Detect Make and Impersonate Token in Splunk
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function returns a copy of the new session's access token, which the adversary can use with SetThreadToken to assign to a thread. This is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft (T1134.001) because it creates a new user token rather than stealing or duplicating an existing one. Real-world threat actors including Cobalt Strike operators (make_token), FIN13 (Incognito V2), BlackByte, SILENTTRINITY, and the Mafalda implant use this technique to escalate privileges or move laterally using known credentials without spawning a new interactive session visible to the target user.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- Sub-technique
- T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security")
((EventCode=4624) OR (EventCode=4648))
| eval LogonTypeNum=tonumber(LogonType)
| where (EventCode=4624 AND LogonTypeNum=9) OR EventCode=4648
| eval DetectionBranch=case(
EventCode=4624 AND LogonTypeNum=9, "NewCredentials_LogonType9",
EventCode=4648, "ExplicitCredentials_4648",
true(), "Unknown"
)
| eval AccountName=coalesce(TargetUserName, AccountName)
| eval AccountDomain=coalesce(TargetDomainName, SubjectDomainName)
| eval CallingProcess=coalesce(ProcessName, SubjectProcessName)
| where NOT (CallingProcess="C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"
OR CallingProcess="C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe"
OR CallingProcess="C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe"
OR CallingProcess="C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe")
| where NOT match(AccountName, "\$$")
| eval IsInteractiveProcess=if(
match(lower(CallingProcess), "(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|msbuild\.exe)"),
1, 0)
| eval SubjectAccountFull=SubjectDomainName+"\\"+SubjectUserName
| eval TargetAccountFull=AccountDomain+"\\"+AccountName
| table _time, host, EventCode, DetectionBranch, SubjectAccountFull, TargetAccountFull,
CallingProcess, LogonTypeNum, IpAddress, IpPort, IsInteractiveProcess
| sort - _timeDetects Make and Impersonate Token via Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9 — NewCredentials, generated by LogonUser API with LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS) and Event 4648 (explicit credential logon). Filters out expected system processes and machine accounts. The IsInteractiveProcess field flags events where the calling process is a general-purpose shell or scripting engine, which significantly increases suspicion as legitimate applications use specific binary paths. LogonType 9 is the canonical indicator of T1134.003: it indicates credentials were provided to create a token but authentication was deferred until first network access.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- runas /netonly used by administrators for alternate-credential domain admin tasks generates LogonType 9 with CallingProcess=runas.exe
- Enterprise password managers and credential vault tools that call LogonUser for credential validation
- SCCM/ConfigMgr and software deployment platforms using service account impersonation
- Remote desktop and VDI session brokers creating logon sessions for user session routing
- Custom enterprise applications using SSPI/LogonUser for application-level AD authentication
Other platforms for T1134.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Make Token via runas /netonly (LogonType 9 Baseline Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9, NewCredentials): SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetDomainName=<domain>, ProcessName=C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe, LogonType=9. Sysmon Event 1: runas.exe process creation with CommandLine containing '/netonly'. A UAC credential dialog will appear requesting the password for dftest — enter any value; the LogonType 9 event fires regardless of password correctness because validation is deferred.
- Test 2Make Token via PowerShell P/Invoke LogonUser API Call
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9) or 4625 (failed logon): AccountName=dftest, LogonType=9, ProcessName contains powershell.exe. Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe CommandLine containing 'LogonUserW', 'advapi32', 'T1134003Test'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: full Add-Type DllImport definition captured. Even if 4625 (failure) fires instead of 4624, the LogonType=9 attribute is still present in the event.
- Test 3Invoke-TokenManipulation Enumerate Available Tokens
Expected signal: Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-TokenManipulation', 'make_token'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: captures the Invoke-Expression and function definition. No Security Event 4624/4648 fires unless -CreateProcess or -Username with credentials is used — this tests the command-line-pattern detection branch only.
- Test 4Explicit Credential Network Authentication (Event 4648 Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4648: SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetServerName=127.0.0.1, ProcessName=cmd.exe. Security Event 4625 (failed logon) with LogonType=3 if password is wrong. Sysmon Event 3: network connection from cmd.exe to 127.0.0.1:445 (SMB). This specifically exercises the Event 4648 detection branch where the calling process is an interactive shell — the highest-confidence signal for lateral movement using explicit credentials.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-setthreadtoken
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-tokens
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4624
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.003/T1134.003.md
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