Detect Backup Software Discovery in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations installed on a system. This discovery technique is commonly performed as pre-ransomware reconnaissance to identify backup solutions (Veeam, Acronis, Backup Exec, Commvault, Windows Server Backup) so attackers can disable, destroy, or encrypt them before deploying ransomware payloads. Methods include registry queries (reg query), process enumeration (tasklist, wmic), service enumeration (sc query, net start), directory listings, and PowerShell-based enumeration scripts such as the Get-DataInfo.ps1 script used by Wizard Spider (FIN12).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1518 Software Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=windows* OR _sourceCategory=sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=wineventlog*)
| where EventCode = "1" OR EventCode = "4688"
| eval imageFull = lower(coalesce(Image, NewProcessName, ""))
| eval commandLine = lower(coalesce(CommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, ""))
| eval parentImage = lower(coalesce(ParentImage, ParentProcessName, ""))
| eval imageName = replace(imageFull, /^.*[\\\\|\/]/, "")
| eval backupTerms = "veeam|acronis|commvault|arcserve|paragon|cobian|backupassist|carbonite|backblaze|crashplan|barracuda|datto|zerto|veritas|wbadmin|wbengine|ntbackup|backup exec|simpana"
| eval isRegQuery = if(imageName = "reg.exe" AND commandLine matches ".*query.*" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval isScQuery = if(imageName = "sc.exe" AND commandLine matches ".*query.*" AND commandLine matches ".*veeam|acronis|backup|commvault|arcserve|wbengine|sdrsvc.*", 1, 0)
| eval isNetStart = if((imageName = "net.exe" OR imageName = "net1.exe") AND commandLine matches ".*start.*" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval isWmic = if(imageName = "wmic.exe" AND commandLine matches ".*(product|process|service).*" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval isPowerShell = if((imageName = "powershell.exe" OR imageName = "pwsh.exe") AND commandLine matches ".*(get-datainfo|get-service|get-itemproperty|get-wmiobject|get-ciminstance).*" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval isTasklist = if(imageName = "tasklist.exe" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval isDir = if(imageName = "cmd.exe" AND commandLine matches ".*\\bdir\\b.*" AND commandLine matches concat(".*(", backupTerms, ").*"), 1, 0)
| eval discoveryScore = isRegQuery + isScQuery + isNetStart + isWmic + isPowerShell + isTasklist + isDir
| where discoveryScore > 0
| eval discoveryMethod = if(isRegQuery = 1, "Registry Query",
if(isScQuery = 1, "Service Control Query",
if(isNetStart = 1, "Net Service Enumeration",
if(isWmic = 1, "WMI Query",
if(isPowerShell = 1, "PowerShell Enumeration",
if(isTasklist = 1, "Process List Enumeration",
if(isDir = 1, "Directory Listing", "Other")))))))
| table _messageTime, Computer, User, imageFull, commandLine, parentImage, discoveryMethod, discoveryScore
| sort by _messageTime descDetects backup software discovery (T1518.002) in Sumo Logic by parsing Windows process creation events from Sysmon EventID 1 and Security EventID 4688. Normalizes process image names and command lines, then evaluates seven distinct discovery methods targeting backup software keywords. A composite discoveryScore field accumulates across method types — a score above 1 on the same host within a short window indicates coordinated pre-ransomware reconnaissance. Adjust _sourceCategory values to match your Sumo Logic source taxonomy.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled backup compliance reporting scripts run by backup administrators that call Get-Service or wmic service queries to generate inventory reports
- IT asset management agents (Lansweeper, Spiceworks, Ivanti) performing periodic software discovery that enumerate backup products via registry or WMI
- Backup software update or self-healing processes that query their own service state and registry configuration on startup or after system reboots
Other platforms for T1518.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Registry Query for Veeam and Acronis Backup Software
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Four Process Create events with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'query' and 'Veeam' or 'Acronis'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing is enabled) with same details. If registry Object Access auditing is enabled, Event ID 4663 fires for each registry key read attempt.
- Test 2PowerShell WMI Backup Software Enumeration via Win32_Product
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-WmiObject' and 'Win32_Product' with backup-related filter terms, and 'Get-Service' with backup terms. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content. WMI activity logged in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 3Service Control Enumeration of Backup Services
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Six Process Create events with Image=sc.exe and CommandLine containing 'query' followed by the backup service name. Security Event ID 4688 for each sc.exe execution if command line auditing is enabled. Note: service status queries do not require elevated privileges and will run as standard user.
- Test 4Tasklist and Net Start Backup Process Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create events for tasklist.exe and net.exe (or net1.exe), with findstr.exe child processes containing backup-related search terms in command line. Security Event ID 4688 for each process if command line auditing enabled.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-targeting-healthcare
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/play-ransomware-volume-shadow-copy
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1518.002/T1518.002.md
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