Detect Domain Groups in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. Commands such as net group /domain, dscacheutil -q group on macOS, and ldapsearch on Linux can list domain-level groups. Tools such as BloodHound, AdFind, and AD Explorer are also commonly used for this purpose by threat actors including OilRig, FIN7, Volt Typhoon, LAPSUS$, and ToddyCat.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1069_002_domain_group_enumeration {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects T1069.002 domain group enumeration via net group /domain, PowerShell AD cmdlets (Get-ADGroup, Get-DomainGroup, DirectorySearcher), known AD recon tools (AdFind, SharpHound, BloodHound, ADExplorer), and dsquery/dsget group commands."
mitre_attack_tactic = "Discovery"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1069.002"
mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/"
severity = "MEDIUM"
confidence = "HIGH"
version = "1.0"
created = "2026-04-17"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
(
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)[\\\\|\/](net|net1)\.exe$`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(\/domain\b|domain[\s]+admins|enterprise[\s]+admins|schema[\s]+admins|domain[\s]+controllers|group[\s]+policy)`)
) or
(
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)[\\\\|\/](powershell|pwsh)\.exe$`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(Get-ADGroup|Get-ADGroupMember|Get-DomainGroup|Get-NetGroup|DirectorySearcher|objectClass=group|samAccountType)`)
) or
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(adfind|sharphound|bloodhound|ADExplorer|adexplorer64)\.exe$`) or
(
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)[\\\\|\/](dsquery|dsget)\.exe$`) and
re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`)
)
)
condition:
$e
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting T1069.002 domain group enumeration using UDM PROCESS_LAUNCH events. Covers four distinct detection branches: (1) net.exe/net1.exe with group /domain or privileged group name targeting, (2) PowerShell with AD group enumeration cmdlets or DirectorySearcher API usage, (3) known AD recon tools by process name, (4) dsquery/dsget with group argument. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK Discovery tactic used by OilRig, FIN7, Volt Typhoon, and LAPSUS$.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Active Directory administrators running net group /domain or PowerShell AD cmdlets from privileged workstations (PAWs) during authorized access management tasks
- IT automation platforms (Ansible, Chef, Puppet, ServiceNow) using PowerShell remoting to query AD groups as part of role-based provisioning workflows
- Legitimate deployment of BloodHound or SharpHound by authorized red team or purple team operators during scheduled security assessment engagements
- Identity governance tools scanning domain groups for quarterly access certifications and toxic combination analysis
Other platforms for T1069.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Net Group Domain Admin Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=net.exe or net1.exe, CommandLine containing 'group' and '/domain'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing is enabled). On the domain controller, Security Event ID 4661 may appear if SACL auditing is configured on Domain Admins group object.
- Test 2PowerShell Active Directory Module Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-ADGroup' and 'Get-ADGroupMember'. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP network connections (port 389 or 3268) from powershell.exe to domain controller IP. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full command. Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation event for groups_out.txt in %TEMP%.
- Test 3AdFind Domain Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=AdFind.exe, CommandLine containing '-f' and 'objectClass=group'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connections from AdFind.exe to domain controller on LDAP port 389 or Global Catalog port 3268. Sysmon Event ID 11: Output files created in %TEMP%. Prefetch file created at C:\Windows\Prefetch\ADFIND.EXE-*.pf.
- Test 4dsquery Group Enumeration
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=dsquery.exe and Image=dsget.exe, CommandLine containing 'group'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP connections (port 389) from dsquery.exe to domain controller.
References (11)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer
- https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/
- https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-silhouette-volt-typhoon
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press-releases/2023_toddycat
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/reconnaissance-discovery-alerts
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