Detect Silver Ticket in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries who have obtained the NTLM password hash of a target service account may forge Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets, known as silver tickets. Silver tickets are more limited in scope than golden tickets — they only grant access to a specific service on a specific host — but are significantly harder to detect because they bypass the Key Distribution Center (KDC) entirely, generating no KDC-side authentication logs. Service account hashes are typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (T1003) or Kerberoasting (T1558.003). Common tooling includes Mimikatz (kerberos::silver), Rubeus (silver), and Empire/Invoke-Mimikatz. AADInternals can forge tickets using the AZUREADSSOACC account hash to attack Azure AD Seamless SSO.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- Sub-technique
- T1558.002 Silver Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
LogScale Detection Query
// Silver Ticket Detection — CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale (CQL)
// Method 1: Tool Execution via ProcessRollup2
// NOTE: CrowdStrike EDR does not ingest Windows Security Event 4769.
// Silver tickets bypass the KDC entirely — no DC-side ticket issuance log is generated.
// Complement this query with Falcon Identity Protection for Kerberos anomaly coverage.
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/(?i)(mimikatz(64)?\.exe$|rubeus\.exe$)/
OR (
FileName=/(?i)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/
AND CommandLine=/(?i)(invoke-mimikatz|invoke-kerberoast|rubeus|new-aadintkerberosticket)/
AND CommandLine=/(?i)(silver|kerberos::ptt|\/ptt|\/target:|\/rc4:|azureadssoacc)/
)
| CommandLine=/(?i)(kerberos::silver|kerberos::ptt|\/ptt|silver| s4u |asktgs|sekurlsa::tickets|createnetonly)/
| ToolUsed := case {
FileName=/(?i)mimikatz/ | "Mimikatz";
FileName=/(?i)rubeus\.exe$/ | "Rubeus";
FileName=/(?i)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/ AND CommandLine=/(?i)invoke-mimikatz/ | "Invoke-Mimikatz (PowerShell)";
FileName=/(?i)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/ AND CommandLine=/(?i)new-aadintkerberosticket/ | "AADInternals";
FileName=/(?i)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/ AND CommandLine=/(?i)rubeus/ | "Rubeus (PowerShell Loader)";
* | "Unknown"
}
| AttackPhase := case {
CommandLine=/(?i)kerberos::silver/ | "Silver Ticket Forge";
CommandLine=/(?i)(kerberos::ptt|\/ptt)/ | "Pass-the-Ticket Injection";
CommandLine=/(?i)sekurlsa::tickets/ | "Ticket Enumeration";
CommandLine=/(?i)(s4u|asktgs)/ | "Service Ticket Request (S4U/TGS)";
CommandLine=/(?i)createnetonly/ | "Process Spawn for PTT";
* | "Ticket Operation"
}
| DetectionMethod := "Tool Execution"
| RiskLevel := "Critical"
| table(
[_time, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ParentCommandLine, ToolUsed, AttackPhase, DetectionMethod, RiskLevel],
sortby=_time,
order=desc
)CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale (CQL) query detecting Silver Ticket attacks via ProcessRollup2 events for Mimikatz, Rubeus, and PowerShell-based silver ticket and pass-the-ticket tooling. Covers direct binary execution and reflective/in-memory loader patterns including Invoke-Mimikatz, Rubeus PowerShell loaders, and AADInternals for Azure AD SSO silver ticket attacks. Important: CrowdStrike EDR does not forward Windows Security Event 4769 — silver tickets bypass the KDC entirely and leave no DC-side ticket issuance log. For Kerberos anomaly detection (RC4 downgrade, abnormal ticket lifetimes), enable and query Falcon Identity Protection events in LogScale.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized red team or penetration testing engagements running Mimikatz or Rubeus on Falcon-enrolled endpoints within assessment scope will match all signatures — cross-reference ComputerName and timestamp against open change management records
- Internal EDR testing pipelines or malware sandboxes connected to the production Falcon CID that execute Mimikatz-family binaries for signature validation, AV evasion testing, or detection engineering workflows
- PowerShell IT operations scripts that include the strings 's4u', '/ptt', or 'silver' in parameter names, function names, inline help, or output-parsing patterns (e.g., wrappers around klist.exe or Kerberos delegation auditing tools)
Other platforms for T1558.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz Silver Ticket — CIFS Service Forge and Inject
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe, CommandLine containing 'kerberos::silver', '/target:', '/rc4:', '/ptt'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) with same command line. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe if ticket injection triggers LSASS interaction. No Event ID 4769 at the Domain Controller — the absence of this expected event is itself a detection signal for mature monitoring programs.
- Test 2Rubeus Silver Ticket — MSSQLSvc SPN Forge with Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two process creation events — one for Rubeus.exe createnetonly (spawning cmd.exe), one for Rubeus.exe silver with /target: /service: /rc4: arguments. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from Rubeus.exe if it contacts the DC for domain SID resolution (can be mitigated with /sid flag). Security Event ID 4648 may appear on the local host if ticket injection triggers explicit credential logon logging.
- Test 3Invoke-Mimikatz Silver Ticket via PowerShell (In-Memory)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-Mimikatz' and 'kerberos::silver'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the deobfuscated Invoke-Mimikatz call with full kerberos::silver arguments. Security Event ID 4688 with PowerShell command line if command-line auditing is enabled. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe from powershell.exe during ticket injection.
- Test 4Kerberos RC4 Encryption Request — Kerberoasting Precursor Simulation
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4769 on the Domain Controller with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4_HMAC_MD5), ServiceName=MSSQLSvc/sqlserver01.lab.local:1433, and the requesting user's account name. This event is the primary indicator captured by the Kerberos RC4 Anomaly detection method. TargetUserName will be the current user running the PowerShell command. ClientAddress will be the requesting machine's IP.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2011
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/BloodHound
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://o365blog.com/post/azureadkerberos/
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