Detect LSASS Driver in Elastic Security
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple DLLs associated with various security functions, all running in the context of the LSASS process (lsass.exe). Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers, an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. Known examples include Wingbird (which drops sspisrv.dll alongside lsass.exe) and Pasam (which infects the SAM DLL).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.008 LSASS Driver
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
Elastic Detection Query
library where process.name : "lsass.exe" and
not dll.path : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") and
not dll.name : ("msv1_0.dll", "kerberos.dll", "wdigest.dll", "tspkg.dll", "schannel.dll", "pku2u.dll", "cloudAP.dll", "negoexts.dll", "msprivs.dll", "lsasrv.dll", "samsrv.dll", "ntdsai.dll")Detects non-standard DLL images loaded by lsass.exe from outside trusted Windows system directories, indicating a potential LSASS driver implant for persistence (T1547.008). Correlates with Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Load) via Elastic Endpoint integration.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate third-party security products (EDR agents, AV engines) that inject authentication provider DLLs into LSASS — verify vendor signature and known file hash
- Smart card middleware or custom SSPI/SSP providers installed by enterprise PKI solutions loaded from non-standard paths during enrollment or credential operations
- Legacy or in-house authentication modules deployed by AD team for custom Kerberos delegation or LDAP auth — validate with identity team and check digital signature
Other platforms for T1547.008
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Drop DLL Alongside LSASS Copy (Wingbird Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for both lsass.exe and sspisrv.dll in C:\Windows\Temp\. The co-location of these files in a non-standard path is the indicator.
- Test 2Enumerate LSASS Loaded Modules
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for tasklist with /m /fi flags targeting lsass.exe.
- Test 3Check LSA Protection Status
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the LSA key.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.md
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