Detect Make and Impersonate Token in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function returns a copy of the new session's access token, which the adversary can use with SetThreadToken to assign to a thread. This is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft (T1134.001) because it creates a new user token rather than stealing or duplicating an existing one. Real-world threat actors including Cobalt Strike operators (make_token), FIN13 (Incognito V2), BlackByte, SILENTTRINITY, and the Mafalda implant use this technique to escalate privileges or move laterally using known credentials without spawning a new interactive session visible to the target user.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- Sub-technique
- T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=*Windows* OR _sourceCategory=*WinEventLog* OR _sourceCategory=*windows/security*)
| where _sourceName matches "*Security*" or _sourceName matches "*security*"
| kv regex "(?s)(\\w+)=([^\r\n]+)" as EventID, LogonType, ProcessName, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, SubjectDomainName, TargetDomainName, IpAddress nodrop
| where EventID in ("4624", "4648")
| where (EventID == "4624" and LogonType == "9") or EventID == "4648"
| where !matches(ProcessName, "*lsass.exe*")
and !matches(ProcessName, "*winlogon.exe*")
and !matches(ProcessName, "*services.exe*")
and !matches(ProcessName, "*svchost.exe*")
| where !matches(TargetUserName, "*$") and TargetUserName != "" and TargetUserName != "-"
| where !matches(SubjectUserName, "*$")
| eval detection_branch = if(EventID == "4624" and LogonType == "9",
"NewCredentials_LogonType9",
if(EventID == "4648", "ExplicitCredentials_4648", "Unknown"))
| eval is_suspicious_process = if(
matches(ProcessName, "*(cmd.exe|powershell.exe|pwsh.exe|mshta.exe|wscript.exe|cscript.exe|rundll32.exe|regsvr32.exe|msbuild.exe)*"),
"true", "false")
| table _messageTime, _sourceHost, EventID, detection_branch, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName,
TargetUserName, TargetDomainName, ProcessName, LogonType, IpAddress, is_suspicious_process
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic query for T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token that ingests Windows Security Event Logs forwarded via Installed Collector or HTTP Source. Parses key-value fields from raw event text and filters for Event 4624 with LogonType 9 (the specific logon class generated by the LogonUser() API call indicating token creation) and Event 4648 (explicit credential logon). Enriches each match with a detection_branch label and an is_suspicious_process flag. Excludes machine accounts (trailing $), empty usernames, and known-benign system processes. Adjust _sourceCategory to match your Sumo Logic source configuration.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise credential vaulting and PAM solutions (CyberArk Privileged Session Manager, BeyondTrust Password Safe) generate LogonType 9 events continuously as they validate or proxy credentials on behalf of privileged users.
- Help desk automation and ITSM integration tools that run scripts under alternate user contexts using stored credentials produce 4648 events, frequently from powershell.exe or cmd.exe invoked by the service.
- Security scanning and vulnerability assessment tools (Nessus, Rapid7 InsightVM) that perform authenticated scans using domain credentials supplied in the scan policy generate 4648 events from their scan agents on each target host.
Other platforms for T1134.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Make Token via runas /netonly (LogonType 9 Baseline Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9, NewCredentials): SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetDomainName=<domain>, ProcessName=C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe, LogonType=9. Sysmon Event 1: runas.exe process creation with CommandLine containing '/netonly'. A UAC credential dialog will appear requesting the password for dftest — enter any value; the LogonType 9 event fires regardless of password correctness because validation is deferred.
- Test 2Make Token via PowerShell P/Invoke LogonUser API Call
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9) or 4625 (failed logon): AccountName=dftest, LogonType=9, ProcessName contains powershell.exe. Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe CommandLine containing 'LogonUserW', 'advapi32', 'T1134003Test'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: full Add-Type DllImport definition captured. Even if 4625 (failure) fires instead of 4624, the LogonType=9 attribute is still present in the event.
- Test 3Invoke-TokenManipulation Enumerate Available Tokens
Expected signal: Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-TokenManipulation', 'make_token'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: captures the Invoke-Expression and function definition. No Security Event 4624/4648 fires unless -CreateProcess or -Username with credentials is used — this tests the command-line-pattern detection branch only.
- Test 4Explicit Credential Network Authentication (Event 4648 Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4648: SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetServerName=127.0.0.1, ProcessName=cmd.exe. Security Event 4625 (failed logon) with LogonType=3 if password is wrong. Sysmon Event 3: network connection from cmd.exe to 127.0.0.1:445 (SMB). This specifically exercises the Event 4648 detection branch where the calling process is an interactive shell — the highest-confidence signal for lateral movement using explicit credentials.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-setthreadtoken
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-tokens
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4624
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.003/T1134.003.md
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