Which SIEM platforms have a T1558.002 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1558.002 (Silver Ticket) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Silver Ticket (T1558.002)?

Detecting Silver Ticket requires the following data sources: Process: Process Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Windows Security Event Log.

What severity and confidence is the T1558.002 detection?

The T1558.002 detection is rated critical severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1558.002?

Common false positives for T1558.002 include: Authorized red team, penetration testing, or purple team exercises using Mimikatz or Rubeus in controlled lab environments with explicit change ticket authorization; Legacy Windows environments or applications (Windows Server 2003/2008-era services, SAP, Oracle EBS, older IBM middleware) that do not support AES Kerberos and legitimately require RC4 encryption for service tickets; SQL Server clusters, IIS application pools, or third-party enterprise applications using service accounts configured for RC4 Kerberos due to application compatibility constraints or missing AES keytab updates.

T1558.002 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Silver Ticket in Elastic Security

Adversaries who have obtained the NTLM password hash of a target service account may forge Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets, known as silver tickets. Silver tickets are more limited in scope than golden tickets — they only grant access to a specific service on a specific host — but are significantly harder to detect because they bypass the Key Distribution Center (KDC) entirely, generating no KDC-side authentication logs. Service account hashes are typically obtained via OS Credential Dumping (T1003) or Kerberoasting (T1558.003). Common tooling includes Mimikatz (kerberos::silver), Rubeus (silver), and Empire/Invoke-Mimikatz. AADInternals can forge tickets using the AZUREADSSOACC account hash to attack Azure AD Seamless SSO.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Credential Access
Technique: T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Sub-technique: T1558.002 Silver Ticket
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/002/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)

eql

any where
  /* Method 1: Silver ticket tool execution — Mimikatz, Rubeus, PowerShell wrappers */
  (
    event.category == "process" and event.type == "start"
    and (
      (
        process.name : ("mimikatz.exe", "mimikatz64.exe")
        and process.command_line : ("*kerberos::silver*", "*kerberos::ptt*", "*sekurlsa::tickets*", "*/ptt*")
      )
      or
      (
        process.name : "rubeus.exe"
        and process.command_line : ("*silver*", "*s4u*", "*ptt*", "*/ticket:*", "*asktgs*", "*createnetonly*")
      )
      or
      (
        process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and process.command_line : ("*invoke-mimikatz*", "*invoke-kerberoast*", "*rubeus*")
        and process.command_line : ("*silver*", "*kerberos::ptt*", "*/ptt*", "*/target:*", "*/rc4:*")
      )
      or
      (
        process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
        and process.command_line : ("*new-aadintkerberosticket*", "*azureadssoacc*")
        and process.command_line : ("*aadsso*", "*seamlesssso*", "*kerberos::golden*")
      )
    )
  )
  or
  /* Method 2: Kerberos RC4 downgrade — Windows Security Event 4769 */
  (
    event.code == "4769"
    and winlog.event_data.TicketEncryptionType : ("0x17", "0x18")
    and not winlog.event_data.ServiceName : ("*$", "krbtgt", "UNKNOWN", "-")
    and not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName : ("*$", "-", "ANONYMOUS LOGON")
  )

critical severity high confidence

Detects Silver Ticket attacks (T1558.002) via two methods: (1) process execution of Mimikatz, Rubeus, and PowerShell wrappers using silver ticket or pass-the-ticket arguments including AADInternals for Azure AD SSO silver ticket attacks; (2) Kerberos TGS requests (Event 4769) using RC4 encryption types 0x17/0x18, the Mimikatz/Rubeus default and a strong downgrade signal on modern AES-capable domain controllers. Ingested via Elastic Agent with Windows integration or Winlogbeat with Sysmon.

Data Sources

Windows Endpoint via Elastic Agent (process events)Winlogbeat (Windows Security Event Log, Sysmon Operational)

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.process-*winlogbeat-*logs-system.security-*

False Positives & Tuning

Legacy enterprise applications (SAP ABAP clients, MIT Kerberos on Linux, older Java GSSAPI implementations) configured to require RC4 Kerberos will generate Event 4769 with 0x17 continuously, producing high-volume false positives on the RC4 downgrade branch
Authorized red team or penetration testing engagements executing Mimikatz or Rubeus on enrolled endpoints will match all tool execution signatures — cross-reference with change management windows
PowerShell Kerberos administration scripts containing keywords such as 'silver', 's4u', or '/ptt' in parameter names, variable assignments, or comment blocks without performing malicious ticket operations

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1558.002

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Mimikatz Silver Ticket — CIFS Service Forge and Inject
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe, CommandLine containing 'kerberos::silver', '/target:', '/rc4:', '/ptt'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) with same command line. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe if ticket injection triggers LSASS interaction. No Event ID 4769 at the Domain Controller — the absence of this expected event is itself a detection signal for mature monitoring programs.
Test 2Rubeus Silver Ticket — MSSQLSvc SPN Forge with Pass-the-Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two process creation events — one for Rubeus.exe createnetonly (spawning cmd.exe), one for Rubeus.exe silver with /target: /service: /rc4: arguments. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from Rubeus.exe if it contacts the DC for domain SID resolution (can be mitigated with /sid flag). Security Event ID 4648 may appear on the local host if ticket injection triggers explicit credential logon logging.
Test 3Invoke-Mimikatz Silver Ticket via PowerShell (In-Memory)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-Mimikatz' and 'kerberos::silver'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the deobfuscated Invoke-Mimikatz call with full kerberos::silver arguments. Security Event ID 4688 with PowerShell command line if command-line auditing is enabled. Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) targeting lsass.exe from powershell.exe during ticket injection.
Test 4Kerberos RC4 Encryption Request — Kerberoasting Precursor Simulation
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4769 on the Domain Controller with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4_HMAC_MD5), ServiceName=MSSQLSvc/sqlserver01.lab.local:1433, and the requesting user's account name. This event is the primary indicator captured by the Kerberos RC4 Anomaly detection method. TargetUserName will be the current user running the PowerShell command. ClientAddress will be the requesting machine's IP.

Last updated: 2026-04-13 Research depth: deep

References (10)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1558.002 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Detect Silver Ticket in Elastic Security

MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1558.002

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

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Parent Technique

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Same Tactic: Credential Access

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MITRE ATT&CK

Elastic Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1558.002

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Parent Technique

Related Sub-techniques

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Credential Access

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