T1069

Permission Groups Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings to understand which user accounts and groups are available, group memberships, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. This information informs targeting decisions and enables privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistence planning. Common enumeration methods include native Windows commands (net group, net localgroup), PowerShell cmdlets (Get-ADGroup, Get-LocalGroup), LDAP queries, BloodHound/SharpHound collection, Linux identity commands (id, groups, getent group), and cloud-provider APIs. Threat actors including APT41, TA505, Volt Typhoon, and Scattered Spider have used these techniques in real-world intrusions.

Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

kusto

let GroupDiscoveryCommands = dynamic([
  "net group", "net localgroup", "net user /domain",
  "Get-ADGroup", "Get-ADGroupMember", "Get-LocalGroup", "Get-LocalGroupMember",
  "dsquery group", "dsget group",
  "gpresult", "whoami /groups", "whoami /all",
  "id ", "id;", "groups ", "getent group",
  "SharpHound", "BloodHound"
]);
let SuspiciousParents = dynamic([
  "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
  "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "svchost.exe"
]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (
    // net.exe based group enumeration
    (FileName =~ "net.exe" or FileName =~ "net1.exe")
    and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("group", "localgroup")
  ) or (
    // PowerShell AD/local group cmdlets
    (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" or FileName =~ "pwsh.exe")
    and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-ADGroup", "Get-ADGroupMember", "Get-LocalGroup", "Get-LocalGroupMember", "Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership")
  ) or (
    // dsquery/dsget LDAP group enumeration
    (FileName =~ "dsquery.exe" or FileName =~ "dsget.exe")
    and ProcessCommandLine has "group"
  ) or (
    // whoami with group flags — common post-exploitation recon
    FileName =~ "whoami.exe"
    and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/groups", "/all", "/priv")
  ) or (
    // gpresult — Group Policy result showing group memberships
    FileName =~ "gpresult.exe"
  ) or (
    // BloodHound / SharpHound collector binaries
    ProcessCommandLine has_any ("SharpHound", "BloodHound", "-CollectionMethod", "--CollectionMethods")
  )
| extend IsDomainGroupQuery = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/domain", "net group", "dsquery group", "Get-ADGroup")
| extend IsLocalGroupQuery = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("localgroup", "Get-LocalGroup", "whoami /groups")
| extend IsBloodHound = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("SharpHound", "BloodHound", "-CollectionMethod")
| extend SuspiciousParent = InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (SuspiciousParents)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, AccountDomain,
         FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
         InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
         IsDomainGroupQuery, IsLocalGroupQuery, IsBloodHound, SuspiciousParent
| sort by Timestamp desc

medium severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Process: Process Creation Command: Command Execution Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

IT administrators and helpdesk staff routinely running net localgroup or net group to troubleshoot access issues
Active Directory management scripts and scheduled tasks using Get-ADGroup or Get-ADGroupMember for account provisioning
Security tools and monitoring agents (e.g., CrowdStrike, Tenable) that enumerate group memberships as part of posture assessment
Software installation processes that check for membership in local Administrators or specific service groups
Legitimate BloodHound usage by authorized red team or vulnerability management teams with change management records
GPO deployment verification scripts using gpresult to confirm policy application to the correct groups

Splunk

spl

index=wineventlog (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1)
OR (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688)
| eval Image=coalesce(Image, NewProcessName)
| eval CommandLine=coalesce(CommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| eval ParentImage=coalesce(ParentImage, ParentProcessName)
| eval LowerCMD=lower(CommandLine)
| eval LowerImage=lower(Image)
| where
    (
      (match(LowerImage, "\\\\net\.exe$") OR match(LowerImage, "\\\\net1\.exe$"))
      AND (match(LowerCMD, "group") OR match(LowerCMD, "localgroup"))
    ) OR (
      (match(LowerImage, "\\\\powershell\.exe$") OR match(LowerImage, "\\\\pwsh\.exe$"))
      AND match(LowerCMD, "(get-adgroup|get-adgroupmember|get-localgroup|get-localgroupmember|get-adprincipalGroupmembership)")
    ) OR (
      (match(LowerImage, "\\\\dsquery\.exe$") OR match(LowerImage, "\\\\dsget\.exe$"))
      AND match(LowerCMD, "group")
    ) OR (
      match(LowerImage, "\\\\whoami\.exe$")
      AND match(LowerCMD, "(/groups|/all|/priv)")
    ) OR (
      match(LowerImage, "\\\\gpresult\.exe$")
    ) OR (
      match(LowerCMD, "(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod)")
    )
| eval IsDomainGroupQuery=if(match(LowerCMD, "(/domain|net group|dsquery group|get-adgroup)"), 1, 0)
| eval IsLocalGroupQuery=if(match(LowerCMD, "(localgroup|get-localgroup|whoami /groups)"), 1, 0)
| eval IsBloodHound=if(match(LowerCMD, "(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod)"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousParent=if(match(lower(ParentImage), "(wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32)"), 1, 0)
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, IsDomainGroupQuery, IsLocalGroupQuery, IsBloodHound, SuspiciousParent
| sort - _time

medium severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Process: Process Creation Command: Command Execution Sysmon Event ID 1 Windows Security Event ID 4688

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational WinEventLog:Security

False Positives

IT administrators and helpdesk staff routinely running net localgroup or net group to troubleshoot access issues
Active Directory management scripts and scheduled tasks using Get-ADGroup or Get-ADGroupMember for account provisioning
Security tools and monitoring agents enumerating group memberships as part of posture assessment
Software installation processes checking for local Administrators or specific service group membership
Authorized BloodHound usage by red team or vulnerability management teams
GPO deployment verification scripts using gpresult

IBM QRadar (AQL)

sql

SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source,
  sourceip,
  username,
  "Process Name" AS process_name,
  "Command" AS command_line,
  "Parent Process Name" AS parent_process,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(/domain|net group|dsquery group|get-adgroup).*' THEN 'true'
    ELSE 'false'
  END AS is_domain_group_query,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(localgroup|get-localgroup|whoami /groups).*' THEN 'true'
    ELSE 'false'
  END AS is_local_group_query,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod).*' THEN 'true'
    ELSE 'false'
  END AS is_bloodhound,
  CASE
    WHEN LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES '.*(wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32).*' THEN 'true'
    ELSE 'false'
  END AS suspicious_parent
FROM events
WHERE
  LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 13, 14, 15, 45)  /* Windows Security, Sysmon, Windows System */
  AND devicetime > (NOW() - 86400000)
  AND (
    (
      (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\net\.exe$' OR LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\net1\.exe$')
      AND (LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*group.*' OR LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*localgroup.*')
    ) OR (
      (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\powershell\.exe$' OR LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\pwsh\.exe$')
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(get-adgroup|get-adgroupmember|get-localgroup|get-localgroupmember|get-adprincipalgroupmembership).*'
    ) OR (
      (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\dsquery\.exe$' OR LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\dsget\.exe$')
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*group.*'
    ) OR (
      LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\whoami\.exe$'
      AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/groups|/all|/priv.*'
    ) OR (
      LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*\\\\gpresult\.exe$'
    ) OR (
      LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod|--collectionmethods).*'
    )
  )
ORDER BY devicetime DESC

medium severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Security Event Log (EventCode 4688) Sysmon via Windows Event Log QRadar Windows Log Source

Required Tables

events

False Positives

Active Directory administrators performing scheduled group membership audits or running Get-ADGroup as part of routine identity governance processes
IT support staff using whoami /groups or gpresult to diagnose policy application failures or permission issues during user escalations
Automated vulnerability scanners or EDR agents that enumerate local and domain groups as part of their asset profiling baseline
Configuration management platforms (Ansible, PowerShell DSC) that check group membership during provisioning workflows

Sumo Logic CSE

sql

_sourceCategory=*windows* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*endpoint*
| where _raw matches /(?i)(EventCode=1|EventCode=4688|event_id=1|event_id=4688)/
| parse field=_raw "Image=*" as Image nodrop
| parse field=_raw "NewProcessName=*" as NewProcessName nodrop
| parse field=_raw "CommandLine=*" as CommandLine nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ProcessCommandLine=*" as ProcessCommandLine nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ParentImage=*" as ParentImage nodrop
| parse field=_raw "ParentProcessName=*" as ParentProcessName nodrop
| parse field=_raw "User=*" as User nodrop
| parse field=_raw "Computer=*" as Computer nodrop
| eval process_image = if(!isEmpty(Image), Image, NewProcessName)
| eval cmd_line = if(!isEmpty(CommandLine), CommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| eval parent_image = if(!isEmpty(ParentImage), ParentImage, ParentProcessName)
| eval lower_image = toLowerCase(process_image)
| eval lower_cmd = toLowerCase(cmd_line)
| where (
    (matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\net\.exe$") OR matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\net1\.exe$"))
    AND (matches(lower_cmd, ".*group.*") OR matches(lower_cmd, ".*localgroup.*"))
  ) OR (
    (matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\powershell\.exe$") OR matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\pwsh\.exe$"))
    AND matches(lower_cmd, ".*(get-adgroup|get-adgroupmember|get-localgroup|get-localgroupmember|get-adprincipalgroupmembership).*")
  ) OR (
    (matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\dsquery\.exe$") OR matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\dsget\.exe$"))
    AND matches(lower_cmd, ".*group.*")
  ) OR (
    matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\whoami\.exe$")
    AND matches(lower_cmd, ".*/groups.*|.*/all.*|.*/priv.*")
  ) OR (
    matches(lower_image, ".*\\\\gpresult\.exe$")
  ) OR (
    matches(lower_cmd, ".*(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod|--collectionmethods).*")
  )
| eval IsDomainGroupQuery = if(matches(lower_cmd, ".*/domain.*|.*net group.*|.*dsquery group.*|.*get-adgroup.*"), 1, 0)
| eval IsLocalGroupQuery = if(matches(lower_cmd, ".*localgroup.*|.*get-localgroup.*|.*whoami /groups.*"), 1, 0)
| eval IsBloodHound = if(matches(lower_cmd, ".*(sharphound|bloodhound|-collectionmethod).*"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousParent = if(matches(toLowerCase(parent_image), ".*(wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32).*"), 1, 0)
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, process_image, cmd_line, parent_image, IsDomainGroupQuery, IsLocalGroupQuery, IsBloodHound, SuspiciousParent
| sort by _messageTime desc

medium severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Windows Event Log (Security 4688, Sysmon EID 1) Sumo Logic Windows Collector Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Enterprise

Required Tables

Windows event log sources via _sourceCategory

False Positives

System administrators performing routine AD group membership reviews or compliance checks using Get-ADGroup and related PowerShell cmdlets from management workstations
Help desk technicians running gpresult or whoami /all to troubleshoot GPO application or access permission issues for end users
Automated discovery agents from CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or similar PAM solutions enumerating privileged group memberships during account vaulting
Red team or penetration testing exercises using BloodHound/SharpHound with documented authorization and scope agreements

Google Chronicle / SecOps

yaral

rule mitre_t1069_permission_groups_discovery {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects MITRE ATT&CK T1069 Permission Groups Discovery via net.exe group enumeration, PowerShell AD/local group cmdlets, dsquery/dsget, whoami with group flags, gpresult, and BloodHound/SharpHound collectors"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Discovery"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1069"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/"
    severity = "MEDIUM"
    confidence = "HIGH"
    version = "1.0"
    created = "2026-04-18"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.principal.hostname = $hostname
    $e.principal.user.userid = $user
    $e.target.process.command_line = $cmdline
    $e.target.process.file.full_path = $proc_path

    (
      // net.exe / net1.exe group enumeration
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)net1?\.exe$`)
        and (
          re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`)
          or re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\blocalgroup\b`)
        )
      )
      or
      // PowerShell AD/local group cmdlets
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(Get-ADGroup|Get-ADGroupMember|Get-LocalGroup|Get-LocalGroupMember|Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership)`)
      )
      or
      // dsquery / dsget LDAP group queries
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)(dsquery|dsget)\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`)
      )
      or
      // whoami with group/privilege flags
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)whoami\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(/groups|/all|/priv)`)
      )
      or
      // gpresult — Group Policy result showing group memberships
      re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)gpresult\.exe$`)
      or
      // BloodHound / SharpHound collection
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(SharpHound|BloodHound|-CollectionMethod|--CollectionMethods)`)
    )

  condition:
    $e
}

medium severity high confidence

Data Sources

Google Chronicle SIEM Chronicle Forwarder with Sysmon/Windows Security Chronicle UDM normalized process events

Required Tables

UDM events (PROCESS_LAUNCH type)

False Positives

IT administrators using Get-ADGroup or net group commands from privileged admin workstations during routine identity lifecycle management tasks
Group Policy troubleshooting workflows where helpdesk runs gpresult /r or whoami /groups to diagnose policy application failures
Authorized red team operators or internal penetration testers running BloodHound/SharpHound under a defined rules-of-engagement scope
Configuration management and deployment automation tools querying group membership to validate role-based access control configuration

CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)

cql

#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)((net|net1|powershell|pwsh|dsquery|dsget|whoami|gpresult)\.exe)$/
| CommandLine = /(?i)(group|localgroup|Get-ADGroup|Get-ADGroupMember|Get-LocalGroup|Get-LocalGroupMember|Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership|dsquery group|dsget group|\/groups|\/all|\/priv|gpresult|SharpHound|BloodHound|-CollectionMethod|--CollectionMethods)/
| case {
    ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)net1?\.exe$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(group|localgroup)/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := if(CommandLine = /(?i)\/domain/, true, false), IsLocalGroupQuery := if(CommandLine = /(?i)localgroup/, true, false), QueryType := "net_group_enum" ;
    ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(Get-ADGroup|Get-ADGroupMember|Get-LocalGroup|Get-LocalGroupMember|Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership)/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := if(CommandLine = /(?i)Get-ADGroup/, true, false), IsLocalGroupQuery := if(CommandLine = /(?i)Get-LocalGroup/, true, false), QueryType := "powershell_group_enum" ;
    ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)(dsquery|dsget)\.exe$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)group/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := true, IsLocalGroupQuery := false, QueryType := "ldap_group_enum" ;
    ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)whoami\.exe$/ AND CommandLine = /(?i)(\/groups|\/all|\/priv)/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := false, IsLocalGroupQuery := true, QueryType := "whoami_groups" ;
    ImageFileName = /(?i)(\\|\/)gpresult\.exe$/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := false, IsLocalGroupQuery := true, QueryType := "gpresult" ;
    CommandLine = /(?i)(SharpHound|BloodHound|-CollectionMethod|--CollectionMethods)/ | IsDomainGroupQuery := true, IsLocalGroupQuery := true, QueryType := "bloodhound_collection" ;
    * | QueryType := "other"
  }
| SuspiciousParent := if(ParentBaseFileName = /(?i)(wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32)\.exe$/, true, false)
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, QueryType, IsDomainGroupQuery, IsLocalGroupQuery, SuspiciousParent])
| sort(field=@timestamp, order=desc)

medium severity high confidence

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon EDR (ProcessRollup2) CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale (Humio)

Required Tables

#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2

False Positives

Active Directory administrators running Get-ADGroup, Get-ADGroupMember, or dsquery group from domain controller admin sessions as part of access review processes
IT helpdesk staff executing whoami /groups, whoami /all, or gpresult to verify Group Policy application and troubleshoot access issues
Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions such as CyberArk or BeyondTrust periodically enumerating group memberships to build and maintain privileged access inventories
Authorized purple team exercises using BloodHound/SharpHound for AD attack path analysis within agreed engagement windows

Last updated: 2026-04-18 Research depth: deep

References (11)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

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Get the full detection package for T1069 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Permission Groups Discovery

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Sourcetypes

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

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Sub-techniques (3)

Same Tactic: Discovery

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