T1036 Splunk · SPL

Detect Masquerading in Splunk

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1036 Masquerading
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (OriginalFileName IN ("svchost.exe", "csrss.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "smss.exe", "wininit.exe", "winlogon.exe", "explorer.exe", "spoolsv.exe", "taskhost.exe", "taskhostw.exe", "conhost.exe", "dllhost.exe", "RuntimeBroker.exe")
  OR Image IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe", "*\\lsass.exe", "*\\services.exe", "*\\smss.exe", "*\\wininit.exe", "*\\winlogon.exe", "*\\explorer.exe", "*\\spoolsv.exe", "*\\taskhost.exe", "*\\taskhostw.exe", "*\\conhost.exe", "*\\dllhost.exe", "*\\RuntimeBroker.exe"))
  NOT (Image="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe")
| eval ProcessName=mvindex(split(Image, "\\"), -1)
| table _time, host, User, Image, OriginalFileName, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, ProcessId, ParentProcessId
| sort - _time
high severity medium confidence

Detects execution of processes named after known Windows system binaries from non-standard paths using Sysmon Event ID 1. Compares Image path against expected System32/SysWOW64 locations. Uses OriginalFileName from PE metadata when available for additional context on renamed binaries.

Data Sources

Process: Process CreationProcess: Process MetadataSysmon Event ID 1

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate software installers that temporarily extract executables with system-like names to temp directories
  • Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) and virtualization software that may run processes with similar names
  • Software testing and development environments where binaries are compiled with system-like names
  • Some third-party security tools that use helper processes named after system binaries
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1036


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Masquerade as svchost.exe from Temp Directory

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=%TEMP%\svchost.exe, OriginalFileName=Cmd.Exe. Security Event ID 4688 with NewProcessName containing svchost.exe in a temp directory. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for svchost.exe in temp.

  2. Test 2Masquerade as lsass.exe from User Profile

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=%APPDATA%\lsass.exe, OriginalFileName=NOTEPAD.EXE. The OriginalFileName mismatch is a key indicator.

  3. Test 3Masquerade as explorer.exe from Downloads

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image in Downloads folder, OriginalFileName mismatch. File creation event for explorer.exe in Downloads.

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Get the full detection package for T1036 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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