Detect Domain Groups in Elastic Security
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Commands such as net group /domain, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups. Tools such as BloodHound, AdFind, and AD Explorer are also commonly used for this purpose by threat actors including OilRig, FIN7, Volt Typhoon, LAPSUS$, and ToddyCat.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
Elastic Detection Query
process where event.type == "start" and (
(
process.name in~ ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and
process.command_line like~ "* group *" and
(
process.command_line like~ "*/domain*" or
process.command_line like~ "*domain admins*" or
process.command_line like~ "*enterprise admins*" or
process.command_line like~ "*schema admins*" or
process.command_line like~ "*domain controllers*" or
process.command_line like~ "*group policy*"
)
) or
(
process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
(
process.command_line like~ "*Get-ADGroup*" or
process.command_line like~ "*Get-ADGroupMember*" or
process.command_line like~ "*Get-DomainGroup*" or
process.command_line like~ "*Get-NetGroup*" or
process.command_line like~ "*DirectorySearcher*" or
process.command_line like~ "*objectClass=group*" or
process.command_line like~ "*samAccountType*"
)
) or
process.name in~ ("adfind.exe", "sharphound.exe", "bloodhound.exe", "adexplorer.exe", "adexplorer64.exe") or
(
process.name in~ ("dsquery.exe", "dsget.exe") and
process.command_line like~ "*group*"
)
)Detects T1069.002 domain group enumeration using Elastic EQL against ECS-normalized process events. Covers net group /domain, PowerShell AD cmdlets (Get-ADGroup, Get-DomainGroup, DirectorySearcher), known AD reconnaissance tools (AdFind, SharpHound, BloodHound, ADExplorer), and dsquery/dsget group commands. Matches behavior equivalent to the KQL and SPL detections.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Active Directory administrators running Get-ADGroup or Get-ADGroupMember as part of routine account provisioning or access reviews
- IT helpdesk staff running net group /domain to verify user group membership when troubleshooting access issues
- Authorized security tools such as Tenable AD, Varonis, or CyberArk that enumerate domain groups for RBAC auditing and access certification campaigns
- Scheduled scripts or monitoring agents (e.g., SolarWinds, ManageEngine ADManager) that periodically enumerate AD groups for reporting dashboards
Other platforms for T1069.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Net Group Domain Admin Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=net.exe or net1.exe, CommandLine containing 'group' and '/domain'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing is enabled). On the domain controller, Security Event ID 4661 may appear if SACL auditing is configured on Domain Admins group object.
- Test 2PowerShell Active Directory Module Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-ADGroup' and 'Get-ADGroupMember'. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP network connections (port 389 or 3268) from powershell.exe to domain controller IP. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full command. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for groups_out.txt in %TEMP%.
- Test 3AdFind Domain Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=AdFind.exe, CommandLine containing '-f' and 'objectClass=group'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connections from AdFind.exe to domain controller on LDAP port 389 or Global Catalog port 3268. Sysmon Event ID 11: Output files created in %TEMP%. Prefetch file created at C:\Windows\Prefetch\ADFIND.EXE-*.pf.
- Test 4dsquery Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=dsquery.exe and Image=dsget.exe, CommandLine containing 'group'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP connections (port 389) from dsquery.exe to domain controller.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
- https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
- https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-silhouette-volt-typhoon
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2023_toddycat
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/reconnaissance-discovery-alerts
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