Detect Remote Access Hardware in CrowdStrike LogScale
An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment. Remote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Technique
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- Sub-technique
- T1219.003 Remote Access Hardware
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| RemotePort in (5900, 5901, 623, 5000, 8443, 8888, 8080)
| regex(field=LocalAddressIP4, regex="^(192\.168\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.)")
| ConnectionType := case {
RemotePort in (5900, 5901) => "VNC/KVM";
RemotePort = 623 => "IPMI/BMC";
RemotePort in (5000, 8443, 8888) => "Web-based KVM";
RemotePort = 8080 => "Alt-HTTP KVM";
* => "KVM-Adjacent"
}
| groupBy(
[ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, RemoteAddressIP4, ConnectionType],
function=[
count(as=Connections),
min(@timestamp, as=FirstSeen),
max(@timestamp, as=LastSeen),
collect(RemotePort, as=PortsUsed)
]
)
| Connections > 1
| sort(Connections, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (Falcon) CQL query using NetworkConnectIP4 process-level network telemetry events to detect repeated outbound connections to hardware KVM device ports. Filters to internal RFC1918 source addresses using a regex on LocalAddressIP4, classifies connection type via case expression, then aggregates by host, user, and initiating binary. Threshold of >1 connection suppresses single-shot noise while surfacing sustained KVM access patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- System administrators using Falcon-monitored endpoints to connect to legitimate server KVM interfaces (iDRAC, iLO, IPMI) in the datacenter network
- Helpdesk tooling (e.g., VNC Viewer, TigerVNC) initiating authorized remote desktop connections to internal workstations for end-user support
- Network monitoring agents running on endpoints that poll IPMI port 623 on server ranges for hardware health data collection
Other platforms for T1219.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1IPMI Interface Discovery via ipmitool
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Test-NetConnection command. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempt to 192.168.1.1:623. The connection will likely fail (no IPMI target) but the network connection event still fires showing the port 623 probe.
- Test 2VNC Port Scan Simulation for KVM Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection attempts to 192.168.1.1-5 on port 5900. Multiple connection events to different IPs on VNC port indicates scanning behavior.
- Test 3USB HID Device Enumeration Check
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with Get-PnpDevice command line. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the WMI/PnP query content. No network events expected — this is a local enumeration test.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/003/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/north-korean-it-workers/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/mitigating-dprk-it-worker-threat/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-207a
- https://pikvm.org/
- https://tinypilotkvm.com/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table
- https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000178115/idrac-9-security-configuration-guide
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