T1219.003 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Remote Access Hardware in Elastic Security

An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment. Remote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1219 Remote Access Tools
Sub-technique
T1219.003 Remote Access Hardware
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
network where event.type == "start" and
  destination.port in (5900, 5901, 623, 5000, 8443, 8888, 8080) and
  cidr(destination.ip, "192.168.0.0/16", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12") and
  (
    destination.domain like~ "*pikvm*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*tinypilot*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*kvm*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*ipmi*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*idrac*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*ilo*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*raritan*" or
    destination.domain like~ "*avocent*" or
    destination.port == 623
  )
high severity medium confidence

Detects outbound network connections to KVM hardware device ports (VNC 5900/5901, IPMI 623, web-based KVM 5000/8443/8888) targeting internal RFC1918 addresses with KVM-indicative hostnames, using Elastic ECS network event schema. Port 623 (IPMI) is flagged unconditionally due to its exclusive use by baseboard management controllers.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityPacketbeat network captureWinlogbeat with Sysmon module

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.network-*logs-system.security-*winlogbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • IT administrators legitimately accessing iDRAC, iLO, or IPMI interfaces for server hardware maintenance and firmware updates
  • Authorized VNC remote desktop sessions established by helpdesk or endpoint management tooling (e.g., Bomgar, Dameware)
  • Automated monitoring systems (Zabbix, Nagios, PRTG) polling IPMI port 623 for hardware sensor telemetry on internal server ranges
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1219.003


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1IPMI Interface Discovery via ipmitool

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Test-NetConnection command. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 192.168.1.1:623. The connection will likely fail (no IPMI target) but the network connection event still fires showing the port 623 probe.

  2. Test 2VNC Port Scan Simulation for KVM Discovery

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempts to 192.168.1.1-5 on port 5900. Multiple connection events to different IPs on VNC port indicates scanning behavior.

  3. Test 3USB HID Device Enumeration Check

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Get-PnpDevice command line. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the WMI/PnP query content. No network events expected — this is a local enumeration test.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1219.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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