T1566.004 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Spearphishing Voice in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries use voice communications (phone calls, VoIP) to socially engineer victims into granting system access, installing remote management tools (RMM), executing malicious scripts, or approving fraudulent MFA prompts. The attacker typically impersonates IT support or a trusted authority, creating urgency to bypass the victim's critical thinking. Unlike phishing email techniques, vishing leaves no direct technical artifact from the call itself — detection must focus on the downstream behaviors: abnormal RMM tool installation, suspicious process chains spawned during or after remote sessions, and MFA anomaly patterns. Storm-1811 is a documented threat group using this technique, directing victims to open Quick Assist (a built-in Windows remote desktop tool) to hand over system control to the attacker posing as Microsoft or internal IT support.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access
Technique
T1566 Phishing
Sub-technique
T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004/

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon OR _sourceCategory=windows/security
| json auto
| where EventID in ("1","4688")
| eval ParentLower = toLower(coalesce(ParentImage, ParentProcessName, ""))
| eval ImageLower = toLower(coalesce(Image, NewProcessName, ""))
| eval rmm_tools = "(anydesk|teamviewer|screenconnect|quickassist|remotepc|logmeinrescue|atera|splashtop|supremo|ultraviewer|rustdesk|meshagent)"
| eval script_tools = "(cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta|certutil|bitsadmin|msiexec|rundll32|regsvr32)"
| eval is_rmm_from_script = if(ImageLower matches concat(".*",rmm_tools,".*") AND
    ParentLower matches concat(".*",script_tools,".*"), 1, 0)
| eval is_script_from_rmm = if(ParentLower matches concat(".*",rmm_tools,".*") AND
    ImageLower matches concat(".*",script_tools,".*"), 1, 0)
| where is_rmm_from_script == 1 OR is_script_from_rmm == 1
| eval detection_type = if(is_rmm_from_script == 1, "RMM_Launched_By_Script", "Script_Launched_By_RMM")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, detection_type
| sort by _time desc
high severity medium confidence

Detects voice phishing attacks via RMM tool abuse patterns in Sumo Logic.

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon via Sumo LogicWindows Security via Sumo Logic

Required Tables

windows/sysmonwindows/security

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate IT helpdesk sessions where support staff use Quick Assist or AnyDesk to assist users and then run PowerShell diagnostic scripts
  • Managed Service Providers (MSPs) running RMM agents (Atera, ConnectWise, Splashtop) that legitimately execute scripts for patch management or software deployment
  • Software asset management tools that deploy or update packages via RMM-like processes during business hours
  • IT onboarding workflows where AnyDesk or TeamViewer is used to configure new endpoints and install baseline tooling via scripted deployment
  • Vendor-initiated remote support sessions for enterprise software that involve running diagnostic PowerShell commands
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1566.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Silent AnyDesk Installation (Vishing Initial Access Simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): AnyDesk.exe written to %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): AnyDesk.exe spawned with --portable argument, parent process is PowerShell. Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection): Outbound connection to download.anydesk.com (185.34.32.x) on port 443 for download, and to AnyDesk relay servers on port 7070 or 443 after launch. Windows Security Event 4688 if command line auditing enabled.

  2. Test 2Quick Assist Session Initiation with Child PowerShell (Storm-1811 TTP)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): quickassist.exe started. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): powershell.exe started with parent process being the test script's shell (simulating quick assist parent). The detection query branch 'QuickAssist_Child_Execution' specifically looks for Quick Assist spawning PowerShell. Microsoft-Windows-RemoteAssistance/Operational Event ID 1 logged when Quick Assist initializes.

  3. Test 3Post-Vishing Script Delivery via RMM Session Simulation

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): powershell.exe with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, -WindowStyle Hidden, and Net.WebClient/DownloadString in CommandLine. Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection): attempt to connect to 127.0.0.1:9999 (will fail — no listener). Sysmon Event ID 11 (File Create): vishing-stage2-test.txt written to %TEMP%. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104: full deobfuscated script content captured.

  4. Test 4Callback Phishing URL Pattern Execution (Luna Moth Simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create): cmd.exe spawning msiexec.exe with HTTP URL argument. Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection): msiexec.exe attempting outbound HTTP connection to 127.0.0.1:9998 (will fail). Windows Security Event 4688: msiexec.exe process creation with URL in command line if command line auditing enabled. The msiexec with HTTP URL pattern is characteristic of vishing-directed software installation.

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Get the full detection package for T1566.004 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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