Dynamic Resolution
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control (C2) infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This is achieved using malware that shares a common algorithm with the adversary's infrastructure to dynamically determine communication parameters such as domain names, IP addresses, or port numbers. Sub-techniques include Fast Flux DNS (T1568.001) — where DNS TTLs are kept extremely short and A records rotate through large pools of IPs to resist takedown; Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002) — where both adversary infrastructure and malware use the same seeded pseudorandom algorithm to produce hundreds of candidate domains, with only a few registered at any given time; and DNS Calculation (T1568.003) — where DNS responses encode the C2 address directly (e.g., RTM malware converting Bitcoin blockchain data to IP octets). Real-world actors leveraging this technique include APT29, SUNBURST (randomly-generated subdomains within avsvmcloud.com), Gamaredon Group, TA2541, Transparent Tribe, BITTER, Gelsemium, Bisonal, and AsyncRAT operators. Detection focuses on three primary signals: connections to known dynamic DNS providers from non-browser processes, high-frequency DNS resolution bursts characteristic of DGA cycling, and anomalous IP volatility for a single FQDN indicating Fast Flux infrastructure.
let KnownDDNSProviders = dynamic([
"no-ip.com", "noip.com", "dyndns.org", "dyndns.com", "duckdns.org",
"changeip.com", "afraid.org", "freedns.afraid.org", "dynv6.com",
"hopto.org", "ddns.net", "zapto.org", "sytes.net", "redirectme.net",
"myvnc.com", "servehttp.com", "serveftp.com", "bounceme.net",
"loseyourip.com", "ooguy.com", "theworkpc.com", "casacam.net",
"dnsdynamic.org", "myfreeweb.us", "dy.fi", "3utilities.com",
"blogdns.com", "myftp.org", "myftp.biz", "servegame.com",
"viewdns.net", "ddnsfree.com", "dnsalias.com", "dyn.com",
"dtdns.com", "selfip.com", "tzo.com", "dnspark.com"
]);
let BrowserProcesses = dynamic([
"chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "iexplore.exe",
"opera.exe", "brave.exe", "safari.exe", "seamonkey.exe", "waterfox.exe"
]);
let HighRiskProcesses = dynamic([
"powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
"mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "msbuild.exe", "csc.exe",
"InstallUtil.exe", "regasm.exe", "regsvcs.exe", "schtasks.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe", "certutil.exe", "wmic.exe"
]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (KnownDDNSProviders)
| where not (InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (BrowserProcesses))
| extend IsHighRiskProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (HighRiskProcesses)
| extend IsNonStandardPort = RemotePort !in (80, 443)
| extend IsHiddenProcess = (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "" or isnull(InitiatingProcessFileName))
| extend RiskScore = case(
IsHighRiskProcess and IsNonStandardPort, 4,
IsHighRiskProcess, 3,
IsNonStandardPort, 2,
IsHiddenProcess, 2,
1
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessParentCommandLine,
RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType,
IsHighRiskProcess, IsNonStandardPort, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore desc, Timestamp desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Developers or system administrators accessing personal DDNS-registered home lab or remote access infrastructure (common with No-IP or DuckDNS for self-hosted services)
- Remote access tools such as TeamViewer, AnyDesk, or VNC clients that use DDNS to locate remote endpoints when the user has configured a DDNS address for their home machine
- IoT management software, IP camera viewers, or NVR clients that connect to consumer DDNS services to locate home surveillance equipment
- Network monitoring agents or IT automation tools that use DDNS-hosted endpoints for health check callbacks or configuration retrieval
References (14)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/003/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/10/gelsemium-when-threat-actors-go-gardening/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html
- https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta2541-targeting-aviation-aerospace
- https://www.recordedfuture.com/redecho-targeting-indian-power-sector
- https://securelist.com/tomiris-called-they-want-their-turla-malware-back/104169/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-devicenetworkevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1568/T1568.md
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