match(CommandLine, "kerberos::ptt")
OR match(CommandLine, "kerberos::purge")
OR match(CommandLine, "golden\s+/rc4:")
OR match(CommandLine, "golden\s+/aes256:")
OR match(CommandLine, "ptt\s+/ticket:")
OR match(CommandLine, "sekurlsa::krbtgt")
| eval DetectionType="GoldenTicket_ToolExecution"
| eval ToolIndicator=case(
match(CommandLine, "kerberos::golden"), "Mimikatz_kerberos::golden",
match(CommandLine, "kerberos::silver"), "Mimikatz_kerberos::silver",
match(CommandLine, "kerberos::ptt"), "Mimikatz_Pass-the-Ticket",
match(CommandLine, "golden\s+/rc4:"), "Rubeus_golden_RC4",
match(CommandLine, "golden\s+/aes256:"), "Rubeus_golden_AES256",
match(CommandLine, "ptt\s+/ticket:"), "Rubeus_PTT",
Image LIKE "%mimikatz.exe", "Mimikatz_binary",
Image LIKE "%rubeus.exe", "Rubeus_binary",
1=1, "Unknown_KerberosTool"
)
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, DetectionType, ToolIndicator]
| sort - _timeDetects Golden Ticket attacks using a union of two searches. The first search targets Windows Security Event 4769 (Kerberos Service Ticket requests) where the ticket encryption type is RC4-HMAC (0x17), using rex to extract structured fields from the event Message. The second search targets Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for known golden ticket tool execution patterns from Mimikatz and Rubeus. Both branches normalize to a common output schema (DetectionType, ToolIndicator) for unified analyst review. The | union syntax joins results from both searches into a single result set sorted by time.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Legacy applications and services using RC4 Kerberos encryption legitimately — validate against known service account inventory before tuning out
- Authorized penetration tests using Mimikatz or Rubeus — correlate against scheduled assessment windows and pentest tracking records
- Security tooling that inspects Kerberos ticket state using Mimikatz kerberos::list in read-only mode without ticket forgery
Other platforms for T1558.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Golden Ticket Creation and Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::golden'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe (during /ptt injection). Windows Security Event 4769 on DC: TGS requests with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 from the test machine after ticket injection. No corresponding Event 4768 (TGT request) for GoldenUser from the test machine IP since the TGT was forged locally.
- Test 2Rubeus Golden Ticket Generation with AES256
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe and CommandLine containing 'golden /aes256:'. Windows Security Event 4769 on DC after ticket use: TicketEncryptionType=0x12 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) — NOTE: this variant does NOT trigger the RC4 detector, demonstrating the importance of the TGS-without-TGT hunt and process execution detection as complementary layers. No Event 4768 from the test machine for GoldenUser.
- Test 3Mimikatz kerberos::list — Inspect Existing Kerberos Tickets
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::list'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation events for .kirbi ticket files exported to the current directory. No Kerberos events on DC since this only reads the local ticket cache.
- Test 4Impacket ticketer.py Golden Ticket (Linux/Windows)
Expected signal: Linux syslog/auditd: process execution of python3 with ticketer.py arguments including '-nthash' and '-domain-sid'. On the target Windows DC, Security Event 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4) when the golden ticket is used to authenticate, and notably NO preceding Event 4768 from the Linux host's IP. Network: Kerberos (UDP/TCP port 88) traffic from the Linux attacker IP to the DC for TGS requests.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-kerberos
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-mitigating-active-directory-compromises/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/understanding-lateral-movement-alerts
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.001/T1558.001.md
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1558.001 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.