T1102.001 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Dead Drop Resolver in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries post content (dead drop resolvers) on services like Pastebin, GitHub, Twitter, Google Docs, YouTube, or Microsoft TechNet with embedded and often obfuscated or encoded domains or IP addresses. Infected victims reach out to these resolvers to obtain real C2 server addresses, allowing attackers to change infrastructure dynamically while hiding behind trusted domains. This technique leverages the legitimacy and SSL/TLS encryption of popular web services to blend into normal network traffic and protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Command and Control
Technique
T1102 Web Service
Sub-technique
T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
  sourceip,
  destinationip,
  destinationport,
  username,
  URL,
  LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
  CATEGORYNAME(category) AS EventCategory,
  "ApplicationProtocol",
  devicehostname AS HostName,
  LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) AS SourceType,
  CASE
    WHEN URL MATCHES '(?i).*(pastebin\.com|pastebin\.pl|paste\.ee|hastebin\.com).*' THEN 1
    ELSE 0
  END AS IsPastebin,
  CASE
    WHEN URL MATCHES '(?i).*(raw\.githubusercontent\.com|gist\.github\.com).*' THEN 1
    ELSE 0
  END AS IsGitHubRaw,
  CASE
    WHEN URL MATCHES '(?i).*(api\.twitter\.com|reddit\.com|livejournal\.com).*' THEN 1
    ELSE 0
  END AS IsSocialMedia,
  CASE
    WHEN URL MATCHES '(?i).*(amazonaws\.com|docs\.google\.com|drive\.google\.com|onedrive\.live\.com|sharepoint\.com).*' THEN 1
    ELSE 0
  END AS IsCloudStorage,
  CASE
    WHEN "Process Name" MATCHES '(?i).*(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|wget\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|python\.exe|python3\.exe|java\.exe|msiexec\.exe).*' THEN 1
    ELSE 0
  END AS IsSuspiciousProcess
FROM events
WHERE
  starttime > NOW() - 1 DAYS
  AND (
    URL MATCHES '(?i).*(pastebin\.com|pastebin\.pl|paste\.ee|hastebin\.com|raw\.githubusercontent\.com|gist\.github\.com|api\.twitter\.com|t\.co|docs\.google\.com|drive\.google\.com|sites\.google\.com|youtube\.com|technet\.microsoft\.com|livejournal\.com|imgur\.com|reddit\.com|workers\.dev|amazonaws\.com|s3\.amazonaws\.com|onedrive\.live\.com|sharepoint\.com|notion\.so|trello\.com|discord\.com|discordapp\.com|telegram\.org|t\.me).*'
  )
  AND (
    "Process Name" MATCHES '(?i).*(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|wget\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|python\.exe|python3\.exe|perl\.exe|ruby\.exe|java\.exe|msiexec\.exe).*'
    OR NOT "Process Name" MATCHES '(?i).*(chrome\.exe|msedge\.exe|firefox\.exe|iexplore\.exe|opera\.exe|brave\.exe|safari\.exe|outlook\.exe|teams\.exe|slack\.exe|onedrive\.exe|dropbox\.exe|svchost\.exe).*'
  )
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500
high severity medium confidence

AQL query against QRadar flow and event data to detect dead drop resolver access patterns. Correlates HTTP/HTTPS URL field data with process name context from endpoint log sources, applying categorical scoring for paste sites, GitHub raw, social media, and cloud storage domains when accessed by suspicious or non-browser processes.

Data Sources

QRadar Network Activity (flows)Windows Security Event Log via WinCollectSysmon via WinCollectEndpoint Detection sources

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Automated patch management or configuration management tools (Ansible, Chef, Puppet) fetching playbooks or configs from GitHub or cloud storage
  • Java-based enterprise applications (JIRA, Confluence) making API calls to cloud services using java.exe as the initiating process
  • Python-based monitoring or DevOps scripts legitimately querying cloud APIs from servers
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1102.001


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1PowerShell Dead Drop Resolver — Pastebin C2 Address Retrieval

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing '-WindowStyle Hidden' and 'Net.WebClient' and 'pastebin.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from powershell.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com from the powershell.exe process. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for ddr_test_output.txt in %TEMP%.

  2. Test 2cURL Dead Drop Resolver — GitHub Raw Content Fetch

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=curl.exe, CommandLine containing 'raw.githubusercontent.com' and '-o' flag. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from curl.exe to raw.githubusercontent.com port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for raw.githubusercontent.com. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for ddr_github_test.txt in %TEMP%.

  3. Test 3WScript Dead Drop Resolver — VBScript Fetching Content from Legitimate Service

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wscript.exe, CommandLine referencing pastebin.com URL. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from wscript.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com from wscript.exe process. File creation in C:\Windows\Temp\.

  4. Test 4Certutil Dead Drop — Fetching Encoded Content from Web Service

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=certutil.exe, CommandLine containing '-urlcache' and 'pastebin.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from certutil.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of ddr_certutil_test.txt. Windows Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled).

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Get the full detection package for T1102.001 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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