Detect Golden Ticket in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries who have obtained the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), known as golden tickets. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory with arbitrary group memberships, privilege levels, and ticket lifetimes — including non-existent accounts. The KRBTGT hash is typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (DCSync or direct LSASS dump) against a domain controller. Tools including Mimikatz (kerberos::golden), Rubeus (golden /rc4: or /aes256:), Impacket ticketer.py, and the Empire/Sliver frameworks can generate forged TGTs locally without contacting the KDC. The forged ticket is then injected into memory (Pass-the-Ticket) and used to request Kerberos Service Tickets (TGS) for any resource in the domain. Golden tickets are highly persistent: they remain valid until the KRBTGT password is reset twice, and the attacker can regenerate them at will as long as the KRBTGT hash is known.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.001 Golden Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
LogScale Detection Query
// Component 1: Golden Ticket tool execution — CrowdStrike Falcon ProcessRollup2
#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
| CommandLine = /(?i)(kerberos::golden|kerberos::silver|kerberos::ptt|kerberos::purge|sekurlsa::krbtgt|golden\s+\/rc4:|golden\s+\/aes256:|golden\s+\/aes128:|golden\s+\/des:|silver\s+\/rc4:|silver\s+\/aes256:|ptt\s+\/ticket:|asktgt\s+\/user:)/
OR ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\mimikatz\.exe|\\rubeus\.exe)$/
| ToolIndicator := case {
CommandLine = /(?i)kerberos::golden/ => "Mimikatz_kerberos::golden";
CommandLine = /(?i)kerberos::silver/ => "Mimikatz_kerberos::silver";
CommandLine = /(?i)kerberos::ptt/ => "Mimikatz_Pass-the-Ticket";
CommandLine = /(?i)golden\s+\/rc4:/ => "Rubeus_golden_RC4";
CommandLine = /(?i)golden\s+\/aes256:/ => "Rubeus_golden_AES256";
CommandLine = /(?i)ptt\s+\/ticket:/ => "Rubeus_PTT";
ImageFileName = /(?i)mimikatz\.exe$/ => "Mimikatz_binary";
ImageFileName = /(?i)rubeus\.exe$/ => "Rubeus_binary";
* => "Unknown_KerberosTool"
}
| DetectionType := "GoldenTicket_ToolExecution"
| table([_timeParsed, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ToolIndicator, DetectionType])
| sort(field=_timeParsed, order=desc)
// Component 2: RC4-HMAC Kerberos TGS requests — correlate with KerberosServiceTicketRequested if available
// CrowdStrike Falcon does not natively expose Event 4769 directly; use the following for environments
// where Windows event forwarding feeds into LogScale alongside Falcon telemetry:
// If ingesting Windows Security events into LogScale:
#event_simpleName = "WindowsSecurityEvent"
| EventCode = "4769"
| TicketEncryptionType = "0x17"
| Status = "0x0"
| ServiceName != /.*\$$/ // Exclude machine accounts
| ServiceName != "krbtgt"
| ServiceName != "kadmin/changepw"
| IpAddress != /^(::1|127\.0\.0\.1|-)$/
| DetectionType := "GoldenTicket_KerberosRC4Encryption"
| ToolIndicator := "RC4-HMAC_TGS_Request"
| table([_timeParsed, ComputerName, AccountName, ServiceName, IpAddress, TicketEncryptionType, DetectionType, ToolIndicator])
| sort(field=_timeParsed, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (Humio CQL) detection for Golden Ticket attacks using two components. Component 1 queries ProcessRollup2 events from the Falcon sensor for process launches matching Mimikatz kerberos::golden/silver/ptt patterns or Rubeus golden/silver/ptt command-line arguments, with case-based tool indicator classification. Component 2 targets Windows Security Event 4769 (if forwarded into LogScale) for RC4-HMAC TGS requests. Both exclude machine accounts, KDC-internal services, and loopback addresses.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Falcon sensors on hosts running authorized red team tooling will generate ProcessRollup2 alerts for legitimate Mimikatz or Rubeus executions — use CrowdStrike's detection exclusion policies for approved testing hosts during scheduled exercises
- RC4-HMAC TGS events (Event 4769) will be generated by older Windows workstations, printers, and embedded systems that have not been configured to negotiate AES Kerberos — build exclusion lists based on asset inventory of legacy systems
- Security research VMs or sandboxes on the corporate network that execute malware samples containing Mimikatz may generate tool execution detections — segregate research infrastructure and apply sensor policy exclusions to known analysis hosts
Other platforms for T1558.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Golden Ticket Creation and Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::golden'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe (during /ptt injection). Windows Security Event 4769 on DC: TGS requests with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 from the test machine after ticket injection. No corresponding Event 4768 (TGT request) for GoldenUser from the test machine IP since the TGT was forged locally.
- Test 2Rubeus Golden Ticket Generation with AES256
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe and CommandLine containing 'golden /aes256:'. Windows Security Event 4769 on DC after ticket use: TicketEncryptionType=0x12 (AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96) — NOTE: this variant does NOT trigger the RC4 detector, demonstrating the importance of the TGS-without-TGT hunt and process execution detection as complementary layers. No Event 4768 from the test machine for GoldenUser.
- Test 3Mimikatz kerberos::list — Inspect Existing Kerberos Tickets
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe and CommandLine containing 'kerberos::list'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation events for .kirbi ticket files exported to the current directory. No Kerberos events on DC since this only reads the local ticket cache.
- Test 4Impacket ticketer.py Golden Ticket (Linux/Windows)
Expected signal: Linux syslog/auditd: process execution of python3 with ticketer.py arguments including '-nthash' and '-domain-sid'. On the target Windows DC, Security Event 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4) when the golden ticket is used to authenticate, and notably NO preceding Event 4768 from the Linux host's IP. Network: Kerberos (UDP/TCP port 88) traffic from the Linux attacker IP to the DC for TGS requests.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=483
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/detect-pass-the-ticket-attacks
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-kerberos
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/05/detecting-and-mitigating-active-directory-compromises/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/understanding-lateral-movement-alerts
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1558.001/T1558.001.md
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