Spearphishing Voice
Adversaries use voice communications (phone calls, VoIP) to socially engineer victims into granting system access, installing remote management tools (RMM), executing malicious scripts, or approving fraudulent MFA prompts. The attacker typically impersonates IT support or a trusted authority, creating urgency to bypass the victim's critical thinking. Unlike phishing email techniques, vishing leaves no direct technical artifact from the call itself — detection must focus on the downstream behaviors: abnormal RMM tool installation, suspicious process chains spawned during or after remote sessions, and MFA anomaly patterns. Storm-1811 is a documented threat group using this technique, directing victims to open Quick Assist (a built-in Windows remote desktop tool) to hand over system control to the attacker posing as Microsoft or internal IT support.
let RMMProcesses = dynamic([
"anydesk.exe", "teamviewer.exe", "teamviewer_service.exe",
"screenconnect.exe", "connectwisecontrol.exe", "quickassist.exe",
"remotepc.exe", "logmeinrescue.exe", "atera_agent.exe", "atera.exe",
"splashtop.exe", "supremo.exe", "ultraviewer.exe", "rustdesk.exe",
"ammyyadmin.exe", "getscreen.exe", "zoho_assist.exe",
"msra.exe", "fixmeit.exe", "dwagent.exe"
]);
let SuspiciousChildren = dynamic([
"powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
"mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "certutil.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe", "msiexec.exe", "curl.exe", "wget.exe"
]);
let SuspiciousCmdPatterns = dynamic([
"-EncodedCommand", "-enc ", "Invoke-WebRequest", "DownloadString",
"DownloadFile", "IEX(", "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass", "-WindowStyle Hidden",
"Start-BitsTransfer", "certutil -urlcache", "Net.WebClient"
]);
// Branch 1: RMM tool spawning suspicious interpreter or LOLBin (key vishing post-exploitation pattern)
let RMMSpawningSuspicious = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (RMMProcesses)
| where FileName has_any (SuspiciousChildren)
| extend DetectionBranch = "RMM_Spawned_Suspicious_Child"
| extend HasSuspiciousCmd = ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousCmdPatterns)
| extend RiskScore = 3 + toint(HasSuspiciousCmd);
// Branch 2: RMM tool process with a suspicious command line (direct download/execution via RMM session)
let RMMWithSuspiciousCmd = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any (RMMProcesses)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousCmdPatterns)
| extend DetectionBranch = "RMM_Process_Suspicious_Cmdline"
| extend HasSuspiciousCmd = true
| extend RiskScore = 2;
// Branch 3: Quick Assist (Storm-1811 specific) spawning any child process
let QuickAssistChildren = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "quickassist.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "msra.exe"
| where FileName has_any (SuspiciousChildren)
| extend DetectionBranch = "QuickAssist_Child_Execution"
| extend HasSuspiciousCmd = ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousCmdPatterns)
| extend RiskScore = 4 + toint(HasSuspiciousCmd);
union RMMSpawningSuspicious, RMMWithSuspiciousCmd, QuickAssistChildren
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
DetectionBranch, HasSuspiciousCmd, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore desc, Timestamp desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate IT helpdesk sessions where support staff use Quick Assist or AnyDesk to assist users and then run PowerShell diagnostic scripts
- Managed Service Providers (MSPs) running RMM agents (Atera, ConnectWise, Splashtop) that legitimately execute scripts for patch management or software deployment
- Software asset management tools that deploy or update packages via RMM-like processes during business hours
- IT onboarding workflows where AnyDesk or TeamViewer is used to configure new endpoints and install baseline tooling via scripted deployment
- Vendor-initiated remote support sessions for enterprise software that involve running diagnostic PowerShell commands
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/15/threat-actors-misusing-quick-assist-in-social-engineering-attacks-leading-to-ransomware/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/luna-moth-callback-phishing/
- https://blog.sygnia.co/luna-moth-false-subscription-scams
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa23-025a
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-reference/vishing
- https://www.redcanary.com/blog/storm-1811/
- https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/05/23/email-bombing-and-vishing-attacks-deploying-black-basta-ransomware/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/network-security/windows-firewall/quick-assist
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1566.004/T1566.004.md
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