Detect LSASS Driver in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple DLLs associated with various security functions, all running in the context of the LSASS process (lsass.exe). Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers, an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. Known examples include Wingbird (which drops sspisrv.dll alongside lsass.exe) and Pasam (which infects the SAM DLL).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.008 LSASS Driver
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT DATEFORMAT(deviceTime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
sourceip,
"hostname",
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"filename" AS loaded_dll,
"filepath" AS dll_path,
"username"
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) ILIKE '%sysmon%'
AND QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%image load%'
AND "ParentImage" ILIKE '%\\lsass.exe'
AND "ImageLoaded" NOT ILIKE 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\%'
AND "ImageLoaded" NOT ILIKE 'C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\%'
AND "ImageLoaded" NOT ILIKE 'C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\%'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'msv1_0.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'kerberos.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'wdigest.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'tspkg.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'schannel.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'pku2u.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'cloudAP.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'negoexts.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'msprivs.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'lsasrv.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'samsrv.dll'
AND "filename" NOT ILIKE 'ntdsai.dll'
LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY deviceTime DESCDetects unauthorized DLL loads by lsass.exe from non-system directories by querying Sysmon Image Load events (Event ID 7) forwarded to QRadar. Filters out known legitimate LSA security package DLLs to surface potential LSASS driver implants used for persistence.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Third-party authentication providers or password filter DLLs registered as LSA notification packages loaded from application-specific directories rather than System32
- Enterprise SSO solutions (CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Centrify) that register credential providers or SSPI packages with custom install paths
- Security monitoring agents that instrument LSASS memory from user-land via a loaded module for credential protection or monitoring purposes
Other platforms for T1547.008
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Drop DLL Alongside LSASS Copy (Wingbird Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for both lsass.exe and sspisrv.dll in C:\Windows\Temp\. The co-location of these files in a non-standard path is the indicator.
- Test 2Enumerate LSASS Loaded Modules
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for tasklist with /m /fi flags targeting lsass.exe.
- Test 3Check LSA Protection Status
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the LSA key.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/008/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.008/T1547.008.md
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