Detect Local Groups in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. Commands such as net localgroup of the Net utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1069.001 Local Groups
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
sourceip,
username,
"hostname",
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS event_category,
"Process Name" AS process_name,
"Command" AS command_line,
"Parent Process Name" AS parent_process,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*administrators.*' THEN 1
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*backup operators.*' THEN 1
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*remote desktop.*' THEN 1
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*power users.*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS is_admin_group_query,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*(net\.exe|net1\.exe)' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*localgroup.*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS is_net_localgroup,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(get-localgroup|get-localgroupmember).*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS is_ps_localgroup,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*wmic\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(group|localgroup).*' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS is_wmic_group,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Parent Process Name") MATCHES '.*(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|rundll32\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|python\.exe|bash|sh)' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS suspicious_parent
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
AND (
(LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*(net\.exe|net1\.exe)' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*localgroup.*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(get-localgroup|get-localgroupmember|localgroup).*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*wmic\.exe' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*(group|localgroup).*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*dscl' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*groups.*')
OR (LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*(\bgroups\b|\bid\b|getent)' AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*group.*')
)
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500QRadar AQL detection for local group enumeration (T1069.001). Queries Windows Security Event Log and Sysmon log sources for process execution events matching net localgroup, PowerShell LocalGroup cmdlets, WMIC group queries, and Linux/macOS enumeration tools. Computes suspicion indicators for admin group targeting and suspicious parent processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled compliance auditing scripts run by IT operations teams to enumerate local group membership for reporting
- Remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools such as ConnectWise Automate or NinjaRMM executing group queries as part of endpoint health checks
- System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) hardware/software inventory collections that enumerate local groups
- Active Directory group policy verification scripts checking local group membership to validate GPO application
Other platforms for T1069.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Enumerate Local Groups with net localgroup
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, CommandLine='net localgroup' and 'net localgroup Administrators'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) with NewProcessName=net.exe and ProcessCommandLine containing 'localgroup'. Parent process will be cmd.exe or powershell.exe depending on execution context.
- Test 2Enumerate Local Groups with PowerShell Get-LocalGroup
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLines containing 'Get-LocalGroup' and 'Get-LocalGroupMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Event ID 4104 in Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational will capture the full cmdlets. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.
- Test 3Enumerate Local Groups with WMIC
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe, CommandLines containing 'group list brief' and 'group where'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. WMI activity may also be captured in Event ID 5857-5861 from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 4Enumerate Local Groups on Linux with groups and getent
Expected signal: Auditd process creation events (if auditd is configured with -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve rules) for groups, id, getent, and cat processes. Syslog entries if process accounting is enabled. On systems with Sysmon for Linux, Event ID 1 process creation events will be generated.
- Test 5Simulate Turla-style net localgroup output redirection
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing 'net localgroup administrators' and output redirection '>>'. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child process net.exe spawned by cmd.exe with CommandLine 'net localgroup administrators'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create event for the output file in %TEMP%. Security Event ID 4688 for both cmd.exe and net.exe if process creation auditing is enabled.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/net-localgroup
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.localaccounts/get-localgroup
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/26/agentbtz-comrat-ten-years/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/admin338
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2016/04/29/digging-deep-for-platinum/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/understanding-active-directory-attack-tools/
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1069.001 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.