Detect MMC in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a signed Microsoft binary used to create, open, and save custom consoles containing administrative snap-ins. Adversaries can craft malicious .msc files that execute arbitrary commands when opened in MMC. The Medusa ransomware group has been documented using this technique. MMC snap-ins can execute commands, run scripts, and perform system administration actions, making malicious .msc files a powerful execution vehicle that bypasses application control.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.014 MMC
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security"
| json auto
| where EventID = "1" or EventCode = "1"
| where (toLower(Image) matches "*\\mmc.exe" or toLower(ParentImage) matches "*\\mmc.exe")
| eval has_msc = if(matches(CommandLine, "(?i)\.msc"), 1, 0)
| eval suspicious_path = if(matches(CommandLine, "(?i)(Temp|AppData|Downloads|Public|Desktop|ProgramData)"), 1, 0)
| eval remote_msc = if(matches(CommandLine, "(?i)(https?://|\\\\\\\\[a-zA-Z])"), 1, 0)
| eval suspicious_parent = if(matches(ParentImage, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta|winword|excel|outlook)\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval suspicious_child = if(toLower(ParentImage) matches "*\\mmc.exe" and matches(Image, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|net|netsh)\.exe"), 1, 0)
| eval risk_score = (has_msc * suspicious_path) + remote_msc + suspicious_parent + suspicious_child
| where risk_score > 0 or suspicious_child = 1
| fields _messagetime, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, has_msc, suspicious_path, remote_msc, suspicious_parent, suspicious_child, risk_score
| sort by _messagetime descSumo Logic detection for MMC.exe abuse (T1218.014). Ingests Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) to identify MMC loading .msc files from suspicious paths, remote MSC payloads via UNC/HTTP, suspicious spawning parents (Office, script interpreters), or MMC spawning dangerous child shells. Risk scoring mirrors SPL logic.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT operations scripts that call mmc.exe from PowerShell during scheduled maintenance windows to apply Group Policy or manage services
- Software packaging workflows where installers stage .msc files in TEMP or ProgramData directories and launch them via cmd.exe for configuration
- Vendor-supplied management utilities (e.g., storage or network appliance management consoles) that rely on MMC snap-ins and launch via Office macros or helper scripts
Other platforms for T1218.014
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1MMC Execution with Custom MSC File from Temp
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: .msc file written to Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: mmc.exe with Temp path in command line. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 2MMC Launched from PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe then mmc.exe with ParentImage=powershell.exe. SuspiciousParent fires. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 3MMC Child Process Spawning
Expected signal: If a real malicious snap-in were loaded, Sysmon EventCode=1 would show cmd.exe or powershell.exe with ParentImage=mmc.exe. This test generates the mmc.exe process creation event for detection validation.
References (4)
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