Detect Golden Ticket in Elastic Security
Adversaries who have obtained the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), known as golden tickets. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory with arbitrary group memberships, privilege levels, and ticket lifetimes — including non-existent accounts. The KRBTGT hash is typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (DCSync or direct LSASS dump) against a domain controller. Tools including Mimikatz (kerberos::golden), Rubeus (golden /rc4: or /aes256:), Impacket ticketer.py, and the Empire/Sliver frameworks can generate forged TGTs locally without contacting the KDC. The forged ticket is then injected into memory (Pass-the-Ticket) and used to request Kerberos Service Tickets (TGS) for any resource in the domain. Golden tickets are highly persistent: they remain valid until the KRBTGT password is reset twice, and the attacker can regenerate them at will as long as the KRBTGT hash is known.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.001 Golden Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
[process where event.type == "start" and
(process.name : ("mimikatz.exe", "rubeus.exe") or
process.args : ("kerberos::golden", "kerberos::silver", "kerberos::ptt", "kerberos::purge", "sekurlsa::krbtgt", "/ptt", "/rc4:", "/aes256:", "/ticket:", "/sid:") or
process.command_line : ("*golden /rc4:*", "*golden /aes256:*", "*golden /aes128:*", "*golden /des:*", "*silver /rc4:*", "*silver /aes256:*", "*ptt /ticket:*", "*asktgt /user:*"))]
| any where event.code == "4769" and
winlog.event_data.TicketEncryptionType == "0x17" and
winlog.event_data.Status == "0x0" and
not winlog.event_data.ServiceName : ("*$", "krbtgt", "kadmin/changepw") and
not winlog.event_data.IpAddress : ("::1", "127.0.0.1", "-")
// Standalone RC4 TGS anomaly — no tool execution required
OR
any where event.code == "4769" and
winlog.event_data.TicketEncryptionType == "0x17" and
winlog.event_data.Status == "0x0" and
not winlog.event_data.ServiceName : ("*$", "krbtgt", "kadmin/changepw") and
not winlog.event_data.IpAddress : ("::1", "127.0.0.1", "-")
// Standalone tool execution
OR
process where event.type == "start" and
(process.name : ("mimikatz.exe", "rubeus.exe") or
process.command_line : ("*kerberos::golden*", "*kerberos::silver*", "*kerberos::ptt*", "*golden /rc4:*", "*golden /aes256:*", "*ptt /ticket:*", "*sekurlsa::krbtgt*"))Detects Golden Ticket attacks via two correlated signals: (1) known tool execution (Mimikatz kerberos::golden/silver/ptt or Rubeus golden/silver/ptt commands) and (2) Kerberos TGS requests using RC4-HMAC encryption (0x17) in environments where AES is expected. The sequence correlates tool execution with subsequent anomalous Kerberos activity on the same host. Standalone signals are also alerted independently.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legacy applications or services that are explicitly configured to use RC4-HMAC Kerberos encryption rather than AES — common in older Windows Server environments or mixed-version domains
- Penetration testing or red team exercises using Mimikatz or Rubeus in authorized engagements — coordinate with security team on scheduled testing windows
- Security tooling that enumerates or tests Kerberos configurations (e.g., BloodHound, PingCastle) may generate RC4 TGS requests as part of reconnaissance
Other platforms for T1558.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Golden Ticket Creation and Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::golden'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe (during /ptt injection). Windows Security Event 4769 on DC: TGS requests with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 from the test machine after ticket injection. No corresponding Event 4768 (TGT request) for GoldenUser from the test machine IP since the TGT was forged locally.
- Test 2Rubeus Golden Ticket Generation with AES256
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe and CommandLine containing 'golden /aes256:'. Windows Security Event 4769 on DC after ticket use: TicketEncryptionType=0x12 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) — NOTE: this variant does NOT trigger the RC4 detector, demonstrating the importance of the TGS-without-TGT hunt and process execution detection as complementary layers. No Event 4768 from the test machine for GoldenUser.
- Test 3Mimikatz kerberos::list — Inspect Existing Kerberos Tickets
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::list'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation events for .kirbi ticket files exported to the current directory. No Kerberos events on DC since this only reads the local ticket cache.
- Test 4Impacket ticketer.py Golden Ticket (Linux/Windows)
Expected signal: Linux syslog/auditd: process execution of python3 with ticketer.py arguments including '-nthash' and '-domain-sid'. On the target Windows DC, Security Event 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4) when the golden ticket is used to authenticate, and notably NO preceding Event 4768 from the Linux host's IP. Network: Kerberos (UDP/TCP port 88) traffic from the Linux attacker IP to the DC for TGS requests.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-kerberos
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-mitigating-active-directory-compromises/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/understanding-lateral-movement-alerts
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.001/T1558.001.md
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