Detect Graphical User Interface in Elastic Security
Adversaries may use a system's graphical user interface (GUI) during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), instead of a command-line interpreter. GUI-based interaction allows adversaries to search for information, execute files via mouse double-click, use the Windows Run command, or perform other actions that may be more difficult to monitor than command-line activity. This technique has been deprecated in favor of Remote Services (T1021), but detection of suspicious interactive GUI sessions remains operationally relevant. Key indicators include remote interactive logon events (Logon Type 10), unexpected explorer.exe child processes, Run dialog command usage, and interactive sessions established outside of normal business hours or from unusual source IP addresses.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name with maxspan=60m
[authentication where
event.code == "4624" and
winlog.event_data.LogonType == "10" and
source.ip != null and
source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and
source.ip != "::1" and
not user.name like~ "*$"]
[process where
event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name like~ "explorer.exe" and
process.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe",
"wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe",
"msbuild.exe", "certutil.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "net.exe",
"net1.exe", "whoami.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "nltest.exe",
"mimikatz.exe", "procdump.exe", "psexec.exe", "wmic.exe")]EQL sequence detection that correlates a Windows remote interactive logon (Event ID 4624, LogonType 10) from a non-localhost source IP with a subsequent suspicious process spawned by explorer.exe on the same host within 60 minutes. Covers adversaries who establish RDP sessions and use the GUI to launch attack tooling via double-click, Run dialog, or desktop shortcuts. Requires Winlogbeat or Elastic Agent with the Windows integration deployed, collecting both Security and Sysmon operational logs.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- IT administrators who regularly RDP into servers and launch PowerShell or cmd.exe from the desktop or Start menu for legitimate maintenance tasks during business hours
- Help desk staff connecting via remote interactive sessions to user workstations and opening diagnostic tools (ipconfig, nltest) through the Windows GUI to troubleshoot connectivity issues
- Software deployment or configuration management agents (SCCM, Ansible, SaltStack) that establish remote interactive sessions and trigger installer processes as explorer.exe children during scheduled maintenance windows
Other platforms for T1061
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Remote Desktop Session with Suspicious Process Execution
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 10) on target host showing source IP 127.0.0.1 (loopback for local test). Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe and CommandLine containing whoami, ipconfig, net. Security Event ID 4634/4647 on logoff.
- Test 2Windows Run Dialog Command Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe (Run dialog parent). Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU recording the executed command. File creation of gui_test.txt in TEMP.
- Test 3RDP Session Discovery Commands via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe, followed by child processes (whoami.exe, net.exe, ipconfig.exe, systeminfo.exe, tasklist.exe, netstat.exe, nltest.exe, reg.exe). Multiple process creation events within seconds from the same parent PID.
- Test 4Explorer File Double-Click Execution via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of update_service.exe in TEMP. Sysmon Event ID 1: calc.exe (renamed update_service.exe) created with ParentImage=explorer.exe. The renamed binary parent-child relationship is a key indicator of GUI double-click execution.
- Test 5Enumerate Recent RDP Connection History
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe created with CommandLine querying Terminal Server Client registry paths. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default for the simulated connection. Provides evidence of an adversary enumerating RDP history to identify lateral movement targets.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/clients/remote-desktop-client-faq
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4624
- https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer
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