Detect Backup Software Discovery in Splunk
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations installed on a system. This discovery technique is commonly performed as pre-ransomware reconnaissance to identify backup solutions (Veeam, Acronis, Backup Exec, Commvault, Windows Server Backup) so attackers can disable, destroy, or encrypt them before deploying ransomware payloads. Methods include registry queries (reg query), process enumeration (tasklist, wmic), service enumeration (sc query, net start), directory listings, and PowerShell-based enumeration scripts such as the Get-DataInfo.ps1 script used by Wizard Spider (FIN12).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1518 Software Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 OR sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688)
| eval Image=lower(coalesce(Image, NewProcessName))
| eval CommandLine=lower(coalesce(CommandLine, ProcessCommandLine))
| eval ParentImage=lower(coalesce(ParentImage, ParentProcessName))
| eval BackupTerms="veeam|acronis|backup exec|commvault|arcserve|paragon|cobian|carbonite|backblaze|crashplan|barracuda|datto|zerto|veritas|wbadmin|wbengine|ntbackup|simpana"
| eval IsRegQuery=if(match(Image, "\\\\reg\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine, "query") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval IsScQuery=if(match(Image, "\\\\sc\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine, "query") AND match(CommandLine, "veeam|acronis|backup|commvault|arcserve|wbengine|sdrsvc"), 1, 0)
| eval IsNetStart=if((match(Image, "\\\\net\.exe$") OR match(Image, "\\\\net1\.exe$")) AND match(CommandLine, "start") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval IsWmic=if(match(Image, "\\\\wmic\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine, "product|process|service") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval IsPowerShell=if((match(Image, "\\\\powershell\.exe$") OR match(Image, "\\\\pwsh\.exe$")) AND match(CommandLine, "get-service|get-itemproperty|get-wmiobject|get-ciminstance|get-datainfo") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval IsTasklist=if(match(Image, "\\\\tasklist\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval IsDir=if(match(Image, "\\\\cmd\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine, "dir") AND match(CommandLine, BackupTerms), 1, 0)
| eval DiscoveryScore=IsRegQuery + IsScQuery + IsNetStart + IsWmic + IsPowerShell + IsTasklist + IsDir
| where DiscoveryScore > 0
| eval DiscoveryMethod=case(
IsRegQuery=1, "Registry Query",
IsScQuery=1, "Service Control Query",
IsNetStart=1, "Net Service Enumeration",
IsWmic=1, "WMI Query",
IsPowerShell=1, "PowerShell Enumeration",
IsTasklist=1, "Process List Enumeration",
IsDir=1, "Directory Listing",
true(), "Other"
)
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, DiscoveryMethod, DiscoveryScore
| sort - _timeDetects backup software discovery using Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) and Security Event ID 4688. Evaluates process command lines across multiple enumeration methods (registry queries, service control, WMI, PowerShell, tasklist, directory listing) for backup software names. The discovery score helps triage multiple concurrent discovery actions from the same host, which is a stronger ransomware pre-attack indicator than any single method alone.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Backup administrators running legitimate inventory or health-check scripts to verify backup agent status across endpoints
- IT asset management tools (Lansweeper, PDQ Inventory, Snipe-IT) that enumerate installed software and services during scheduled discovery scans
- Monitoring agents (Zabbix, PRTG, SolarWinds) checking backup service health and process status as part of regular infrastructure monitoring
- Backup software itself performing self-checks or compatibility validation during installation, upgrade, or scheduled maintenance windows
Other platforms for T1518.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Registry Query for Veeam and Acronis Backup Software
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Four Process Create events with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'query' and 'Veeam' or 'Acronis'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing is enabled) with same details. If registry Object Access auditing is enabled, Event ID 4663 fires for each registry key read attempt.
- Test 2PowerShell WMI Backup Software Enumeration via Win32_Product
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-WmiObject' and 'Win32_Product' with backup-related filter terms, and 'Get-Service' with backup terms. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content. WMI activity logged in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 3Service Control Enumeration of Backup Services
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Six Process Create events with Image=sc.exe and CommandLine containing 'query' followed by the backup service name. Security Event ID 4688 for each sc.exe execution if command line auditing is enabled. Note: service status queries do not require elevated privileges and will run as standard user.
- Test 4Tasklist and Net Start Backup Process Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create events for tasklist.exe and net.exe (or net1.exe), with findstr.exe child processes containing backup-related search terms in command line. Security Event ID 4688 for each process if command line auditing enabled.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-targeting-healthcare
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/play-ransomware-volume-shadow-copy
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1518.002/T1518.002.md
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1518.002 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.