Impersonation
This detection identifies adversary impersonation activity targeting organizational users through email-based business email compromise (BEC), help desk social engineering, and lookalike sender patterns. The detection focuses on emails with authentication failures (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) combined with high-urgency subject language, display name spoofing where sender display names match internal user identities but originate from external domains, and abnormal SendAs or SendOnBehalf delegation activity. Coverage extends to AAD sign-in anomalies that may indicate successful credential theft following impersonation-based help desk attacks, as seen in LAPSUS$ and Storm-1811 campaigns.
let UrgencyKeywords = dynamic(["urgent", "wire transfer", "payment", "invoice", "account update", "verify", "immediate action", "request", "confidential", "overdue", "final notice", "password reset"]);
let InternalDomains = toscalar(
AADUsers
| extend Domain = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| summarize make_set(Domain)
);
// Branch 1: Email auth failures with urgency keywords
let AuthFailEmails = EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeliveryAction !in ("Blocked")
| where AuthenticationDetails has_any ("dmarc=fail", "spf=fail", "dkim=fail")
| where Subject has_any (UrgencyKeywords)
| extend SenderDomain = tostring(split(SenderFromAddress, "@")[1])
| where SenderDomain !in~ (InternalDomains)
| project
Timestamp,
DetectionType = "AuthFailWithUrgency",
SenderFromAddress,
SenderDisplayName,
SenderDomain,
RecipientEmailAddress,
Subject,
AuthenticationDetails,
SenderIPv4,
UrlCount,
AttachmentCount;
// Branch 2: Display name spoofing (external sender matches internal display name)
let DisplayNameSpoof = EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeliveryAction !in ("Blocked")
| extend SenderDomain = tostring(split(SenderFromAddress, "@")[1])
| where SenderDomain !in~ (InternalDomains)
| join kind=inner (
AADUsers
| project InternalDisplayName = DisplayName, InternalUPN = UserPrincipalName
) on $left.SenderDisplayName == $right.InternalDisplayName
| project
Timestamp,
DetectionType = "DisplayNameSpoof",
SenderFromAddress,
SenderDisplayName,
SenderDomain,
RecipientEmailAddress,
Subject,
AuthenticationDetails,
SenderIPv4,
UrlCount,
AttachmentCount;
// Branch 3: Suspicious SendAs / SendOnBehalf in OfficeActivity
let DelegationAbuse = OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Operation in ("SendAs", "SendOnBehalf")
| where UserId != MailboxOwnerUPN
| extend SenderDomain = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[1])
| project
Timestamp = TimeGenerated,
DetectionType = "SuspiciousDelegation",
SenderFromAddress = UserId,
SenderDisplayName = UserId,
SenderDomain,
RecipientEmailAddress = tostring(parse_json(Parameters)[0].Value),
Subject = "",
AuthenticationDetails = "",
SenderIPv4 = ClientIP,
UrlCount = 0,
AttachmentCount = 0;
union AuthFailEmails, DisplayNameSpoof, DelegationAbuse
| order by Timestamp desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate third-party email service providers (Mailchimp, Salesforce, HubSpot) frequently fail DMARC when not properly configured in the sending domain's DNS, generating high-urgency transactional emails (payment confirmations, invoice delivery)
- Executive assistants or shared mailbox operators legitimately using SendAs or SendOnBehalf delegation on behalf of their principals will trigger the delegation abuse branch — validate by checking O365 delegation configuration in Exchange
- Vendors or contractors whose display names match internal employees with the same name (common surnames) will trigger DisplayNameSpoof detection — correlate with known vendor contact lists and verify recipient context
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/business-email-compromise-bec-trends-tactics-and-techniques/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt42-charms-social-engineering
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/aa23-208a_lapsus_0.pdf
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1656 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.