T1219.003 Microsoft Sentinel · KQL

Detect Remote Access Hardware in Microsoft Sentinel

An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment. Remote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1219 Remote Access Tools
Sub-technique
T1219.003 Remote Access Hardware
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/

KQL Detection Query

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
kusto
let KVMDeviceNames = dynamic([
  "TinyPilot", "PiKVM", "Raritan", "Avocent", "ATEN", "iDRAC",
  "iLO", "IPMI", "Lantronix", "Opengear", "KVM", "Digi",
  "CyberPower", "ServerTech", "Supermicro IPMI"
]);
let KVMPorts = dynamic([5900, 5901, 443, 80, 8080, 623, 5000, 8443, 8888]);
let KVMUserAgents = dynamic([
  "TinyPilot", "PiKVM", "noVNC", "websockify"
]);
// Detection 1: Network connections to KVM-typical ports from new USB devices
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort in (KVMPorts)
| where LocalIP startswith "192.168." or LocalIP startswith "10." or LocalIP startswith "172."
| where RemoteUrl has_any (KVMDeviceNames) or RemoteUrl has_any ("pikvm", "tinypilot", "kvm", "ipmi", "idrac", "ilo")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, LocalIP, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl,
         InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
high severity medium confidence

Detects network connections to known KVM-over-IP device interfaces and management ports. Identifies connections to TinyPilot, PiKVM, Raritan, Avocent, ATEN, Dell iDRAC, HP iLO, and IPMI endpoints by matching remote URLs and port patterns. KVM-over-IP hardware operates at the BIOS/firmware level, bypassing OS-level security tools, making network-based detection essential. This query focuses on internal network traffic to KVM management interfaces.

Data Sources

Network Traffic: Network Connection CreationNetwork Traffic: Network Traffic FlowMicrosoft Defender for Endpoint

Required Tables

DeviceNetworkEvents

False Positives & Tuning

  • Data center administrators using iDRAC, iLO, or IPMI for legitimate out-of-band server management during maintenance windows
  • IT operations teams using rack-mounted KVM switches (Raritan, Avocent, ATEN) for routine server console access in server rooms
  • Network engineers accessing remote Opengear or Lantronix serial console servers for switch/router management
  • Security teams using KVM-over-IP for incident response when OS-level access is unavailable on compromised systems
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1219.003


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1IPMI Interface Discovery via ipmitool

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Test-NetConnection command. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 192.168.1.1:623. The connection will likely fail (no IPMI target) but the network connection event still fires showing the port 623 probe.

  2. Test 2VNC Port Scan Simulation for KVM Discovery

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempts to 192.168.1.1-5 on port 5900. Multiple connection events to different IPs on VNC port indicates scanning behavior.

  3. Test 3USB HID Device Enumeration Check

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Get-PnpDevice command line. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the WMI/PnP query content. No network events expected — this is a local enumeration test.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1219.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections