Detect Make and Impersonate Token in Elastic Security
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. If an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system, the adversary can create a logon session for the user using the LogonUser function. The function returns a copy of the new session's access token, which the adversary can use with SetThreadToken to assign to a thread. This is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft (T1134.001) because it creates a new user token rather than stealing or duplicating an existing one. Real-world threat actors including Cobalt Strike operators (make_token), FIN13 (Incognito V2), BlackByte, SILENTTRINITY, and the Mafalda implant use this technique to escalate privileges or move laterally using known credentials without spawning a new interactive session visible to the target user.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- Sub-technique
- T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
Elastic Detection Query
any where (
(
event.code == "4624" and
winlog.event_data.LogonType == "9" and
not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName in ("", "-", "ANONYMOUS LOGON") and
not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like "*$" and
not winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\lsass.exe" and
not winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\winlogon.exe" and
not winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\services.exe" and
not winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\svchost.exe"
) or
(
event.code == "4648" and
not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName like "*$" and
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName != "" and
(
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\cmd.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\powershell.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\pwsh.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\mshta.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\wscript.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\cscript.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\rundll32.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\regsvr32.exe" or
winlog.event_data.ProcessName like~ "*\\msbuild.exe"
)
) or
(
event.category == "process" and
(
process.command_line like~ "*incognito*" or
process.command_line like~ "*make_token*" or
process.command_line like~ "*invoke-tokenmanipulation*" or
process.command_line like~ "*logonuserw*" or
process.command_line like~ "*logonusera*" or
process.command_line like~ "*tokenvator*" or
process.command_line like~ "*SetThreadToken*" or
process.name like~ "incognito.exe" or
process.name like~ "tokenvator.exe"
)
)
)Detects T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token across three branches: (1) Windows Security Event 4624 with LogonType 9 (NewCredentials) — the specific logon type generated by LogonUser() API calls used to create impersonation tokens without spawning an interactive session; (2) Event 4648 (explicit credential logon) invoked from known scripting interpreters and LOLBins such as cmd.exe, PowerShell, mshta, wscript, cscript, rundll32, regsvr32, and msbuild; (3) process command lines or executable names matching known token manipulation tooling including Cobalt Strike make_token, Incognito v2, Tokenvator, and direct Windows API references. Machine accounts and known-benign system processes are excluded.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Privileged Access Management (PAM) tools such as CyberArk PSM, BeyondTrust, and Delinea Secret Server call LogonUser() to verify stored credentials, generating LogonType 9 events from their service processes on a regular basis.
- Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) agents including ConnectWise Automate, Kaseya VSA, and Datto RMM authenticate to managed endpoints using explicit credentials, producing Event 4648 from their agent executable or from cmd.exe/powershell.exe wrappers they spawn.
- CI/CD pipeline agents and build automation platforms (MSBuild tasks, Azure DevOps agent, Jenkins agent) that access internal artifact repositories or signing services using stored service account credentials can generate matching 4648 events from msbuild.exe or powershell.exe.
Other platforms for T1134.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Make Token via runas /netonly (LogonType 9 Baseline Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9, NewCredentials): SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetDomainName=<domain>, ProcessName=C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe, LogonType=9. Sysmon Event 1: runas.exe process creation with CommandLine containing '/netonly'. A UAC credential dialog will appear requesting the password for dftest — enter any value; the LogonType 9 event fires regardless of password correctness because validation is deferred.
- Test 2Make Token via PowerShell P/Invoke LogonUser API Call
Expected signal: Security Event 4624 (LogonType=9) or 4625 (failed logon): AccountName=dftest, LogonType=9, ProcessName contains powershell.exe. Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe CommandLine containing 'LogonUserW', 'advapi32', 'T1134003Test'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: full Add-Type DllImport definition captured. Even if 4625 (failure) fires instead of 4624, the LogonType=9 attribute is still present in the event.
- Test 3Invoke-TokenManipulation Enumerate Available Tokens
Expected signal: Sysmon Event 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-TokenManipulation', 'make_token'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event 4104: captures the Invoke-Expression and function definition. No Security Event 4624/4648 fires unless -CreateProcess or -Username with credentials is used — this tests the command-line-pattern detection branch only.
- Test 4Explicit Credential Network Authentication (Event 4648 Test)
Expected signal: Security Event 4648: SubjectUserName=<current user>, TargetUserName=dftest, TargetServerName=127.0.0.1, ProcessName=cmd.exe. Security Event 4625 (failed logon) with LogonType=3 if password is wrong. Sysmon Event 3: network connection from cmd.exe to 127.0.0.1:445 (SMB). This specifically exercises the Event 4648 detection branch where the calling process is an interactive shell — the highest-confidence signal for lateral movement using explicit credentials.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/003/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-logonuserw
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-setthreadtoken
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/access-tokens
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4624
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-TokenManipulation.ps1
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1134.003/T1134.003.md
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1134.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.