Detect Remote Access Hardware in IBM QRadar
An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment. Remote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Technique
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- Sub-technique
- T1219.003 Remote Access Hardware
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS DetectionTime,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
destinationip AS DestinationIP,
destinationport AS DestinationPort,
username AS InitiatingUser,
devicecustomstring1 AS ProcessName,
CASE
WHEN destinationport IN (5900, 5901) THEN 'VNC/KVM Protocol'
WHEN destinationport = 623 THEN 'IPMI/BMC Protocol'
WHEN destinationport IN (5000, 8443, 8888) THEN 'Web-Based KVM'
WHEN destinationport = 8080 THEN 'Alt-HTTP KVM'
ELSE 'KVM-Adjacent Port'
END AS ConnectionType,
COUNT(*) AS Connections
FROM events
WHERE starttime > NOW() - 86400000
AND destinationport IN (5900, 5901, 623, 5000, 8443, 8888, 8080)
AND (
INCIDR('192.168.0.0/16', destinationip)
OR INCIDR('10.0.0.0/8', destinationip)
OR INCIDR('172.16.0.0/12', destinationip)
)
AND LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 13)
GROUP BY
DetectionTime, LogSource, SourceIP, DestinationIP,
DestinationPort, InitiatingUser, ProcessName, ConnectionType
HAVING COUNT(*) > 1
ORDER BY Connections DESCQRadar AQL query targeting Sysmon EventID 3 (network connect) events via Windows log source types (LOGSOURCETYPEID 12 = Windows Security Event Log, 13 = XmlWinEventLog/Sysmon). Detects repeated connections to KVM hardware ports on internal RFC1918 ranges. devicecustomstring1 maps to the Sysmon Image field (initiating process path) in standard WinCollect parsing. Groups by connection type to cluster VNC, IPMI, and web-based KVM traffic.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Infrastructure teams with standing access to IPMI/iDRAC/iLO management interfaces generating repeated polling connections during maintenance windows
- Automated datacenter orchestration tools (Ansible, Puppet) connecting to BMC interfaces over port 623 for hardware inventory or configuration
- Legitimate VNC-based remote support sessions from IT service desk tooling to internally managed endpoints
Other platforms for T1219.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1IPMI Interface Discovery via ipmitool
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Test-NetConnection command. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 192.168.1.1:623. The connection will likely fail (no IPMI target) but the network connection event still fires showing the port 623 probe.
- Test 2VNC Port Scan Simulation for KVM Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempts to 192.168.1.1-5 on port 5900. Multiple connection events to different IPs on VNC port indicates scanning behavior.
- Test 3USB HID Device Enumeration Check
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Get-PnpDevice command line. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the WMI/PnP query content. No network events expected — this is a local enumeration test.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-it-workers/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mitigating-dprk-it-worker-threat/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-207a
- https://pikvm.org/
- https://tinypilotkvm.com/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table
- https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000178115/idrac-9-security-configuration-guide
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