Detect Graphical User Interface in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may use a system's graphical user interface (GUI) during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), instead of a command-line interpreter. GUI-based interaction allows adversaries to search for information, execute files via mouse double-click, use the Windows Run command, or perform other actions that may be more difficult to monitor than command-line activity. This technique has been deprecated in favor of Remote Services (T1021), but detection of suspicious interactive GUI sessions remains operationally relevant. Key indicators include remote interactive logon events (Logon Type 10), unexpected explorer.exe child processes, Run dialog command usage, and interactive sessions established outside of normal business hours or from unusual source IP addresses.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Execution
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
devicehostname AS hostname,
username,
sourceip,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"EventID" AS event_id,
"LogonType" AS logon_type,
"ParentProcessName" AS parent_process,
"ProcessName" AS spawned_process,
"CommandLine" AS command_line
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (12, 13, 184)
AND (
(
"EventID" = '4624'
AND "LogonType" = '10'
AND sourceip NOT IN ('127.0.0.1', '::1', '-', '')
AND username NOT LIKE '%$'
)
OR
(
"EventID" = '1'
AND "ParentProcessName" ILIKE '%\\explorer.exe'
AND (
"ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\cmd.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\powershell.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\pwsh.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\mshta.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\wscript.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\cscript.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\regsvr32.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\rundll32.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\msbuild.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\certutil.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\bitsadmin.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\net.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\net1.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\whoami.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\nltest.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\wmic.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\mimikatz.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\procdump.exe'
OR "ProcessName" ILIKE '%\\psexec.exe'
)
)
)
ORDER BY event_time DESC
LAST 24 HOURSQRadar AQL query targeting Windows Security (LOGSOURCETYPEID 12), Windows System (13), and Sysmon (184) log sources to surface remote interactive logon events (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) from non-local IPs alongside suspicious processes spawned by explorer.exe (Sysmon EventID 1). Custom properties EventID, LogonType, ParentProcessName, ProcessName, and CommandLine must be defined in QRadar's DSM Editor or via the Universal DSM. Cross-event temporal correlation (same hostname within 60 minutes) should be implemented as a QRadar Building Block pair with a correlated Offense rule referencing both event categories.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Administrators using RDP to access workstations or servers and launching administrative tools such as PowerShell or cmd.exe from the Windows Start menu or taskbar during normal working hours
- Automated patch management or IT ops tooling (SCCM, PDQ Deploy) that connects interactively via RDP and executes scripts using explorer.exe child processes during maintenance windows
- User support sessions where technicians remote in via RDP and open diagnostic utilities (ipconfig, nltest) to troubleshoot network connectivity or domain authentication issues
Other platforms for T1061
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Remote Desktop Session with Suspicious Process Execution
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4624 (Logon Type 10) on target host showing source IP 127.0.0.1 (loopback for local test). Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe and CommandLine containing whoami, ipconfig, net. Security Event ID 4634/4647 on logoff.
- Test 2Windows Run Dialog Command Execution
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: cmd.exe created with ParentImage=explorer.exe (Run dialog parent). Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU recording the executed command. File creation of gui_test.txt in TEMP.
- Test 3RDP Session Discovery Commands via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 for cmd.exe spawned by explorer.exe, followed by child processes (whoami.exe, net.exe, ipconfig.exe, systeminfo.exe, tasklist.exe, netstat.exe, nltest.exe, reg.exe). Multiple process creation events within seconds from the same parent PID.
- Test 4Explorer File Double-Click Execution via GUI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File creation of update_service.exe in TEMP. Sysmon Event ID 1: calc.exe (renamed update_service.exe) created with ParentImage=explorer.exe. The renamed binary parent-child relationship is a key indicator of GUI double-click execution.
- Test 5Enumerate Recent RDP Connection History
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: reg.exe created with CommandLine querying Terminal Server Client registry paths. Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default for the simulated connection. Provides evidence of an adversary enumerating RDP history to identify lateral movement targets.
References (9)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1061/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_command
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/remote/remote-desktop-services/clients/remote-desktop-client-faq
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4624
- https://github.com/JPCERTCC/LogonTracer
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