Detect Backup Software Discovery in Elastic Security
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations installed on a system. This discovery technique is commonly performed as pre-ransomware reconnaissance to identify backup solutions (Veeam, Acronis, Backup Exec, Commvault, Windows Server Backup) so attackers can disable, destroy, or encrypt them before deploying ransomware payloads. Methods include registry queries (reg query), process enumeration (tasklist, wmic), service enumeration (sc query, net start), directory listings, and PowerShell-based enumeration scripts such as the Get-DataInfo.ps1 script used by Wizard Spider (FIN12).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1518 Software Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
Elastic Detection Query
process where event.type == "start" and
(
(
process.name : "reg.exe" and
process.command_line : "*query*" and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*commvault*", "*arcserve*", "*paragon*", "*cobian*", "*backupassist*", "*windowsbackup*")
) or
(
process.name : "sc.exe" and
process.command_line : "*query*" and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*arcserve*", "*wbengine*", "*sdrsvc*")
) or
(
process.name : ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
process.command_line : "*start*" and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*arcserve*", "*carbonite*", "*wbengine*")
) or
(
process.name : "wmic.exe" and
process.command_line : ("*product*", "*process*", "*service*") and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*arcserve*", "*carbonite*", "*crashplan*", "*barracuda*", "*datto*", "*zerto*", "*veritas*", "*wbadmin*", "*ntbackup*")
) or
(
process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
process.command_line : ("*get-datainfo*", "*get-service*", "*get-itemproperty*", "*get-wmiobject*", "*get-ciminstance*") and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*carbonite*", "*crashplan*", "*barracuda*", "*datto*", "*zerto*", "*veritas*", "*wbadmin*")
) or
(
process.name : "tasklist.exe" and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*carbonite*", "*crashplan*", "*barracuda*")
) or
(
process.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.command_line : "*dir*" and
process.command_line : ("*veeam*", "*acronis*", "*backup*", "*commvault*", "*arcserve*", "*carbonite*")
)
)Detects backup software discovery activity (MITRE T1518.002) via process execution patterns commonly used in pre-ransomware reconnaissance. Matches registry queries (reg.exe), service enumeration (sc.exe, net.exe), WMI queries (wmic.exe), PowerShell enumeration (Get-DataInfo, Get-Service, Get-CimInstance), process listing (tasklist.exe), and directory listings (cmd.exe dir) targeting known backup software names including Veeam, Acronis, Commvault, Arcserve, Carbonite, Barracuda, and Windows Backup utilities. Activity matching multiple enumeration methods on the same host in a short window is a high-confidence pre-ransomware indicator.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT administrators performing authorized backup software audits or CMDB inventory discovery using reg.exe, sc.exe, or wmic.exe queries against backup product registry keys
- Automated backup health-check scripts or ITSM agents (ServiceNow Discovery, Ansible, Puppet) that enumerate installed backup services on a scheduled basis
- Security vulnerability scanners such as Nessus, Qualys, or Rapid7 Nexpose performing credentialed software discovery scans that enumerate registry keys and installed services
Other platforms for T1518.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Registry Query for Veeam and Acronis Backup Software
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Four Process Create events with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'query' and 'Veeam' or 'Acronis'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing is enabled) with same details. If registry Object Access auditing is enabled, Event ID 4663 fires for each registry key read attempt.
- Test 2PowerShell WMI Backup Software Enumeration via Win32_Product
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-WmiObject' and 'Win32_Product' with backup-related filter terms, and 'Get-Service' with backup terms. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content. WMI activity logged in Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 3Service Control Enumeration of Backup Services
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Six Process Create events with Image=sc.exe and CommandLine containing 'query' followed by the backup service name. Security Event ID 4688 for each sc.exe execution if command line auditing is enabled. Note: service status queries do not require elevated privileges and will run as standard user.
- Test 4Tasklist and Net Start Backup Process Discovery
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create events for tasklist.exe and net.exe (or net1.exe), with findstr.exe child processes containing backup-related search terms in command line. Security Event ID 4688 for each process if command line auditing enabled.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/002/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-targeting-healthcare
- https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/play-ransomware-volume-shadow-copy
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1518.002/T1518.002.md
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