Detect Local Groups in Elastic Security
Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group. Commands such as net localgroup of the Net utility, dscl . -list /Groups on macOS, and groups on Linux can list local groups.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1069.001 Local Groups
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name, user.name with maxspan=30s
[process where event.type == "start" and
(
(process.name in~ ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and process.args : "localgroup") or
(process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and process.args : ("Get-LocalGroup", "Get-LocalGroupMember", "*LocalGroup*")) or
(process.name == "wmic.exe" and process.args : ("group", "localgroup")) or
(process.name == "dscl" and process.args : "Groups") or
(process.name in~ ("groups", "id", "getent") and (process.args : "group" or process.name == "groups"))
)
] by process.pid
/* Standalone alert for single-event detection */
/* Use this simpler form if sequence is not needed: */
/*
process where event.type == "start" and
(
(process.name in~ ("net.exe", "net1.exe") and process.args : "localgroup") or
(process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and process.args : ("Get-LocalGroup", "Get-LocalGroupMember")) or
(process.name == "wmic.exe" and process.args : ("group", "localgroup")) or
(process.name == "dscl" and process.args : "Groups") or
(process.name in~ ("groups", "id", "getent") and process.args : "group")
) and
(
process.args : ("administrators", "admin", "remote desktop", "backup operators", "power users") or
process.parent.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "python.exe", "python3", "bash", "sh", "zsh")
)
*/Detects local group enumeration activity consistent with MITRE ATT&CK T1069.001. Identifies execution of net.exe/net1.exe with localgroup arguments, PowerShell Get-LocalGroup/Get-LocalGroupMember cmdlets, WMIC group queries, macOS dscl group listing, and Linux groups/id/getent commands. Elevated suspicion when targeting privileged groups (Administrators, Backup Operators, Remote Desktop Users) or when spawned from script interpreters indicative of post-exploitation activity.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT administrators running inventory or compliance scripts that enumerate local group membership across endpoints
- Configuration management tools (Ansible, Chef, Puppet) that enumerate local groups to verify system state
- Security scanners (Tenable, Qualys, Rapid7) performing authenticated vulnerability assessments that check local group membership
- Helpdesk staff legitimately checking group membership when troubleshooting user permission issues via net localgroup
Other platforms for T1069.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Enumerate Local Groups with net localgroup
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, CommandLine='net localgroup' and 'net localgroup Administrators'. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) with NewProcessName=net.exe and ProcessCommandLine containing 'localgroup'. Parent process will be cmd.exe or powershell.exe depending on execution context.
- Test 2Enumerate Local Groups with PowerShell Get-LocalGroup
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLines containing 'Get-LocalGroup' and 'Get-LocalGroupMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Event ID 4104 in Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational will capture the full cmdlets. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.
- Test 3Enumerate Local Groups with WMIC
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events with Image=C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe, CommandLines containing 'group list brief' and 'group where'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. WMI activity may also be captured in Event ID 5857-5861 from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational.
- Test 4Enumerate Local Groups on Linux with groups and getent
Expected signal: Auditd process creation events (if auditd is configured with -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve rules) for groups, id, getent, and cat processes. Syslog entries if process accounting is enabled. On systems with Sysmon for Linux, Event ID 1 process creation events will be generated.
- Test 5Simulate Turla-style net localgroup output redirection
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing 'net localgroup administrators' and output redirection '>>'. Sysmon Event ID 1: Child process net.exe spawned by cmd.exe with CommandLine 'net localgroup administrators'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create event for the output file in %TEMP%. Security Event ID 4688 for both cmd.exe and net.exe if process creation auditing is enabled.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039/
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0521/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/net-localgroup
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.localaccounts/get-localgroup
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/05/26/agentbtz-comrat-ten-years/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/admin338
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2016/04/29/digging-deep-for-platinum/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/process_creation
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/understanding-active-directory-attack-tools/
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