Detect LSASS Driver in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple DLLs associated with various security functions, all running in the context of the LSASS process (lsass.exe). Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers, an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. Known examples include Wingbird (which drops sspisrv.dll alongside lsass.exe) and Pasam (which infects the SAM DLL).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.008 LSASS Driver
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=ClassifiedModuleLoad
| ImageFileName = /(?i)\\lsass\.exe$/
| ModuleFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+\\Windows\\System32\\/
| ModuleFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\/
| ModuleFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+\\Windows\\WinSxS\\/
| ModuleFileName != /(?i)\\(msv1_0\.dll|kerberos\.dll|wdigest\.dll|tspkg\.dll|schannel\.dll|pku2u\.dll|cloudAP\.dll|negoexts\.dll|msprivs\.dll|lsasrv\.dll|samsrv\.dll|ntdsai\.dll)$/
| table([_time, ComputerName, ImageFileName, ModuleFileName, SHA256HashData, ImageSubsystem])
| sort(field=_time, order=desc)Detects unauthorized DLL loads by lsass.exe from non-system device paths using CrowdStrike Falcon ClassifiedModuleLoad telemetry. Filters known legitimate LSA security package filenames and trusted Windows directory device paths to surface potential LSASS driver implants targeting the Local Security Authority for persistence.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensor itself or other registered EDR modules that instrument LSASS for credential protection and load from non-System32 Falcon install paths
- Custom LSA authentication packages or SSPI providers deployed by enterprise IT for federated identity (e.g., ADFS extenders, biometric auth providers) installed to vendor-specific program directories
- Legitimate Microsoft feature DLLs staged outside System32 during in-place upgrades or Windows Insider preview builds that have not yet been moved to canonical paths
Other platforms for T1547.008
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Drop DLL Alongside LSASS Copy (Wingbird Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for both lsass.exe and sspisrv.dll in C:\Windows\Temp\. The co-location of these files in a non-standard path is the indicator.
- Test 2Enumerate LSASS Loaded Modules
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for tasklist with /m /fi flags targeting lsass.exe.
- Test 3Check LSA Protection Status
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the LSA key.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.md
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