Detect LSASS Driver in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple DLLs associated with various security functions, all running in the context of the LSASS process (lsass.exe). Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers, an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. Known examples include Wingbird (which drops sspisrv.dll alongside lsass.exe) and Pasam (which infects the SAM DLL).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.008 LSASS Driver
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon
| where EventID = "7"
| where Image matches "*\\lsass.exe"
| where !(ImageLoaded matches "C:\\Windows\\System32\\*") and !(ImageLoaded matches "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*") and !(ImageLoaded matches "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*")
| parse field=ImageLoaded "*\\*" as dll_path, dll_name
| where dll_name != "msv1_0.dll"
and dll_name != "kerberos.dll"
and dll_name != "wdigest.dll"
and dll_name != "tspkg.dll"
and dll_name != "schannel.dll"
and dll_name != "pku2u.dll"
and dll_name != "cloudAP.dll"
and dll_name != "negoexts.dll"
and dll_name != "msprivs.dll"
and dll_name != "lsasrv.dll"
and dll_name != "samsrv.dll"
and dll_name != "ntdsai.dll"
| fields _messageTime, Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, dll_name, Hashes, Signed, SignatureStatus
| sort by _messageTime descDetects non-standard DLL image loads by lsass.exe sourced from outside trusted Windows system paths using Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load). Parses the loaded image filename and filters known legitimate LSA provider DLLs to identify potential LSASS driver implants (T1547.008).
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate custom SSPI providers or Kerberos extension DLLs installed by enterprise identity management solutions (e.g., Okta, Duo, RSA) from non-System32 install directories
- Antivirus or EDR products that load hooking DLLs into LSASS for credential protection telemetry from vendor-specific program directories
- Windows patches or updates in progress that temporarily stage DLLs in non-standard paths before moving them to System32 — correlate with Windows Update activity
Other platforms for T1547.008
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Drop DLL Alongside LSASS Copy (Wingbird Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for both lsass.exe and sspisrv.dll in C:\Windows\Temp\. The co-location of these files in a non-standard path is the indicator.
- Test 2Enumerate LSASS Loaded Modules
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for tasklist with /m /fi flags targeting lsass.exe.
- Test 3Check LSA Protection Status
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the LSA key.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.md
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