Detect Golden Ticket in Google Chronicle
Adversaries who have obtained the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), known as golden tickets. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory with arbitrary group memberships, privilege levels, and ticket lifetimes — including non-existent accounts. The KRBTGT hash is typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (DCSync or direct LSASS dump) against a domain controller. Tools including Mimikatz (kerberos::golden), Rubeus (golden /rc4: or /aes256:), Impacket ticketer.py, and the Empire/Sliver frameworks can generate forged TGTs locally without contacting the KDC. The forged ticket is then injected into memory (Pass-the-Ticket) and used to request Kerberos Service Tickets (TGS) for any resource in the domain. Golden tickets are highly persistent: they remain valid until the KRBTGT password is reset twice, and the attacker can regenerate them at will as long as the KRBTGT hash is known.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.001 Golden Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule golden_ticket_detection {
meta:
author = "Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects Golden Ticket attacks via Mimikatz/Rubeus tool execution and RC4-HMAC Kerberos TGS anomalies (T1558.001)"
severity = "CRITICAL"
priority = "HIGH"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Credential Access"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1558.001"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/"
version = "1.0"
events:
// Signal A: Golden ticket tool execution — Mimikatz or Rubeus
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and $e1.principal.hostname = $hostname
and (
re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)mimikatz\.exe$`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)rubeus\.exe$`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)kerberos::golden`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)kerberos::silver`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)kerberos::ptt`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)kerberos::purge`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)sekurlsa::krbtgt`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)golden\s+/rc4:`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)golden\s+/aes256:`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)golden\s+/aes128:`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)ptt\s+/ticket:`)
or re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)asktgt\s+/user:`)
)
)
or
// Signal B: RC4-HMAC Kerberos TGS request (Event 4769 equivalent)
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
and $e1.principal.hostname = $hostname
and $e1.network.application_protocol = "KERBEROS"
and $e1.network.session_id != ""
and re.regex($e1.network.tls.cipher, `(?i)rc4`)
)
or
// Signal B (UDM auth event path for Chronicle-normalized Kerberos)
(
$e1.metadata.event_type = "USER_UNCATEGORIZED"
and $e1.principal.hostname = $hostname
and $e1.metadata.product_event_type = "4769"
and $e1.extensions.auth.mechanism = "KERBEROS"
and $e1.network.application_protocol = "KERBEROS"
// RC4-HMAC indicated via metadata label
and "0x17" in $e1.additional.fields["TicketEncryptionType"]
and not re.regex($e1.target.user.userid, `.*\$$`)
and $e1.target.user.userid != "krbtgt"
)
condition:
$e1
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting Golden Ticket attacks via two UDM signal paths: (1) PROCESS_LAUNCH events matching Mimikatz kerberos::golden/silver/ptt or Rubeus golden/silver/ptt command-line patterns, and (2) Kerberos authentication events (normalized from Windows Event 4769) with RC4-HMAC encryption type 0x17 on successful TGS requests. The rule uses Chronicle's UDM field model with regex matching against process command lines and Kerberos session metadata.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Environments not yet fully migrated to AES Kerberos encryption will produce high volumes of RC4 TGS requests — tune by excluding known service accounts and hosts configured for RC4 via GPO
- Red team and penetration testing toolkits legitimately executing Mimikatz or Rubeus during authorized assessments — coordinate with red team scheduling and add suppression rules for known test host ranges
- Some enterprise single-sign-on products and third-party authentication middleware request RC4 Kerberos tickets for compatibility — identify and baseline these before alerting
Other platforms for T1558.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Golden Ticket Creation and Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::golden'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe (during /ptt injection). Windows Security Event 4769 on DC: TGS requests with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 from the test machine after ticket injection. No corresponding Event 4768 (TGT request) for GoldenUser from the test machine IP since the TGT was forged locally.
- Test 2Rubeus Golden Ticket Generation with AES256
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe and CommandLine containing 'golden /aes256:'. Windows Security Event 4769 on DC after ticket use: TicketEncryptionType=0x12 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) — NOTE: this variant does NOT trigger the RC4 detector, demonstrating the importance of the TGS-without-TGT hunt and process execution detection as complementary layers. No Event 4768 from the test machine for GoldenUser.
- Test 3Mimikatz kerberos::list — Inspect Existing Kerberos Tickets
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::list'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation events for .kirbi ticket files exported to the current directory. No Kerberos events on DC since this only reads the local ticket cache.
- Test 4Impacket ticketer.py Golden Ticket (Linux/Windows)
Expected signal: Linux syslog/auditd: process execution of python3 with ticketer.py arguments including '-nthash' and '-domain-sid'. On the target Windows DC, Security Event 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4) when the golden ticket is used to authenticate, and notably NO preceding Event 4768 from the Linux host's IP. Network: Kerberos (UDP/TCP port 88) traffic from the Linux attacker IP to the DC for TGS requests.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-kerberos
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-mitigating-active-directory-compromises/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/understanding-lateral-movement-alerts
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.001/T1558.001.md
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