Detect Silver Ticket in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries who have obtained the NTLM password hash of a target service account may forge Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets, known as silver tickets. Silver tickets are more limited in scope than golden tickets — they only grant access to a specific service on a specific host — but are significantly harder to detect because they bypass the Key Distribution Center (KDC) entirely, generating no KDC-side authentication logs. Service account hashes are typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (T1003) or Kerberoasting (T1558.003). Common tooling includes Mimikatz (kerberos::silver), Rubeus (silver), and Empire/Invoke-Mimikatz. AADInternals can forge tickets using the AZUREADSSOACC account hash to attack Azure AD Seamless SSO.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.002 Silver Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory="Windows/Security" OR _sourceCategory="Windows/Sysmon")
| parse "EventID=*" as event_id nodrop
| parse "EventCode=*" as event_code nodrop
| if (!isNull(event_code), event_code, event_id) as event_id
| where event_id in ("1", "4688", "4769")
| parse field=_raw "Image=*\n" as Image nodrop
| parse field=_raw "CommandLine=*\n" as CommandLine nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ParentImage=*\n" as ParentImage nodrop
| parse field=_raw "AccountName=*\n" as AccountName nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ServiceName=*\n" as ServiceName nodrop
| parse field=_raw "TicketEncryptionType=*\n" as EncryptionType nodrop
| parse field=_raw "IpAddress=*\n" as ClientAddress nodrop
| parse field=_raw "Computer=*\n" as DeviceName nodrop
| where
(
/* Method 1: Silver ticket tool execution */
event_id in ("1", "4688")
and (
matches(toLowerCase(Image), ".*mimikatz.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(Image), ".*rubeus\\.exe")
or (
matches(toLowerCase(Image), ".*(powershell|pwsh)\\.exe")
and (
matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*invoke-mimikatz.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*kerberos::silver.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*rubeus.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*new-aadintkerberosticket.*")
)
)
)
and (
matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*kerberos::silver.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*kerberos::ptt.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*\\/ptt.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*silver.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".* s4u.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*asktgs.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*sekurlsa::tickets.*")
or matches(toLowerCase(CommandLine), ".*createnetonly.*")
)
)
or
(
/* Method 2: Kerberos RC4 downgrade — Event 4769 */
event_id = "4769"
and EncryptionType in ("0x17", "0x18")
and !endsWith(ServiceName, "$")
and !(ServiceName in ("krbtgt", "UNKNOWN", "-"))
and !endsWith(AccountName, "$")
and !(AccountName in ("-", "ANONYMOUS LOGON"))
)
| if (event_id in ("1", "4688"), "Tool Execution", "Kerberos RC4 Anomaly") as DetectionMethod
| if (event_id in ("1", "4688"), "Critical", "High") as RiskLevel
| if (
event_id = "4769",
concat("enc=", EncryptionType, " spn=", ServiceName, " src=", ClientAddress),
concat("img=", Image, " cmd=", CommandLine)
) as Details
| fields _messageTime, DeviceName, AccountName, DetectionMethod, RiskLevel, Details
| sort by _messageTime descDetects Silver Ticket attacks in Sumo Logic by parsing Windows Security and Sysmon event sources for silver ticket tool execution (Events 1 and 4688) and Kerberos RC4 downgrade anomalies (Event 4769). Uses parse operators with nodrop to handle both event types in a single pipeline. Adjust _sourceCategory values to match your ingestion configuration. For Cloud SIEM Enterprise (CSE) normalized records, replace parse operators with normalized schema fields such as device_process_name and device_process_commandLine.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Windows environments with legacy Kerberos clients not migrated to AES (e.g., MIT Kerberos on Linux, Samba without AES support, embedded systems) will generate Event 4769 with 0x17 at high volume, saturating the RC4 anomaly branch
- Authorized red team activity or scheduled penetration testing engagements using Mimikatz or Rubeus during assessment windows will match all process-based signatures
- PowerShell automation scripts from IT operations that reference 'silver', 's4u', or '/ptt' in parameter names, help strings, or output-parsing variable assignments without executing malicious Kerberos operations
Other platforms for T1558.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Silver Ticket — CIFS Service Forge and Inject
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe, CommandLine containing 'kerberos::silver', '/target:', '/rc4:', '/ptt'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) with same command line. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe if ticket injection triggers LSASS interaction. No Event ID 4769 at the Domain Controller — the absence of this expected event is itself a detection signal for mature monitoring programs.
- Test 2Rubeus Silver Ticket — MSSQLSvc SPN Forge with Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two process creation events — one for Rubeus.exe createnetonly (spawning cmd.exe), one for Rubeus.exe silver with /target: /service: /rc4: arguments. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from Rubeus.exe if it contacts the DC for domain SID resolution (can be mitigated with /sid flag). Security Event ID 4648 may appear on the local host if ticket injection triggers explicit credential logon logging.
- Test 3Invoke-Mimikatz Silver Ticket via PowerShell (In-Memory)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-Mimikatz' and 'kerberos::silver'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the deobfuscated Invoke-Mimikatz call with full kerberos::silver arguments. Security Event ID 4688 with PowerShell command line if command-line auditing is enabled. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe from powershell.exe during ticket injection.
- Test 4Kerberos RC4 Encryption Request — Kerberoasting Precursor Simulation
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4769 on the Domain Controller with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4_HMAC_MD5), ServiceName=MSSQLSvc/sqlserver01.lab.local:1433, and the requesting user's account name. This event is the primary indicator captured by the Kerberos RC4 Anomaly detection method. TargetUserName will be the current user running the PowerShell command. ClientAddress will be the requesting machine's IP.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/BloodHound
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://o365blog.com/post/azureadkerberos/
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