Detect MMC in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a signed Microsoft binary used to create, open, and save custom consoles containing administrative snap-ins. Adversaries can craft malicious .msc files that execute arbitrary commands when opened in MMC. The Medusa ransomware group has been documented using this technique. MMC snap-ins can execute commands, run scripts, and perform system administration actions, making malicious .msc files a powerful execution vehicle that bypasses application control.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1218.014 MMC
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/014/
KQL Detection Query
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "mmc.exe"
| extend HasMSC = ProcessCommandLine has ".msc"
| extend SuspiciousPath = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Temp", "AppData", "Downloads", "Public", "Desktop", "ProgramData")
| extend RemoteMSC = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http://", "https://", "\\\\")
| extend SuspiciousParent = InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe")
| where (HasMSC and SuspiciousPath) or RemoteMSC or SuspiciousParent
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, HasMSC, SuspiciousPath, RemoteMSC, SuspiciousParent
| sort by Timestamp desc
union (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "mmc.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "net.exe", "netsh.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
)Detects mmc.exe abuse by identifying .msc files loaded from user-writable paths, remote MSC loading via UNC or HTTP paths, suspicious parent processes launching MMC with custom console files, and MMC spawning shell or network child processes. Legitimate MMC usage opens built-in snap-ins from System32.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT administrators launching MMC with custom .msc console files from network shares for administrative tasks
- Software that creates custom MMC snap-ins and opens them via mmc.exe during installation or operation
- Group Policy management tools and Active Directory administration utilities that use custom .msc files
- Enterprise monitoring solutions that use MMC snap-ins for management interfaces
Other platforms for T1218.014
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1MMC Execution with Custom MSC File from Temp
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: .msc file written to Temp. Sysmon Event ID 1: mmc.exe with Temp path in command line. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 2MMC Launched from PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe then mmc.exe with ParentImage=powershell.exe. SuspiciousParent fires. Security Event ID 4688.
- Test 3MMC Child Process Spawning
Expected signal: If a real malicious snap-in were loaded, Sysmon EventCode=1 would show cmd.exe or powershell.exe with ParentImage=mmc.exe. This test generates the mmc.exe process creation event for detection validation.
References (4)
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