Detect Graphical User Interface in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may use a system's graphical user interface (GUI) during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), instead of a command-line interpreter. GUI-based interaction allows adversaries to search for information, execute files via mouse double-click, use the Windows Run command, or perform other actions that may be more difficult to monitor than command-line activity. This technique has been deprecated in favor of Remote Services (T1021), but detection of suspicious interactive GUI sessions remains operationally relevant. Key indicators include remote interactive logon events (Logon Type 10), unexpected explorer.exe child processes, Run dialog command usage, and interactive sessions established outside of normal business hours or from unusual source IP addresses.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=*windows*security* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*wineventlog*)
| where (EventCode = "4624" AND LogonType = "10"
AND !(Account_Name matches "*$")
AND Source_Network_Address != "127.0.0.1"
AND Source_Network_Address != "::1"
AND Source_Network_Address != "-")
OR (EventCode = "1"
AND ParentImage matches "*\\explorer.exe"
AND (Image matches "*\\cmd.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\powershell.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\pwsh.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\mshta.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\wscript.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\cscript.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\regsvr32.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\rundll32.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\msbuild.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\certutil.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\bitsadmin.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\net.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\net1.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\whoami.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\nltest.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\wmic.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\mimikatz.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\procdump.exe"
OR Image matches "*\\psexec.exe"))
| eval event_type = if(EventCode = "4624", "rdp_logon", "gui_process_spawn")
| eval normalized_host = toLowerCase(Computer)
| timeslice 1h
| stats
countif(event_type = "rdp_logon") as rdp_logon_count,
countif(event_type = "gui_process_spawn") as process_spawn_count,
values(Source_Network_Address) as src_ips,
values(Account_Name) as logon_accounts,
values(Image) as spawned_processes,
values(CommandLine) as command_lines
by normalized_host, _timeslice
| where rdp_logon_count > 0 AND process_spawn_count > 0
| sort by _timeslice descSumo Logic query combining Windows Security and Sysmon event sources to detect remote interactive RDP logon (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) co-occurring with explorer.exe spawning a suspicious child process (Sysmon EventID 1) within the same 1-hour timeslice per host. The timeslice-based stats aggregation only surfaces hosts where both signal types appear in the same window, substantially reducing noise. Adjust the _sourceCategory values to match your collector configuration. For tighter correlation, reduce timeslice to 15m or 30m in lower-noise environments.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT admins connecting via RDP and opening PowerShell or cmd.exe from the Start menu or desktop for system administration tasks within the same hour timeslice
- VDI or Remote Desktop Services (RDS) environments where all user sessions are inherently remote interactive and users regularly launch tools from explorer.exe throughout the workday
- Automated deployment pipelines that establish remote interactive sessions and invoke build or configuration scripts as explorer.exe children during scheduled maintenance windows
Other platforms for T1061
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Remote Desktop Session with Suspicious Process Execution
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 10) on target host showing source IP 127.0.0.1 (loopback for local test). Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe and CommandLine containing whoami, ipconfig, net. Security Event ID 4634/4647 on logoff.
- Test 2Windows Run Dialog Command Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe (Run dialog parent). Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU recording the executed command. File creation of gui_test.txt in TEMP.
- Test 3RDP Session Discovery Commands via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe, followed by child processes (whoami.exe, net.exe, ipconfig.exe, systeminfo.exe, tasklist.exe, netstat.exe, nltest.exe, reg.exe). Multiple process creation events within seconds from the same parent PID.
- Test 4Explorer File Double-Click Execution via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of update_service.exe in TEMP. Sysmon Event ID 1: calc.exe (renamed update_service.exe) created with ParentImage=explorer.exe. The renamed binary parent-child relationship is a key indicator of GUI double-click execution.
- Test 5Enumerate Recent RDP Connection History
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe created with CommandLine querying Terminal Server Client registry paths. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default for the simulated connection. Provides evidence of an adversary enumerating RDP history to identify lateral movement targets.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/clients/remote-desktop-client-faq
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4624
- https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer
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