Detect MMC in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a signed Microsoft binary used to create, open, and save custom consoles containing administrative snap-ins. Adversaries can craft malicious .msc files that execute arbitrary commands when opened in MMC. The Medusa ransomware group has been documented using this technique. MMC snap-ins can execute commands, run scripts, and perform system administration actions, making malicious .msc files a powerful execution vehicle that bypasses application control.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.014 MMC
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/
LogScale Detection Query
// T1218.014 — MMC.exe Suspicious Execution Detection
// Part 1: MMC loading suspicious .msc files or spawned by suspicious parents
#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
| ImageFileName = /\\mmc\.exe$/i
| eval HasMSC = if(CommandLine = /\.msc/i, 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousPath = if(CommandLine = /(Temp|AppData|Downloads|Public|Desktop|ProgramData)/i, 1, 0)
| eval RemoteMSC = if(CommandLine = /(https?:\/\/|\\\\[a-zA-Z])/i, 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousParent = if(ParentImageFileName = /(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta|winword|excel|outlook)\.exe/i, 1, 0)
| eval RiskScore = (HasMSC * SuspiciousPath) + RemoteMSC + SuspiciousParent
| where RiskScore > 0
| join type=inner (
#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2"
| ParentImageFileName = /\\mmc\.exe$/i
| ImageFileName = /(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|net|netsh)\.exe$/i
| eval SuspiciousChild = 1
| table TargetProcessId, ImageFileName, CommandLine, SuspiciousChild
) where TargetProcessId = TargetProcessId
| table _time, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentImageFileName, ParentCommandLine, HasMSC, SuspiciousPath, RemoteMSC, SuspiciousParent, RiskScore
| sort _time descCrowdStrike LogScale (CQL) detection for MMC.exe abuse (T1218.014). Queries ProcessRollup2 Falcon events to identify MMC loading .msc files from high-risk directories, remote MSC payloads, suspicious parent processes including Office and script interpreters, and MMC spawning dangerous shells. Uses risk scoring consistent with the reference SPL detection.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike sensor or Falcon management components that may spawn mmc.exe for Windows Firewall or policy snap-in management as part of host remediation actions
- Scripted IT provisioning workflows that use cmd.exe or PowerShell to launch MMC with administrative .msc files stored in staging directories
- Legitimate use of Windows administrative tools by privileged users (Domain Admins) who routinely open Active Directory Users and Computers or Group Policy Management from non-standard paths
Other platforms for T1218.014
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1MMC Execution with Custom MSC File from Temp
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: .msc file written to Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: mmc.exe with Temp path in command line. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 2MMC Launched from PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe then mmc.exe with ParentImage=powershell.exe. SuspiciousParent fires. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 3MMC Child Process Spawning
Expected signal: If a real malicious snap-in were loaded, Sysmon EventCode=1 would show cmd.exe or powershell.exe with ParentImage=mmc.exe. This test generates the mmc.exe process creation event for detection validation.
References (4)
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