Detect Dead Drop Resolver in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries post content (dead drop resolvers) on services like Pastebin, GitHub, Twitter, Google Docs, YouTube, or Microsoft TechNet with embedded and often obfuscated or encoded domains or IP addresses. Infected victims reach out to these resolvers to obtain real C2 server addresses, allowing attackers to change infrastructure dynamically while hiding behind trusted domains. This technique leverages the legitimacy and SSL/TLS encryption of popular web services to blend into normal network traffic and protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Command and Control
- Technique
- T1102 Web Service
- Sub-technique
- T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule dead_drop_resolver_t1102_001 {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver - suspicious or non-browser processes contacting known paste sites, raw GitHub, social media APIs, and cloud storage used as C2 dead drop resolvers"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1102.001"
severity = "HIGH"
confidence = "MEDIUM"
version = "1.0"
created = "2026-04-13"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION"
$e.metadata.product_event_type != "browser_navigation"
// Match dead drop resolver domains
(
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(pastebin\.com|pastebin\.pl|paste\.ee|hastebin\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(raw\.githubusercontent\.com|gist\.github\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(api\.twitter\.com|t\.co|twitter\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(docs\.google\.com|drive\.google\.com|sites\.google\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(youtube\.com|youtu\.be)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(technet\.microsoft\.com|social\.technet\.microsoft\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(livejournal\.com|imgur\.com|i\.imgur\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(reddit\.com|old\.reddit\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(workers\.dev|cloudflare\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(amazonaws\.com|s3\.amazonaws\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(onedrive\.live\.com|sharepoint\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(notion\.so|trello\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(discord\.com|discordapp\.com)/ or
$e.target.hostname = /(?i)(telegram\.org|t\.me)/
)
// Must be initiated by suspicious process OR not a known browser/trusted app
(
$e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|certutil\.exe|curl\.exe|wget\.exe|bitsadmin\.exe|python\.exe|python3\.exe|perl\.exe|ruby\.exe|java\.exe|msiexec\.exe)/ or
(
not $e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(chrome\.exe|msedge\.exe|firefox\.exe|iexplore\.exe|opera\.exe|brave\.exe|safari\.exe|outlook\.exe|teams\.exe|slack\.exe|onedrive\.exe|dropbox\.exe|svchost\.exe)/
)
)
$hostname = $e.principal.hostname
$process = $e.principal.process.file.full_path
$target = $e.target.hostname
$user = $e.principal.user.userid
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting dead drop resolver access patterns (T1102.001). Matches network connection events in the UDM where the target hostname resolves to known dead drop platforms and the initiating process is a suspicious LOLBin, scripting engine, or any non-browser/non-trusted application. Designed for Google Chronicle's enterprise telemetry pipeline.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Cloud-native application runtimes (java.exe for enterprise Java apps) legitimately reaching cloud storage endpoints for configuration or licensing
- PowerShell-based administrative automation in Azure environments interacting with SharePoint or OneDrive via Microsoft Graph
- Containerized workloads running python or curl to pull configurations from S3 buckets during legitimate infrastructure bootstrapping
Other platforms for T1102.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell Dead Drop Resolver — Pastebin C2 Address Retrieval
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing '-WindowStyle Hidden' and 'Net.WebClient' and 'pastebin.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from powershell.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com from the powershell.exe process. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for ddr_test_output.txt in %TEMP%.
- Test 2cURL Dead Drop Resolver — GitHub Raw Content Fetch
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=curl.exe, CommandLine containing 'raw.githubusercontent.com' and '-o' flag. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from curl.exe to raw.githubusercontent.com port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for raw.githubusercontent.com. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for ddr_github_test.txt in %TEMP%.
- Test 3WScript Dead Drop Resolver — VBScript Fetching Content from Legitimate Service
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=wscript.exe, CommandLine referencing pastebin.com URL. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from wscript.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com from wscript.exe process. File creation in C:\Windows\Temp\.
- Test 4Certutil Dead Drop — Fetching Encoded Content from Web Service
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=certutil.exe, CommandLine containing '-urlcache' and 'pastebin.com'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connection from certutil.exe to pastebin.com on port 443. Sysmon Event ID 22: DNS query for pastebin.com. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of ddr_certutil_test.txt. Windows Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled).
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001/
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/10/03/who-is-monsieur-fancy-bear/
- https://securelist.com/the-banking-trojans-in-brazil-july-2020/97372/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-dual-espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/09/darwin-s-favorite-apt-group-2.html
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2017/06/unit42-paranoid-plugx/
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4shell-campaign/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kimsuky-translatext-chrome-extension
- https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-network-events
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1102.001/T1102.001.md
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